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Abstract 
 
 This thesis is composed of three essays related to empirical asset pricing. In 
the first essay of the thesis, we investigate recent rational explanations of the value 
premium using a regime-switching approach. Using data from the US stock market, 
we investigate the risk of value and growth in different market states and using 
alternative risk measures such as downside beta and higher moments. Our results 
provide little or no evidence that value is riskier than growth, and that evidence is 
specific to pre-1963 period (including the Great Depression). Within the post-1963 
sample, there are periods when the value premium can be explained by the CAPM, 
whilst during other periods the premium is explained by the fact that the returns on 
value firms increase more than the returns on growth stocks in periods of strong 
market performance, whilst in downturns growth stocks suffer more than value, and 
these features are captured by different upside/downside betas or higher moments. 
These results are not consistent with a risk-based explanation of the value premium. 
 The second essay of the thesis contributes to the debate about the momentum 
premium. We investigate the robustness of the momentum premium in the US over 
the period from 1927 to 2006 using a model that allows multiple structural breaks. 
We find that the risk-adjusted momentum premium is significantly positive only 
during certain periods, notably from the 1940s to the mid-1960s and from the mid-
1970s to the late 1990s, and we find evidence that momentum has disappeared since 
the late 1990s. Our results suggest that the momentum premium has been slowly 
eroded away since the early 1990s, in a process which was delayed by the occurrence 
of the high-technology stock bubble of the 1990s. In particular, we estimate that the 
bubble accounts for at least 60% of momentum profits during the period from 1995 
to 1999.  
In the final essay of this thesis, we study the question of which asset pricing 
factors should be included in linear factor asset pricing model. We develop a simple 
multivariate extension of a Bayesian variable selection procedure from the statistics 
literature to estimate posterior probabilities of asset pricing factors using many assets 
at once. Using a dataset of thousands of individual stocks in the US market, we 
calculate posterior probabilities of 12 factors which have been suggested in the 
literature. Our results indicate strong and robust evidence that a linear factor model 
should include the excess market return, the size and the liquidity factors, and only 
weak evidence that the idiosyncratic volatility and downside risk factors matter. We 
also apply our methodology to portfolios of stocks commonly used in the literature, 
and find that the famous Fama and French (1993, 1996) HML factor has high 
posterior probability only if portfolios formed on book-to-market ratio are used.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
 
The ultimate task of asset pricing, as Cochrane (2001) puts it, is “to understand and 
measure the sources of aggregate or macroeconomic risk that drive asset prices”. 
Advances in theory over the last 50 years - as well as the ever-increasing availability 
of large amounts of data and cheap computational power - have expanded our 
understanding of how asset prices behave enormously. However, one could argue 
that this task remains unfinished. 
 The development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) provided an elegant theoretical solution to 
understand the returns on risky assets. In a Markowitz (1952) efficient market, the 
expected returns on risky assets are determined solely by their covariation with the 
market portfolio of wealth. In other words, expected returns are a linear function of 
betas. The simplicity and intuitive appeal of this model made it extremely popular 
amongst practitioners. However, subsequent empirical studies provided and continue 
to provide evidence that beta is unable to explain asset prices. The typical study of 
this kind looks for variables – most often firm characteristics - associated with a 
spread in average returns. Stocks are ranked according to their corresponding values 
of these variables and a hedge portfolio, which is long stocks in one end of the 
spectrum and short in the other, is formed. If the risk-adjusted return from this hedge 
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portfolio (i.e. the CAPM alpha) is significantly positive, the researcher concludes 
that this is evidence against the CAPM. Three cases in particular have received a vast 
amount of attention from academic works, namely the so-called size, value and 
momentum effects, which refer to the inability of the CAPM to price portfolios 
formed on market capitalisation, the ratio of book to market equity and past returns, 
respectively. 
 The presence of these empirical irregularities is interpreted in a variety of 
ways. Whilst some researchers believe that they indicate the presence of market 
inefficiencies or biased investor behaviour and perception, others believe that they 
represent additional sources of risk which are not captured by the CAPM beta. 
Another possibility is that they are the result of data-snooping, i.e. by looking at 
thousands of possible firm characteristics, researchers have found some which are 
related to average returns by sheer chance. The debate about the value premium is 
illustrative of these different views. Fama and French (1993, 1996), for instance, 
argue very strongly that the value effect is related to a financial distress risk factor, 
but other studies (e.g. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994)) argue in favour of 
the behavioural story. Fama and French further propose a three-factor model 
including the market return and two additional factors related to the size and value 
effects. The idea that multiple risk factors are important to determine asset prices is 
incorporated in the theories of the Intertemporal CAPM of Merton (1973) and the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Ross (1976). These theories, however, are silent as to 
which and how many these factors might be, and this is left as a largely empirical 
issue.  
 There are two closely related issues in empirical asset pricing. The first one 
focuses in understanding the sources of these empirical irregularities, particularly 
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whether they are related to non-diversifiable risk. The second is to identify, 
amongstst many empirical possibilities, which should be used as risk factors in asset 
pricing models. The first two essays in this thesis are related to the first issue, 
specifically to the value and momentum anomalies. The third essay is related to the 
second issue; in particular, which factors should be included in a linear factor model 
to prices stock returns.  
The first essay in this thesis, entitled Is Value Really Riskier Than Growth?, 
contributes to the debate surrounding the value premium. It is a commonly-held 
belief that growth options are riskier than assets in place, because growth options 
depend more on future and uncertain economic conditions. However, value firms 
(whose values come mostly from existing assets) earn higher average returns than 
growth firms (whose values comes mostly from growth options) but have lower betas 
in the post-1963 period. The value premium has drawn considerable attention from 
both academics and practitioners alike. Academics would like to definitively explain 
the source of the premium. If the value premium is, as Fama and French (1993) 
advocate, related to a real, aggregate, non-diversifiable source of risk, academics 
would like to understand exactly what this risk is. Practitioners, on the other hand, 
are concerned with whether, if genuine, this anomaly is going to persist in the future.  
A recent rational theory to explain the value premium, developed by Zhang 
(2005), argues that value firms are riskier than growth firms, especially in bad states 
of the economy, because of costly reversibility (it is more costly for value firms, with 
more assets in place than growth firms, to scale down production) and  
countercyclical price of risk. On the other hand, in good times or expansions, value 
firms benefit from having more assets in place, whilst growth firms need to invest in 
order to take advantage of the favourable environment. Although this theory suggests 
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a role for time-varying risk in explaining the premium, the empirical evidence in that 
respect is mixed.  
We contribute to the debate about the value premium by investigating the risk 
of value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios using a regime-switching 
approach. We do this in two different ways. First, we estimate the systematic risk of 
value and growth in different market states, inferred from a regime-switching model 
of the market return. This approach is appealing because it does not rely on 
subjective choices of conditioning variables, or a high degree of model 
parameterisation, whilst allowing us to test the implications of Zhang’s (2005) 
theory. Second, we propose a regime-switching model which allows alternative risk 
measures such as downside beta or higher moments to be used at different time 
periods. This model could be considered a generalised equilibrium model when 
investors’ risk aversion changes over time and asset returns do not follow the normal 
distribution but are governed by higher moments such as skewness and kurtosis. 
These asymmetric risk measures might be particularly relevant, considering that 
theory suggests that value and growth are expected to react differently to periods of 
good and bad economic conditions. We consider two alternatives to the CAPM: the 
Lower Partial Moment CAPM (LCAPM), originally developed by Bawa and 
Lindenberg (1977) and Harlow and Rao (1989), which is a general framework to 
consider the systematic risk of an asset when the return is below or above a certain 
threshold (from which the downside beta is derived), and the Higher Moment CAPM 
(HCAPM), introduced by Kraus and Litzenberger (1976). We use the version of the 
HCAPM in Hwang and Satchell (1999), which includes two measures of risk in 
addition to the assets’ beta: coskewness and cokurtosis.  
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We investigate a number of value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios 
from the US stock market. Our results do not support the risk-based explanation of 
the value premium. When we identify the market state through regimes extracted 
from the market return, there is little or no difference in the risk of value-minus-
growth portfolios across market states, and this difference does not explain the value 
premium. The analysis with different risk measures suggests that, in the post-1963 
period, there are periods when the value premium can be explained by the CAPM, 
and other periods when the returns on value stocks increase much more than those on 
growth stocks, which is captured by different upside/downside betas or higher 
moments. Our results also suggest that the value premium is likely to be high during 
periods of bad market performance because of the negative returns of the growth 
portfolio. 
In the second essay of this thesis, entitled Disappearance of Momentum, we 
investigate whether momentum strategies have been consistently profitable over 
time. The momentum anomaly has been a major focus of research since the 
publication of an influential paper by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who 
documented that simple strategies that buy stocks that had high returns in the 
previous 3 to 12 months and short stocks that had low returns in the same period earn 
an abnormal return of approximately 1% per month over a holding period of up to 12 
months. How and why such a profitable opportunity appeared to persist for such a 
long period of time is a perplexing question; in an efficient market, arbitrageurs are 
expected to quickly drive away these profits.  
To investigate this issue, we examine the profitability of several momentum 
strategies formed with stocks from the US market over a long period from 1927 to 
2006, using a model which allows multiple structural breaks. We find that the 
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momentum premium is significantly positive only during certain periods of time. 
Particularly, the last structural break we find occurred around the year 2000, and 
since then the momentum premium becomes insignificant. Also, although there have 
been periods of insignificant momentum premium in the past, we find that the 
momentum premium in this recent period is not probable considering the past 
distribution of momentum premia, which indicates that the anomaly might have been 
eroded away.  
We further try to answer the question of why it took so long for the 
momentum premium to disappear, once the anomaly was first reported in the early 
1990s. We seek an answer from the extraordinary boom and bust in the hi-
technology and telecommunication sectors in the late 1990s. During that period, we 
observed several years of extraordinary performance in hi-tech and telecom stocks, 
and these acted as winners in momentum strategies. In order to see this, we 
decompose momentum profits by sectors of the industry and find that, during the 
1995-1999 period, hi-tech and telecom stocks were responsible for approximately 
60% of the profits of the momentum strategy. When we remove the effect of these 
stocks, a declining pattern for the profitability of the momentum strategy emerges 
since the early 1990s. We interpret this pattern as a slow erosion of the profits of the 
momentum strategy by market participants. Consistent with this idea, during this 
period the number and size of hedge funds - arbitrageurs who can undertake long-
short trading strategies such as the momentum strategy - have increased enormously. 
During the 1990-2006 period, the number of hedge funds has increased from around 
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500 to more than 9000, and the assets under management by these funds has risen 
from 50 billion to over 1.5 trillion US dollars1.  
Finally, in the last essay in this thesis, Fishing with a Licence: an Empirical 
Search for Asset Pricing Factors, we investigate which factors should be included in 
a linear factor model to explain stock returns. We use a Bayesian approach to 
calculate posterior probabilities of possible factors. Our methodology is based on a 
Bayesian variable selection procedure from the statistics literature called Stochastic 
Search Variable Selection (SSSV), introduced by George and McCulloch (1993). We 
extend their approach to a simple multivariate case with N assets, i.e. we are 
interested in calculating the posterior probabilities of factors to explain many assets 
simultaneously. Our approach has several advantages. First, our method focuses on 
obtaining the posterior probabilities of the more promising models directly, without 
the need to estimate the posterior probabilities of all possible models, which can be 
quite an overwhelming task considering the growing number of possible factors. 
Second, it allows us to use data on thousands of individual stocks, which is important 
considering the data-snooping biases inherent when factors created by sorting on 
variables are tested on portfolios related to these variables (Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990), Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (1999) and Berk (2000)). 
We test 12 factors that have been reported in the literature. These are: the 
excess market return, size, value, momentum, asset growth, idiosyncratic volatility, 
trading volume, long-term reversal, liquidity, coskewness, cokurtosis and downside 
risk. We apply our methodology to a large number of individual stocks as well as 
portfolios of stocks from the US market. Our results suggest that a linear factor 
model for stock returns should contain the excess market return, the size factor and 
                                                 
1 HedgeFund Intelligence Press Release. 
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the liquidity factor. We find only weak evidence that the idiosyncratic volatility, the 
value/growth and the downside risk factors should be included. Also, our results with 
individual stocks and portfolios of stocks differ dramatically. The posterior 
probability of the Fama and French (1993) value/growth factor (HML) is high only 
when it is estimated with portfolios formed using the book-to-market ratio, but the 
size factors (SMB) has high posterior probability regardless of the assets used. 
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Chapter 2  
Is Value Really Riskier than Growth?  
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Many studies have tried to explain the value premium identified by Rosenberg, Reid 
and Lanstein (1985) and Fama and French (1992, 1993). To the proponents of 
conventional asset pricing theory, the value premium is a puzzle, since growth firms, 
whose values come mostly from growth options, are expected to depend more on 
future business cycles and thus be riskier than value firms, whose values are derived 
more from existing assets. Thus growth stocks are expected to have higher betas and 
higher returns than value stocks. Empirical evidence, however, does not support this 
argument; value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks but have lower betas. 
For example, the famous Fama-French’s HML (high book-to-market portfolio 
returns minus low book-to-market portfolio returns) returns 0.45% a month (standard 
error 0.13) for the period from January 1963 to December 2006. Even after 
considering the systematic risk, the estimated alpha is 0.58% which is highly 
significant. Recently Chen, Petkova and Zhang (2006) show that there is not much 
evidence that the value premium has weakened in recent times, so the anomaly 
persists. 
  
20 
 
Fama and French (1993, 1995) argue that HML is a risk factor which 
represents financial distress of weak firms with low earnings, which tend to have 
high book-to-market ratios. On the other hand, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) suggest investors’ incorrect extrapolation of the past earnings growth of firms 
as the source of the value premium. Others try to explain the premium in the 
framework of the CAPM, with mixed results. For example, Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996) and Ang and Chen (2007) propose conditional CAPM models. Lewellen and 
Nagel (2006) and Petkova and Zhang (2005) also use conditional CAPM models to 
investigate the value premium, but their results are not as strong as those of Ang and 
Chen (2007). Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), on the other hand, decompose the 
beta of a stock into the ‘good’ beta that comes from news about the discount rate and 
the ‘bad’ beta from news about the future cash flows, and show that value stocks 
have higher proportion of ‘bad’ betas. Some of these studies, however, have been 
criticised by Daniel and Titman (2005), who show that their favourable results could 
be due to the low power of the tests used.  
Recently, risk-based explanations for the value premium have been proposed 
which seek answers from the investment inflexibility of value firms upon economic 
conditions in the framework of real options models. Zhang (2005), for example, 
provides an explanation in the neoclassical framework with rational expectations and 
competitive equilibrium; value firms are less flexible and thus riskier than growth 
firms, especially in bad times, since value firms have more assets in place and thus it 
is more costly for these firms to scale down production than for growth firms which 
have fewer assets in place. On the other hand, in expansions value firms are favoured 
in detriment of growth firms, which need to invest to take advantage of the optimistic 
economic environment. Most of the empirical evidence supporting this argument is 
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provided in the firm or industry level using firm characteristics. Xing and Zhang 
(2005) show that value firms in the manufacturing sector perform worse than growth 
firms in the negative business cycle and vice versa, using variables such as earnings 
growth, sales growth, investment growth, and investment rate, whilst Cooper, Gerard 
and Wu (2005) investigate the link between the rate of capacity and the degree of 
investment irreversibility and the book-to-market ratio.  
One caveat with the empirical studies above is that they use subsets of stocks, 
whilst the value premium is calculated using a much larger number of stocks from 
the whole market. For example, the number of manufacturing firms Xing and Zhang 
(2005) use in their study is only 21% (37% in market capitalisation) of the firms 
publicly traded in the market. In addition, the firm characteristics used by these 
studies may reflect business cycles, but are not necessarily concurrent with the 
movements in financial markets because the lead and lag relationship between the 
firm characteristics and the dynamics in the stock market is not likely to be constant.  
 Some of the studies mentioned above attempt to model time-varying risk and 
the expected market risk premium directly. We do not follow this path for two 
reasons. First, as mentioned before, studies based on this approach fail to show 
conclusive evidence that time-varying risk explains the value premium. Second, the 
choice to use a conditional model and to estimate the expected market risk premium 
involves either a subjective decision about which conditioning variables to use, or a 
high degree of model parameterisation (as in Ang and Chen (2007)).  
Instead, motivated by the literature on regime-switching models and business 
cycles, particularly the work of Hamilton and Lin (1996), we model market returns 
with a regime-switching process to identify different market states as regimes with 
  
22 
 
different mean market returns and volatilities. This approach allows us to study the 
risk of the value-minus-growth strategy in different market conditions, whilst 
avoiding a high degree of parameterisation and subjective choices of conditioning 
variables. Specifically, we investigate the risk of value and growth by estimating the 
CAPM conditioned on the state of the market as inferred from the regime-switching 
model of the market return. If value is riskier than growth during bad states when the 
market is doing poorly, there should be an increase in the beta of HML in the 
corresponding market regime2.  
The approach above, however, may be criticised in two points. First, this 
analysis assumes that the risk of HML is related to the state of the economy as 
measured by the market regimes. Even if the risk of HML is not related to the 
different market regimes, there could still be increases (decreases) in this risk over 
different periods. Second, using beta as the measure of risk might not be adequate, 
since investors are not likely to have quadratic utility and asset returns do not follow 
the normal distribution. If the investors’ utility function is better specified by power 
utility and higher moments such as skewness and kurtosis matter in asset return 
distribution, asymmetry or fat tails should be priced. These asymmetric risk measures 
might be particularly relevant, considering that value and growth are expected to 
react differently to periods of good and bad economic conditions. Therefore we 
consider the possibility that different risk measures other than the CAPM beta, such 
as the downside beta and higher moments, matter to explain portfolios’ returns over 
time, without the explicit assumption that they must be related to the state of the 
market or economy.  
                                                 
2 This approach is related to the one followed by Petkova and Zhang (2005, section 4), except that they regress HML returns on 
a dummy variable indicating whether the estimated expected market risk premium is lower than its sample average (good 
times) or higher (bad times). 
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Several asset pricing models have been proposed to explain asymmetry and 
fat tails. Amongst these, we choose two widely known equilibrium asset pricing 
models in addition to the CAPM: the lower partial moment CAPM (henceforth 
LCAPM) and the higher moment CAPM (henceforth HCAPM). The LCAPM, which 
was developed by Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) and Harlow and Rao (1989), 
includes asymmetric reactions to downside and upside markets separately. Chan 
(1988), De Bondt and Thaler (1987), and Petkova and Zhang (2005) use it to 
investigate the value premium but give us mixed results. The HCAPM introduced by 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) prices higher moments. A closely related study is 
Harvey and Siddique (2000) who model conditional skewness. Higher moments 
explain asset returns with asymmetry or fat tails, but are not necessarily the same as 
the upside and downside betas. 
  One major difference of the approach above from those of previous studies is 
that any of the three models − CAPM, LCAPM, and HCAPM − can explain asset 
returns in the regime switching framework we employ. Since these are based on 
equilibrium models, our approach is still within the rationality framework. Thus we 
seek explanations on the value premium in the conventional risk-return framework 
by concentrating on the empirical possibility of changing risk measures and its 
impact on asset pricing. When there are no differences in upside and downside betas 
or when higher moments are not priced, the model is equivalent to the conventional 
CAPM. Therefore the LCAPM or HCAPM are selected only when asymmetries or 
fat tails matter in asset pricing.  
 With appropriate risk measures chosen for different time periods, we 
investigate whether or not value firms are riskier than growth firms. As argued by 
Zhang (2005), if value firms are riskier than growth firms during troughs, the 
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asymmetric models should show that the downside beta is higher than upside beta for 
value-minus-growth portfolios during bear markets or that the coefficients on higher 
moments should be significant during bear markets such that value firms become 
riskier.  
Our results show that, when we identify the market state through a regime-
switching model for the market return, there is little or no difference in the risk of 
value-minus-growth portfolios across market regimes, and this difference does not 
explain the value premium, except when the pre-1963 sample (including the Great 
Depression) is used. Moreover, when we investigate the value premium using 
different risk measures, we find that there are periods of time when the premium can 
be explained by the CAPM, whilst during other periods the premium is explained by 
the fact that the returns of value firms increase more than the returns on growth 
stocks in periods of strong market performance, whilst in downturns growth stocks 
suffer more than value stocks. These features are captured by the upside/downside 
betas in the LCAPM or by the coefficient on the square and cube of the market return 
in the HCAPM. Overall, our results are not consistent with a risk-based explanation 
of the value premium.  
 The rest of this work is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we explain the 
methodology used. Section 2.3 contains the explanation of the data set and the 
empirical results including robustness tests. Section 2.4 concludes. 
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2.2. Regime-Switching Model 
 
In this section we first explain different risk measures and why they could be used to 
model the value premium. We then introduce a regime switching model that allows 
these risk measures to be used over time, and the method used to estimate it.  
 
2.2.1. Lower Partial Moment CAPM 
 
Previous studies test either betas, consumption betas or conditional betas of 
value-minus-growth portfolios as the relevant measure of risk. However, the 
asymmetric reactions of value and growth firms to market conditions, proposed by 
Zhang (2005), might not be well explained by symmetric models such as the CAPM. 
An alternative model to test this theory would be the downside/upside CAPM, which 
allows different response to positive and negative market movements.  
This upside/downside CAPM model (the Lower Partial Moment CAPM, 
LCAPM) initially developed by Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) and Harlow and Rao 
(1989), has been a popular method to investigate asymmetric reactions to market 
movements or if downside beta is priced.3 This model suggests that investors react 
differently to the returns above or below a specified target return:   
 pt LCAPM mt mt tr r rα β β ε− − + += + + + , (2.1) 
                                                 
3 See Kim and Zwalt (1979), Chen (1982), De Bondt and Thaler (1987), Chan (1988), Harlow and Rao (1989), Petkova and 
Zhang (2005), Post and Van Vliett (2005) and Ang, Chen and Xing (2006). 
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where ptr  is the excess return on portfolio p, mt mt fr R r= −  is the excess market 
return, ( )targetmt mt mtr r I r r+ = >  and ( )targetmt mt mtr r I r r− = <  are the positive and negative 
components of the excess market return relative to the target return targetr , I(.) is the 
indicator variable, and tε  is an error term with mean zero and standard deviation pσ .  
Although the LCAPM has an appealing property for the explanation of 
asymmetry in asset returns, there are a few issues which remain unclear. First, this 
model cannot be directly estimated through OLS using equation (2.1), due to the 
issue discussed in Post and Van Vliett (2005): if the constant is included, the 
downside and upside betas calculated by OLS are not consistent with what the 
LCAPM suggests4. Consequently, throughout this study, we first estimate β −  and 
β +  by running a regression without the constant to obtain the estimates that are 
consistent with the LCAPM theory, and then calculate ˆLCAPMα  using these estimates 
as the mean and standard error of the residuals ˆ ˆˆLCPAM pt mt mtr r rα β β+ + − −= − − . Second, 
there is no agreement about how we should define the upside and downside markets 
that are inherently unobservable. Popular methods are setting the target return to zero 
or to the average market return. Petkova and Zhang (2005) obtain four market states 
(peak, expansion, recession, and trough) depending on the expected market risk 
premium calculated with four macroeconomic variables. Although this method is 
consistent with theory and thus appealing, the estimated market premium could be 
noisy, and the breakpoints between peak and expansion and between recession and 
                                                 
4 Ignoring this issue, as most studies do, produces non-trivial distortions in upside and downside betas. For example, when we 
use the HML returns from 1963 to 2006 (data from Kenneth French’s data library), the estimation of downside and upside 
betas (where the target return is zero) for the HML portfolio estimated with the constant term are -0.288 and -0.261 (not 
statistically different from each other), whilst those without the constant are -0.360 and -0.168 (different at less than 1% 
significance level). The conclusion in each case is quite different; in the former, there is no difference between upside and 
downside betas, whilst in the latter upside beta is larger than downside beta. 
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trough, i.e. 10% and -10%, are arbitrary. We will come back to this issue later in 
Section 2.3.3. 
 
2.2.2. Higher Moment CAPM 
 
Alternative risk measures could be obtained by generalising the assumption 
of the CAPM, i.e. the unrealistic mean-variance assumption based on normality or 
quadratic utility function. Assume that asset returns are non-normal and investors’ 
utility function is not quadratic, which we believe is more realistic than normality or 
a quadratic utility function. The utility function can be linearised using the Taylor 
series expansion assuming compact returns (see Ingersoll (1987)). In equilibrium the 
expanded utility function is equivalent to the CAPM only when moments higher than 
the second moment are trivial. In general, for investors whose utility function is 
linear risk tolerant, asset prices need to be modelled by the CAPM with additional 
higher moment terms. The requirement of the additional terms depends on the 
probability density function of asset returns, which changes over time. Although both 
the HCAPM and LCAPM can model asymmetry in asset returns5, the HCAPM 
models returns as a non-linear function of the market return, whilst in the LCAPM 
asset returns are priced linearly with market returns conditioning on up- and down-
markets. Therefore the two models are not necessarily the same and in particular, the 
HCAPM can be used to price kurtosis in addition to skewness in asset returns.  
                                                 
5 Bawa’s (1978) study suggests that asset pricing with downside risk is consistent with a utility function that satisfies Arrow’s 
properties of positive but decreasing marginal utility of wealth and decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
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There are several different approaches to include higher moments (see for 
example Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Friend and Westerfield (1980), Sears and 
Wei (1985), Barone-Adesi (1985), Harvey and Siddique (2000)). As explained in 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and Hwang and Satchell (1999), we use the following 
cubic market model which is consistent with the four moment (coskewness and 
cokurtosis) CAPM. The specification is: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )2 31 2 3pt HCAPM mt mt mt mt mt tr r R E R R E Rα β β β ε= + + − + − + . (2.2) 
 
2.2.3. Regime-Switching Model with Alternative Risk Measures 
 
We consider three equilibrium based models, i.e. the traditional CAPM, the 
LCAPM that allows different responses to up- and down-market states and the 
HCAPM that models skewness and fat tails in addition to the traditional beta. 
Empirically, most of the previous studies test one of these models against the other 
models for certain sample periods and then conclude which one explains assets’ 
returns better than the others. For example, beta appears to be priced before 1968 
(Fama and MacBeth (1973)), but not from 1963 to 1990 (Fama and French (1992)). 
Lim (1989) reports that skewness is priced in some sub-periods. These empirical 
results indicate that asset returns are priced with different risk measures for different 
time periods.  
In order to explain these empirical results, let us assume a market where 
asset returns are not normally distributed and investors’ utility functions have the 
desirable properties of positive but decreasing marginal utility of wealth and 
  
29 
 
decreasing absolute risk aversion as in Arrow (1971). Moreover assume that both 
the probability density function of asset returns and the investors’ degree of risk 
aversion change over time (Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). Then, in this 
generalised framework the choice of risk measures does not lie in selecting one that 
dominates the others for the entire sample period, but in finding out which one is 
selected over time. When asset returns are normally distributed for a specific period 
of time, for example, the CAPM explains asset returns. However, when asset returns 
become non-normal, i.e. skewed or fat-tailed, and investors become far more risk 
averse, assets are priced not only by mean and variance but also by higher moments 
or downside risk. Therefore, different risk measures may be required for different 
periods of time to explain asset returns. 
In order to model asset returns with different risk measures over different 
periods of time, we assume that there are N regimes defined by tS , a random 
Markov regime variable
 
that for each time t assigns a value in { }1, , NK . When a 
dummy variable jtS , j=1, 2, …, N, is defined for each regime, that is, 1jtS = when 
tS j= and 0jtS =  otherwise, our model is given by 
 
1
N
pt p jt jt pt
j
r S mα ε== + +∑ , (2.3) 
where jtm  is a fully-specified relationship between the portfolio return ptr , and the 
set of factors in regime j, and ( )2~ 0,pt ptε σ , where 2 2,
1
N
pt p j jt
j
Sσ σ==∑ . 
For  jtm  the following three models are used. First, for the CAPM we have 
 1t mtm rβ= . (2.4) 
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Following the discussion in subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, we allow the LCAPM and 
the HCAPM to be selected by defining  
 2t mt mtm r rβ β− − + += +  (2.5) 
and  
 ( )( ) ( )( )2 33 1 2 3t mt mt mt mt mtm r R E R R E Rβ β β= + − + − . (2.6) 
When the data generating processes follow equations (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6), they are 
equivalent to the CAPM, LCAPM, and HCAPM, respectively. Therefore, our regime 
switching model can be presented as: 
 
[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )1 2 2 33 1 2 3pt p t mt t mt mtt mt mt mt mt mt ptr S r S r rS r R E R R E Rα β β ββ β β ε− − + +⎡ ⎤= + + +⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤+ + − + − +⎣ ⎦  (2.7) 
Note that the transition probability matrix will describe how likely it is to migrate 
from one regime, say the CAPM, to another, say, the HCAPM. Since we specify a 
first-order Markov chain, the only information that matters to predict the regime at 
time t+1 is the regime at time t.  
This regime-dependent risk measure model is quite flexible since asset 
returns can be modelled with time variation in both asset returns’ distribution and 
investors’ risk aversion. Over different periods of time, any one of the models can 
dominate the other two, or there may be no dominant model. The estimates of the 
parameters and probabilities of regimes could provide answers to the questions of 
whether and when value firms are riskier than growth firms; e.g. by comparing β , 
β − , and β + of value and growth portfolios. If β β− +>  in the LCAPM during bear 
markets, the portfolio is riskier in downside markets. On the other hand, when 
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2 0β < 2( 0)β >  in the HCAPM, the portfolio is expected to show lower returns 
(higher returns) and be riskier (less risky) than other portfolios that just follow the 
CAPM. If 3 0β >  3( 0)β <  and market returns are positively skewed, the portfolio is 
expected to show higher (lower) returns than the symmetric CAPM and the portfolio 
is less risky (riskier). 
 
2.2.4. Estimation Method 
 
We estimate the regime-switching model (2.7) via a Bayesian Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) Gibbs-sampling approach. As Kim and Nelson (1999) point 
out, using the Gibbs sampler to estimate unobserved variables as well as parameters 
allows us to draw from the relevant distributions simultaneously. Moreover, the 
model has conditioning features that make it simple to implement the Gibbs sampler. 
Another reason to use an MCMC method is that it provides posterior distributions 
from which we draw the parameter estimates and conduct significance tests directly. 
Finally, by averaging the generated values of the regime dummy variables we obtain 
estimates of the smoothed probabilities of regime selection over time, which are 
useful to study the implications of our model. 
The Gibbs sampling estimation of model (2.7) consists of two steps. Let ( )1 2 3 1 2 3, , , , , , , , , Pα β β β β β β σ σ σ− +=θ  denote the vector of parameters in the 
model. In the first step, conditional on θ , we sample from the distribution of ( )1T TS S=S% K  using the multi-move algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994). 
Conditional on TS
% , the model reduces to a regression model with known structural 
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breaks, so in the second step each parameter in θ  is sampled in turn, conditioned on 
these structural breaks. We use standard conjugate Gaussian distributions for the 
regression coefficients and the inverted gamma distribution for the variance, as in 
Zellner (1971). Given the issue discussed in Section 2.2.1, we take special care to 
draw β −  and β + from the correct distributions (i.e. these parameters are drawn from 
the distribution which disregards the constant term, so that correct downside and 
upside betas are estimated). The transition probabilities are estimated using conjugate 
beta priors. We allow for a large number of burn-in iterations to guarantee 
convergence. All results are obtained with 10,000 iterations after 30,000 burn-in 
iterations.  
 
2.3. Empirical Results 
 
This section is organised as follows. The data are described in subsection 
2.3.1. In subsection 2.3.2 we analyse the value premium with OLS estimates of the 
CAPm, LCAPM and HCAPM. In subsection 2.3.3, we report the results of our 
investigation of the risk of value and growth portfolios according to the regime of the 
market as inferred from a regime-switching model. In subsection 2.3.4, we consider 
the results obtained with the regime-switching model with alternative risk measures. 
Robustness tests are discussed in subsection 2.3.5. 
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2.3.1. Data 
 
There are many different ways of constructing value/growth portfolios. Book-
to-market, earnings and other firm characteristics have been used with different 
breakpoints in the literature. We focus on several widely used value, growth and 
value-minus-growth portfolios.  
The main results in this paper are reported for two sets of portfolios. The first 
set of portfolios are Fama and French’s (1993) H (high book-to-market or value 
portfolio), L (low book-to-market or growth portfolio), and HML (value-minus- 
growth) portfolios, which are constructed using a two-by-three sort on size and book-
to-market. HML has been used as a standard measure of the value premium since 
Fama and French (1993), and has been used in many studies, including Petkova and 
Zhang (2005) and Fama and French (2006a). The second set of portfolios considers 
size, since the value premium is supposedly stronger amongst smaller firms 
(Loughran (1997) and Fama and French (2006a)). From a five-by-five sort on size 
and book-to-market the small-value (Hs) and small-growth (Ls) portfolios can be 
calculated, and the small value premium HMLs is the small-value portfolio (Hs) 
minus the small-growth portfolio (Ls). To check the robustness of our results, we 
also use portfolios based on a decile sort on earnings-to-price ratio6. The excess 
market return is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio return minus the one-month 
Treasury bill rate. All the data are obtained from Kenneth French’s data library.7  
                                                 
6 Fama and French (2006a) show that the value premium becomes less dependent on size if earnings-to-price ratio is used 
instead of book-to-market ratio 
7 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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We consider different subsamples within the period from July 1926 to 
December 2006: the full sample (1926-2006), the post-depression sample (1935-
2006), and the post-1963 sample (1963-2006). We focus more on the post-1963 
sample because the value premium is more difficult to explain during this period. 
The value premium in the period from 1926 to 1963 can be explained using the 
simple CAPM or the conditional CAPM; see Ang and Chen (2007) and Fama and 
French (2006a). We consider the post-depression sample because the Great 
Depression was a remarkably unique event which could alter the results significantly. 
In our robustness checks we also consider the pre-1963 sample.  
 The value premium can be measured by average returns or unconditional 
alphas of value-minus-growth portfolios. Table 2-1 reports several descriptive 
statistics for our portfolios. Consistent with previous studies, i.e. Fama and French 
(1992, 1993, 2006) and Davis, Fama and French (2000), the value premium exists 
and is stronger for small stocks. The value premia from HML and HMLs in the full 
sample (Panel A) are, in terms of average returns (CAPM alphas), 0.42% and 0.51% 
(0.32% and 0.48%), respectively. When we exclude the Great Depression (Panel B), 
the value premia from the HML and HMLs portfolios increase to 0.48% and 0.56% 
(0.51% and 0.66%) in terms of average returns (unconditional alphas). Finally, in the 
more recent period from 1963 to 2006 (Panel C), the average returns (unconditional 
alphas) of the HML and HMLs portfolios still remain high, at 0.45% and 0.62% 
(0.58% and 0.80%), respectively.  
Other statistics suggest that all value portfolios have fatter tails (higher 
kurtosis) than the growth portfolios and the market in all sample periods, whilst 
growth portfolios tend to have less extreme returns than the market. However, the 
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value portfolios have larger skewness than the growth portfolios and thus the value-
minus-growth portfolios have positive skewness.  
 
2.3.2. Preliminary Results with Unconditional Models 
 
In this subsection we investigate the value premium with OLS estimation of 
the CAPM, LCAPM and HCAPM. Panels A, B and C of Table 2-2 report the results 
using the full, post-depression and post-1963 periods, respectively. From the 
estimates of the CAPM, there is very little evidence that value is riskier than growth; 
indeed, the betas of HML and HMLs are positive only when the sample includes the 
Great Depression (see Panel A), whilst in the post depression and post-1963 samples 
betas are negative and mostly significant (Panels B and C). 
Accounting for different responses to up- and down-markets reduces alpha 
significantly. The LCAPM alphas are much smaller than the CAPM alphas in all 
three samples. For instance, in the full sample the LCAPM explains the value 
premium ( ˆ 0.15%LCAPMα = − , t-stat = -1.39), whilst the CAPM does not                       
( ˆ 0.32%CAPMα = , t-stat = 2.69). This results has been obtained by Chan (1988), De 
Bondt and Thaler (1987) and was replicated in Petkova and Zhang (2005). Value 
stocks seem to benefit from a larger increase in returns in up-markets and a smaller 
decrease in returns in down-markets (i.e. β β+ −> ), whilst growth stocks behave in 
the opposite way (β β− +> ). However, value is not riskier than growth in any of the 
samples; in the full samples the downside betas of HML and HMLs are not 
significantly different from zero, whilst in the post-depression and post-1963 samples 
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the downside betas are negative and statistically significant. Specifically, in the post-
1963 sample, the downside betas of HML and HMLs (-0.36 and -0.50) are roughly 
double the upside betas (-0.17 and -0.22), so during this period we expect the value-
minus-growth strategies to have high and positive returns when the market return is 
negative, but negative returns when the market return is positive.  
Higher moments seem to be significant mostly when the sample includes the 
Great Depression. In the full sample, the coefficients of HML on the square and cube 
of the market return are positive and significant. However, they do not represent risk; 
the positive coefficient on the square market return ( 2b ) suggests that the return on 
HML increases further when the market return is positive, but decreases less when 
market returns are negative. Also, since the market has positive skewness in the full 
sample (Panel A, Table 2-1), HML increases even further with the positive 3b . The 
HCAPM seems to reduce the size and significance of the premium; for instance over 
the full sample, the CAPM alpha is 0.32% (t-stat = 2.69) but the HCAPM alpha is 
lower at 0.25% and borderline significant (t-stat = 2.00). The higher moments are not 
significant in the post-depression samples, but are significant for the growth 
portfolios in the post-1963 sample, increasing their risk relative to the CAPM.  
This exploratory analysis indicates that asymmetries play a large role in the 
relationship between value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios and the 
market. These results are not consistent with Zhang’s (2005) implication that value 
firms are in advantage in favourable economic situations (in up-market) since the 
upside betas of growth firms are higher than those of value firms, and overall do not 
elicit evidence that value might be riskier than growth.  
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2.3.3. Is Value Riskier than Growth? Reinvestigation with Market 
Regimes 
 
In this subsection we reinvestigate if value is riskier than growth in different 
market states. As pointed out earlier, we first show that market states derived from 
the estimated expected market risk premium may be too noisy. For example, Petkova 
and Zhang (2005) obtain market states from estimates of the expected market risk 
premium obtained with macroeconomic variables. Although they argue this is a 
better measure of the market return than ex-post returns, it is not clear whether the 
lagged four macroeconomic variables could provide unbiased and noise-free 
estimates of the expected market risk premium.  
To investigate this, as in Petkova and Zhang (2005), we run Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted market returns in excess of one 
month Treasury Bill rate ( mtr ) on the following four lagged macroeconomic 
variables: the one month Treasury Bill (TBill), credit spread (CS) (the difference 
between Moody's AAA and BAA rated corporate bonds), term spread (TS) (the 
difference between the US 10 year and the 1 year treasury bond rates), and dividend 
yield (DY) (the CRSP value-weighted dividend yields).8 For the period between 
January 1963 and December 2004 (504 monthly observations) we have  
 , 1 , 1
(0.060) (1.432) (2.053) (0.178) (0.072)
ˆ0.0004 2.211 1.461 0.042 0.084m t t t t t m tr TBill CS TS DY ε+ += − + + − +  (2.8) 
                                                 
8 These monthly data are from the database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and CRSP. 
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where the numbers in brackets are the Newey-West heteroskedasticity consistent t 
statistics.9 None of the lagged macroeconomic variables are significant at the 1% 
level, and only one lagged variable, CS, is significant at 5% level.10 Moreover, the 
value of R-square is only 1.85%. In other words, less than 2% of ex post market 
returns reflects ex ante market returns if the regression is a proper way to estimate 
the expected market returns. These results suggest that even though we admit that 
individual beliefs are not homogeneous (Ross (1978)), the difference between ex post 
and ex ante returns appears to be too large to justify using the simple regression to 
approximate the expected market returns. In addition, by including variables (such as 
DY, TS, and TBill) that do not appear to explain next month excess market returns, 
the estimated market risk premium is likely to have large measurement errors. 
Although the four macroeconomic variables are economically motivated and thus are 
widely used in the literature (see e.g. the discussion in Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin 
(2003)) , we could not conclude that the estimated expected market return from the 
regression is a good proxy for the expected market risk premium. This is supported 
by Cooper and Gubellini (2008), who show that the results from conditional models 
(including the one used by Petkova and Zhang (2005)) are extremely sensitive to the 
conditioning variables used.  
 
                                                 
9 Further studies on the properties of these four macroeconomic variables suggest that the augmented Dick-Fuller test fails to 
reject that TBill and DY have unit root. Thus as shown by Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (2003), the regression results may be 
further undermined by the high level of autocorrelation in these independent variables. 
10 We also estimated the regression equation using 5-year sub-sample periods, and obtained similar results. 
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2.3.3.1. Regime Switching Models for the Market Return 
 
We consider a different approach to identify the market states, which is motivated by 
the regime-switching literature and the modelling of business cycles. Following 
Hamilton (1989) and Schwert (1989), Turner, Startz and Nelson (1989) and 
Hamilton and Susmel (1994) show that there are distinct regimes in the S&P 500 
index in terms of mean and volatility. Moreover, Hamilton and Lin (1996) 
investigate the relationship between stock returns and real output growth in industrial 
production, and conclude that economic recessions are the primary drivers of 
fluctuations in market volatility. More recently, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann 
(2000) use regime-switching models to study the risk of firms with different sizes in 
expansions and recessions. These studies suggest that regime switching models are 
an effective tool to identify regimes which are linked to economic conditions.  
We model the data-generating process of the market return as a three-state 
first-order Markov process with switching mean and variance11. Our model for the 
market return can be described in the following way. Let tS  be a regime variable 
assuming the values of 1, 2 or 3 according to the appropriate regime, and ( )jt tS I S j= =  be dummy variables which assume the value of 1 when the market is 
in regime , 1,2,3j j = , where I(.) is the indicator variable. The model is then given by 
 
1 1 2 2 3 3 ,
2 2 2 2
, ,1 1 ,2 2 ,3 3
,
mt t t t m t t
m t m t m t m t
r S S S
S S S
µ µ µ σ εσ σ σ σ= + + += + =  (2.9) 
                                                 
11 We also considered a model with two regimes, but found that three regimes better specify the market states than two 
regimes. Namely, for all three periods a model with three-regimes captures the features of the data (such as heteroskedasticity, 
skewness and excess kurtosis) well, in the sense that a Jarcque-Bera test of the standardised residuals does not reject normality. 
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where jµ  and ,m jσ  are the expected excess market return and volatility, respectively, 
in regime j. Following Hamilton (1989), we allow the regime variable tS  to be 
governed by a first-order Markov chain with a transition probability matrix { } ,ijP p=  where ( )1|ij t tp P S j S i−= = =  is the probability that regime i at time t-1 is 
followed by regime j at time t. We interpret each regime according to estimates of 
the mean and volatility of the market.  
 
2.3.3.2. Description of Market Regimes 
 
We estimate the regime-switching model for the three sample periods using the 
Bayesian MCMC Gibbs-sampling estimation, which is standard from the regime-
switching literature (see Kim and Nelson (1999) for example). From the MCMC 
estimates of the dummy variable tS , we estimate the smoothed probabilities of the 
market being in each regime in each month. Figure 2-1 to Figure 2-3 plot the 
smoothed probabilities of each regime for the full, post-Depression and post-1963 
samples, respectively. Table 2-3 reports descriptive statistics for the market return, 
and also the value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios in each of these 
regimes. We label each regime according to the characteristics of the market return. 
We name Regime 3 as “Bear market”, since the mean return is negative and the 
volatility is high. Likewise, Regime 2 is labelled “Bull market”, since the mean 
return is positive and the volatility is low. Finally, Regime 1 is labelled “Transition”, 
when the market is neither bullish nor bearish.  
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 For example, for the full sample, the average monthly market return in the 
bull and bear markets are 1.26% and -059%, respectively, whilst the volatilities are 
2.95% and 11.19% (see the column labelled “Market” in Table 2-3). Figure 2-1 
shows that the bear market regime is selected mostly during the Great Depression 
and during the period from the middle of 1937 through the middle of 1940, which 
includes the first two years of the Second World War, and then during short periods 
such as the 1973 oil crisis and the Black Monday month of October 1987. When we 
exclude the Great Depression period (Figure 2-2), we find that the bear market 
regime now includes many other periods.  
 In the post-1963 sample (Figure 2-3), the bear market regime captures 
periods such as the two oil crises, the Mexican moratorium of 1982, the Black 
Monday of 1987, the Russian crisis of 1998, the burst of the internet bubble and the 
period following the terrorist attacks of 2001. The bull regime includes most of the 
economic expansion of the US economy in the early 1960s, and also most of the 
early 1990s. The overall picture we obtain with these results is that the return on the 
aggregate stock market can be modelled as a mixture of longer expansion or bull 
market periods with high returns and low volatility (the mean market return and 
volatility in the bull regime are 1.57% and 3.53%), and infrequent and shorter 
periods of contraction during which the stock market does very poorly and has high 
volatility (the mean market return and volatility in the bear regime are -1.54% and 
6.34%), which agrees with the modelling of regimes and the business cycle using 
macroeconomic data as in Hamilton (1989).  
It is difficult to infer a relationship between the state of the market and the 
average value-minus-growth return. From Table 2-3, when the whole sample is used, 
the average HML return seems to increase with the market return: it is highest 
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(0.53% in terms of average return) when the market is in the bull market regime and 
lowest (0.19%) when the market is in the bear regime (the difference in the median 
HML across regimes is statistically significant at 1%). However, in the more recent 
post-1963 period, we find that, as expected from the estimates of the LCAPM for this 
period (Panel C, Table 2-2), the average HML return is higher in the bear market 
regime, at 1.21% a month) and actually negative in the bull market regime (these 
differences are also statistically significant). Therefore, over the last 40 years, growth 
stocks do marginally better than value stocks during bull markets, but do much worse 
than value stock in the bear market regime. This is contrary to what one expects from 
the theory of Zhang (2005)12.  
 
2.3.3.3. The Value Premium in Different Market Regimes 
 
We now proceed to investigate the risk of the value, growth and value-minus-growth 
portfolios in different market states. We estimate the CAPM conditioned on the state 
of the market (transition, bull or bear). The purpose of this subsection is to 
investigate the asymmetric reactions of value and growth firms to market conditions 
suggested by Zhang (2005).  
Panels A, B and C of Table 2-4 report the estimation results for the H, L and 
HML portfolios using the full, post-depression and post-1963 periods, respectively13. 
The risk of the value portfolio increases during bear market only if the sample 
includes the period of the Great Depression. When we exclude the Great Depression 
                                                 
12 However, we notice that the post-1963 period has relatively few recessions and also contains the unprecedented boom in the 
stock market in the late 1990s (which was driven by growth stocks), so we should be cautious regarding this interpretation. 
13 The results with the Hs, Ls and HMLs portfolios are largely similar, so we do not present or comment on them.  
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(Panel B), value is not riskier than growth in any of the regimes, whilst alpha is 
positive and statistically significant in the bull and transition regimes. In the post-
1963 sample (Panel C), value is significantly less risky than growth in the bull and 
bear regimes, whilst in the transition regime beta is not statistically different from 
zero. Also, as expected, the value premium is very strong in the bear market regime 
(the bear-market alpha is 0.82%, t-statistic 2.56), but not very strong in the bull 
regime (the bull-market alpha is only 0.31% and not statistically significant). 
The period since 1963 is particularly troublesome for a risk-based 
explanation of the value premium. Not only does value have lower betas than 
growth, whilst having higher average returns; growth is riskier than - or at least as 
risky as - value in all market regimes. Other studies such as Ang and Chen (2007) 
and Petkova and Zhang (2005) provide little or no evidence that value is riskier than 
growth for this period. Ang and Chen’s estimate of time-varying betas for the period 
are mostly negative and they argue that the (unconditionally) high value premium 
during the period can be explained by small-sample properties of the unconditional 
alpha when betas are time-varying. Petkova and Zhang’s (2005) evidence for this 
period goes in opposite directions from a risk-based explanation of the value 
premium: value betas covary negatively with the market risk premium, whilst growth 
betas have no significant covariation with the market risk premium. When the results 
in panels A and C are compared, we conclude that it is only when the Great 
Depression period is included that these conditional models explain the value 
premium and that value is riskier than growth. Since the Great Depression was an 
extreme recession with unique characteristics (as pointed out by Bernanke (1983)), 
for our main results in the next section we focus on the post-1963 period. 
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2.3.4. Regime-Switching Risk Measures 
 
The results so far have revealed no conclusive empirical evidence supporting 
Zhang’s (2005) theory or Petkova and Zhang’s (2006) result that value is riskier than 
growth in bad times. In this subsection we investigate whether or not our regime 
switching model with different risk measures can capture the asymmetric risk pattern 
of HML over time. We combine the three models (CAPM, LCAPM and HCAPM) in 
the regime-switching model in Equation (2.7), so each model has the possibility of 
being selected in each month. If there are periods when the relationship between the 
portfolios and the market is symmetric, then the CAPM should be selected. 
Asymmetries can be modelled by two alternative models: either in dichotomous up 
and down markets (LCAPM) or in a continuous framework (HCAPM).  
We estimate the regime-switching model (2.7) for the H, L, HML, Hs, Ls and 
HMLs portfolios for the post-1963 sample. We focus on this sample for a few 
reasons. First, as stated before, the value premium is more difficult to explain during 
this period. Second, there is a structural break in the early 1960s (see for instance 
Section 3.1 of Petkova and Zhang (2005), and Figure 1 of Fama French (2006)), and 
thus using a long time series without considering the breaks could be misleading. 
Our earlier results also confirm that including the Great Depression period could give 
us wrong inferences about the value premium for the last 40 years. Finally, our 
regime switching model allows different classes of risks, but not time-varying risks 
within a regime.  
The results are displayed in Table 2-5, in which we report the posterior means 
and standard deviations of the parameters from the MCMC iterations. The smoothed 
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probabilities in Figure 2-5 can be interpreted as the probability that, at each month, 
the CAPM, LCAPM and HCAPM are selected. 
 It is important to note that the regime switching risk measures explain the 
value premium in terms of alpha. The posterior distributions of the alphas of HML 
and HMLs suggest that HML and HMLs can be explained by the model at the 1% 
significance level. In the next subsection, we show that the value premium is 
explained by the higher upside betas of the value-minus-growth portfolios, relative to 
their downside betas, and the positive coefficient on the squared and cubed market 
returns. This result suggests that it is not increased downside risk during bearish 
markets which drives the value premium. In the following subsections, we examine 
the risk of the value portfolio and the value premium in more detail. 
 
2.3.4.1. Is Value Riskier than Growth? 
 
From the estimates in Table 2-5, there is no evidence that value is riskier than growth 
in any of the regimes. First, the CAPM beta is negative (and significant) for both 
portfolios: for HML (HMLs) the average posterior beta is -0.16 (-0.28), with a 
standard deviation of 0.07 (0.05). Second, in the LCAPM regime, the downside betas 
of both portfolios are also negative and significant. The downside beta of HML 
(HMLs) is -0.69 (-0.87), with a standard deviation of 0.16 (0.14). Finally, in the 
HCAPM regime, beta is not significantly different from zero for either of the value-
minus-growth portfolios, but the coefficients on the square and cube of the market 
return are positive and statistically significant14. A positive coefficient on the second 
                                                 
14 In the sense that their estimated posterior distributions do not include the value zero. 
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moment of excess market return makes HML concave to market movements, 
increasing returns whilst decreasing risk. 
These estimates also suggest that the average HML (HMLs) return might be 
higher in the LCAPM and HCAPM regimes. In the LCAPM regime, this is expected 
because even though both the downside and the upside betas are negative, the 
downside beta is larger than the upside beta, so the return on HML will increase 
more when the market return is negative than it will decrease when the market return 
is positive15. In the HCAPM regime, in addition to the increase due to the positive 
coefficient on the squared market return, the positive coefficient on the third moment 
of excess market returns increases the returns of HML even further because the 
market has positive skewness in this regime (not reported).  
Table 2-6 displays the average HML and HMLs returns in each of the three 
regimes. The t-statistics show whether the average return within a regime is 
significantly different from that of the whole sample. The average value-minus-
growth returns in the CAPM regime are significantly lower than those of the whole 
period: they are only 0.01% and -0.10% for HML and HMLs respectively. As 
expected, in the LCAPM and HCAPM regimes the average returns are much higher 
and in some cases significant. We examine whether these differences are significant 
with a non-parametric median test for robustness, since we do not know the 
distribution of market returns within a regime. The hypothesis that the median return 
is the same across regimes is rejected at the 1% significance level for both HML and 
HMLs. On the other hand, the difference in market returns across regimes is not 
significant.  
                                                 
15 The probability that the upside beta is higher than the downside beta is around 90% (99%) for the HML (HMLs) portfolio. 
This probability is calculated by counting the number of cases in the MCMC iterations that upside beta is higher than downside 
beta and is more robust compared to methods that assume a specific probability density function. 
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Again, these results are at odds with a risk-based explanation of the value 
premium. In the first place, they show no sign that value is riskier than growth. 
Secondly, even though we found that the selection of the different risk measures is 
linked to differences in the average returns of the value-minus-growth portfolios, the 
regimes do not seem to be linked to the condition of the market in terms of average 
market returns. According to Zhang (2005), value becomes riskier than growth in 
bad times and thus the value premium is expected to be linked to market conditions. 
Chen, Petkova and Zhang (2006), for instance, argue that the value premium peaks in 
recessions in the post-1963 sample. However, from the 77 months of recession in our 
sample (according to the NBER), 40 months occur in the LCAPM regime, and thus 
our results suggest that the value premium is higher during recessions not because 
value becomes riskier than growth, but because of the difference in upside and 
downside betas between value and growth stocks. Indeed, the average excess value 
(H) and growth (L) returns in the LCAPM regime are 0.66% and -0.45% 
respectively, which shows that a large part of the positive HML return comes from 
the negative returns of growth stocks. On the other hand, in the HCAPM regime the 
average HML return increases due to the higher moments associated with the value 
portfolio, and the average excess returns on the H and L portfolios during this regime 
are 1.38% and 0.36%. Therefore in this regime the high value-minus-growth returns 
come from the outperformance of value relative to growth, especially when the 
market return is high.  
 
  
48 
 
 
2.3.4.2. Selection of Regimes 
 
In this subsection we study the selection of each regime through time. The transition 
probabilities tell us how likely it is to remain in each model (i.e. the CAPM, LCAPM 
or HCAPM) or to move to another one. Also, we analyse the smoothed probabilities 
that each regime has been selected at each month.  
The regimes are persistent for all portfolios except the L portfolio. Figure 2-5 
shows that for the L portfolio, the only persistent regime is the LCAPM regime. 
Since the higher moment coefficients are not significant, and the betas in the CAPM 
and HCAPM regimes are very close, the L portfolio could be well described by a 
model with two regimes (CAPM and LCAPM). So there are periods when growth 
stocks behave similarly in up and down markets, and other periods when downside 
risk is increased. For the H portfolio, all regimes are persistent, as indicated by the 
transition probabilities.  
The HML and HMLs portfolios tend to exhibit similar (but weaker) patterns 
to the H and Hs portfolios, respectively (see Figure 2-5). It should be noticed that, in 
the case of portfolio Hs, the HCAPM regime is quite persistent, even though the 
higher moments are not significant. The estimate of beta in this regime, though, is 
much smaller than in the CAPM regime, so we can attribute the persistence to the 
difference in beta. 
 The smoothed probabilities of the regimes for HML and HMLs seem to be 
quite similar, which indicates that both strategies behave similarly regarding the 
selection of the regimes. We know that the average value-minus-growth return is 
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close to zero (for HML) or negative (for HMLs) when the CAPM regime is selected, 
that is, when the relationship between the return on the value-minus-growth 
strategies and the return on the market is symmetrical. This regime is selected over 
short one or two-year long periods, with the exception of two longer periods, one in 
the late 1970s and another from 1985 to 1992. Overall, this is the most prevalent 
regime: it is selected in 241 (249) months when the model is estimated with the HML 
(HMLs) portfolio, which corresponds to almost half of the whole sample. Therefore, 
the value premium is close to zero during half of the post-1963 sample. 
The LCAPM regime is selected during some turbulent periods, such as the oil 
crisis of 1973 and a four-year period following the burst of the internet bubble in 
2000. The average excess return on the H and L portfolios during this regime are 
0.66% and -0.45%, respectively, and thus much of the HML return during this period 
comes from the negative returns of growth firms.  
The HCAPM is the least persistent regime for both HML and HMLs; the 
probability of remaining in this regime ( 33p ) is 0.84 and 0.82 for the HML and 
HMLs portfolios respectively. This regime is selected in 131 (120) months for the 
HML (HMLs) portfolio, which corresponds to around 25% (22%) of the whole 
sample. It is selected over short periods, usually less than a year, except for the 
period from the middle of 2003 until early 2005.  
These results are quite interesting because although the value premium is 
high in both the LCAPM and HCAPM regimes, the reasons are quite different. In the 
former regime, the value premium comes from the negative returns of growth firms, 
especially when the market is doing poorly, whilst in the latter it stems from the 
outperformance of value relative to growth when the market is doing well.  
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2.3.5. Robustness Checks 
 
So far we have reported results obtained using two sets of portfolios, both of which 
are based on sorting procedures using market equity and the book-to-market ratio. 
We have also focused more on the more recent sample period from 1963 onwards. 
We address the first issue by replicating our results using value, growth and value-
minus-growth portfolios based on a decile sort on Earnings/Price ratio. We define the 
highest decile to be the value portfolio (H_EP) and the lowest decile to be the growth 
portfolio (L_EP), and the value-minus-growth portfolio (HML_EP) is the H_EP 
portfolio minus the L_EP portfolio. To address the second issue, we replicate our 
results for the pre-1963 sample period, using the H, L and HML portfolios. 
 
2.3.5.1. Portfolios Formed on Earning/Price Ratio 
 
Panel A of Table 2-7 reports descriptive statistics for the value, growth and value-
minus growth portfolios based on a decile sort on Earnings/Price. The value premium 
defined by Earnings/Price ratio is higher than Fama and French’s HML; the average 
HML_EP return over the 1963-2006 period is 0.60%, compared to 0.45% of HML. 
The CAPM alpha of HML_EP is also higher at 0.69%, compared to 0.58% of HML. 
The results obtained with the CAPM, LCAPM and HCAPM are similar to the ones 
obtained with the size and book-to-market-sorted portfolios, so we do not report 
them. Next, we estimate the CAPM in the different market regimes. The results are 
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reported on Table 2-8. Similarly to our previous results in Table 2-4, value (H_EP) is 
not riskier than growth (L_EP) in any of the market regimes, and alpha is large in the 
bear and transition regimes (although it is not statistically significant in the bear 
regime).  
Finally, we estimate the regime-switching model with different risk measures 
for the H_EP, L_EP and HML_EP portfolios. The results are reported in Panel A of 
Table 2-9 and are quite similar to those obtained before. In Panel A of Table 2-10, 
we repeat our analysis of the average value premium and market return in each 
regime, and the results are also similar to those obtained with the HML portfolio: the 
value premium is highest in the LCAPM regime, at 1.29%, and nearly zero in the 
CAPM regime at 0.08%. It is also very high in the HCAPM regime, at 0.93%. As 
with the results for the HML portfolio, the difference in the median HML_EP return 
across regimes is statistically significant.  
 
2.3.5.2. The Pre-1963 Period 
 
In this subsection we repeat our analyses for the pre-1963 sample. This period is 
quite interesting because it contains the Great Depression, but also the remarkable 
post-war expansion of the US economy. When we estimate the regime-switching 
model for the market return over this period, we find that one of the regimes captures 
almost exclusively the Great Depression (see Figure 2-4), whilst the other two 
regimes have characteristics of bull and bear markets. Therefore we name the 
regimes ‘Great Depression’, ‘Bull’ and ‘Bear’. The average market return in the 
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Great Depression, Bull and Bear market regimes are -0.42%, 1.95% and -1.13% 
respectively, and the market volatilities are 12.99%, 2.93% and 5.85% (not reported).  
 The descriptive statistics over the pre-1963 period are reported in Panel B of 
Table 2-7, which shows that there is no value premium over the period: the average 
return of the HML strategy is 0.37%, and the CAPM alpha is only 0.06%, and not 
statistically significant. The estimates of the CAPM in the different market regimes 
are reported in Panel B of Table 2-8. The table shows that value is significantly 
riskier than growth in all three regimes, and the CAPM explains the returns on HML 
in all three regimes. The risk of HML is highest in the Great Depression (beta is 0.41 
and statistically significant), whilst it is similar in the bull and bear regimes. 
 The estimate of the regime-switching model with alternative risk measures 
(Panel B, Table 2-9) shows that value is riskier than growth in the CAPM and 
LCAPM regimes (the beta of HML in the CAPM regime is 0.20, and the downside 
beta in the LCAPM regime is 0.45, both statistically significant). Also, the upside 
beta of HML is positive and larger than its downside beta, suggesting that value 
firms are favoured by increases in the market return, relative to growth firms. In the 
HCAPM regime, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. Unlike our 
previous results, the average HML premium in the pre-1963 period does not seem to 
be related to these regimes (see Panel B of Table 2-10). 
Summarising our robustness checks, the results using the alternative 
portfolios formed on Earnings/Price largely confirm our evidence for the post-1963 
sample. The results with the pre-1963 sample are supportive of the risk base 
explanation of the value premium: during this period, value is riskier than growth, 
the value premium is explained by the CAPM and the risk of HML is highest in bad 
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states of the market. We conclude that the evidence supporting the theory, e.g. 
Petkova and Zhang (2005), is mainly driven by the inclusion of the pre-1963 period 
in the sample. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
This work contributes to the debate about the value premium in two ways. First, we 
show that the empirical conclusion of Petkova and Zhang (2005) that value is riskier 
than growth in bad times is driven by the pre-1963 period and the method they use to 
estimate the market risk premium. When we use a different method (a regime-
switching model) to identify the market state, there is little or no evidence that value 
is riskier than growth, and thus the value premium is not explained by higher risk of 
value firms in bad times.  
Second, we propose a regime-switching model which allows three different 
risk measures to be selected over time, relaxing the CAPM statement which is 
derived under restrictive assumptions such as normality of returns and quadratic 
utility. When both the probability density function of asset returns and investors’ risk 
aversion change over time, the simple mean-variance analysis could misspecify asset 
returns. Periods when returns are normally distributed can be modelled by the 
CAPM, but periods when returns become heavy-tailed and/or skewed or when 
downside and upside betas differ may be explained by higher moments in the 
HCAPM or dichotomous downside/upside betas in the LCAPM. We find that the 
value premium in the post-1963 sample can be empirically explained with this 
generalised model, but value is not riskier than growth in any of the regimes. 
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Overall, our results are not consistent with the risk-based explanation of the 
value premium proposed by Zhang (2005). We find that value stocks’ returns 
increase more in up-markets than they decrease in down-markets, which is reflected 
by the higher upside beta of value relative to its downside beta (or the positive 
coefficients on the square and cube of the market return), whilst growth stocks 
behave in the opposite way (their returns decrease more in down markets than they 
increase in up markets). However, overall the upside betas of growth portfolio are 
still larger than those of the value portfolio, which is the opposite of what is expected 
from Zhang’s theory. 
These results make a risk-based explanation of the premium less likely and 
also allow us to view the anomaly from a different perspective. As in Zhang (2005), 
during bull periods investors would gladly pay more to hold value firms but would 
not be willing to pay much for growth firms. Unless these asymmetric risk patterns 
can be linked to some kind of fundamental risk which is not captured by beta, our 
results point to behavioural explanations of the value premium, such as the one 
proposed by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). In this case, the question is 
why the anomaly persists, many years after having been documented. 
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Table 2-1 Descriptive statistics of value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios  
This table reports descriptive statistics for several value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios.  H and L are the value and growth portfolios obtained with a 2 by 3 sort on size 
and book-to-market ratio. Hs and Ls are the small-value and small-growth portfolios obtained with a five-by-five sort on size and book-to-market, and HML (HMLs) is a strategy 
which is long the H (Hs) portfolio and short the L (Ls) portfolio. The t-statistic are adjusted using the Newey and West (1987) method with 3 lags.  
 
 
Panel A. January 1927 - December 2006      
 H L HML Hs Ls HMLs Market 
Monthly return (%) 1.084 0.668 0.415 1.231 0.722 0.510 0.650 
Monthly volatility (%) 7.652 6.386 3.592 8.356 7.854 3.668 5.437 
Skewness 2.052 0.459 1.896 2.292 1.051 0.970 0.220 
Kurtosis 23.919 10.317 18.928 25.528 13.558 12.096 10.911 
Alpha (CAPM) (%) 0.258 -0.065 0.323 0.364 -0.114 0.478 - 
t-stat 2.449 -1.128 2.690 2.888 -0.996 3.813 - 
Panel B. January 1935 - December 2006      
 H L HML Hs Ls HMLs Market 
Monthly return (%) 1.154 0.675 0.479 1.284 0.721 0.563 0.696 
Monthly volatility (%) 5.742 5.511 2.939 6.385 6.794 3.174 4.527 
Skewness 0.185 -0.413 0.756 0.302 -0.239 0.334 -0.536 
Kurtosis 11.021 5.985 8.968 11.438 5.982 6.874 6.292 
Alpha (CAPM) (%) 0.371 -0.138 0.510 0.454 -0.205 0.659 - 
t-stat 3.869 -2.530 4.564 3.839 -1.867 5.470 - 
Panel C. January 1963 - December 2006      
 H L HML Hs Ls HMLs Market 
Monthly return (%) 0.894 0.441 0.453 1.075 0.456 0.619 0.477 
Monthly volatility (%) 4.633 5.558 2.901 5.329 6.961 3.325 4.380 
Skewness -0.318 -0.458 0.011 -0.331 -0.328 -0.135 -0.510 
Kurtosis 6.859 4.706 5.552 7.291 4.842 5.832 5.135 
Alpha (CAPM) (%) 0.448 -0.135 0.583 0.593 -0.202 0.795 - 
t-stat 4.072 -1.754 4.415 4.030 -1.312 5.358 - 
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Table 2-2 OLS regressions of CAPM, LCAPM (Lower Partial Moment CAPM) and HCAPM (Higher-moment CAPM) 
The table reports OLS estimation of the following three models: 
( )( ) ( )( )2 3
1 2 3
,
pt CAPM mt pt
pt LCAPM mt mt pt
pt HCAPM mt mt mt mt mt
r r
r r r
r r R E R R E R
α β εα β β εα β β β
− − + +
= + +
= + + +
= + + − + −
 
where ptr  denotes the excess return on either a value, growth or value-minus-growth portfolio, mtr denotes the excess market return, ( 0)mt mt mtr r I r
− = <
 
and ( 0)
mt mt mt
r r I r+ = > are the 
negative and positive components of the market return and 
mt
R is the raw market return. The LCAPM regression is estimated without the constant to obtain the correct upside and 
downside betas, as discussed in Post and Van Vliett (2005), and the constant is calculated as the mean of the residuals, i.e. ˆ ˆˆ
LCPAM pt mt mtr r rα β β+ + − −= − − . The t-stats are computed using 
the Newey and West (1987) method to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation with 3 lags. H and L are the value and growth portfolios obtained with a 2 by 3 sort on size 
and book-to-market, and HML is the H portfolio subtracted from the L portfolio. Hs and Ls are the small-value and small-growth portfolios obtained with a five-by-five sort on size 
and book-to-market, and HMLs is the Hs portfolio subtracted from the Ls portfolio. The coefficients b2 and b3 are multiplied by 100 for visualisation purposes.  
 
 
Panel A. January 1927 - December 2006 
  H   L  HML  Hs  Ls  HMLs 
Model   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
CAPM a 0.258 2.449  -0.065 -1.128 0.323 2.690 0.364 2.888 -0.114 -0.996 0.478 3.813 
 
b 1.270 17.700  1.128 54.660 0.142 1.904 1.333 16.617 1.284 29.679 0.048 0.696 
                                  
LCAPM a -0.224 -2.158  -0.071 -1.234 -0.154 -1.385 -0.181 -1.372 -0.173 -1.495 -0.008 -0.071 
 
b- 1.133 18.642  1.125 39.203 0.008 0.112 1.180 17.633 1.264 23.096 -0.084 -1.292 
 
b+ 1.385 9.472  1.128 30.952 0.257 1.758 1.464 8.743 1.296 15.414 0.168 1.221 
                                  
HCAPM a 0.102 0.942  -0.144 -2.450 0.246 2.000 0.188 1.391 -0.279 -2.360 0.467 3.522 
 
b1 1.161 20.820  1.161 43.669 0.000 -0.003 1.220 17.745 1.318 23.320 -0.098 -2.120 
 
b2 0.738 3.412  0.206 1.695 0.532 2.444 0.815 2.918 0.500 2.006 0.315 1.330 
 
b3 0.032 2.459  -0.011 -2.268 0.043 3.925 0.033 1.983 -0.012 -1.230 0.045 4.259 
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Panel B. January 1935 - December 2006 
  H  L HML Hs Ls HMLs 
Model   Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
CAPM a 0.371 3.869  -0.138 -2.530 0.510 4.564 0.454 3.839 -0.205 -1.867 0.659 5.470 
 
b 1.124 25.030  1.168 86.487 -0.045 -1.028 1.192 23.242 1.330 44.230 -0.138 -3.361 
LCAPM a 0.119 1.311  -0.040 -0.753 0.159 1.587 0.213 1.831 -0.010 -0.093 0.223 2.100 
 
b- 1.057 16.894  1.195 59.159 -0.138 -1.978 1.133 16.837 1.385 32.989 -0.253 -3.574 
 
b+ 1.199 13.138  1.139 41.556 0.060 0.751 1.267 11.350 1.274 21.131 -0.007 -0.092 
                 
HCAPM a 0.343 2.629  -0.140 -2.363 0.483 3.600 0.481 2.940 -0.170 -1.373 0.651 4.635 
 
b1 1.077 26.593  1.167 71.609 -0.090 -2.136 1.142 23.784 1.325 38.693 -0.184 -4.281 
 
b2 0.412 0.683  0.017 0.129 0.395 0.736 0.144 0.196 -0.153 -0.456 0.297 0.568 
 
b3 0.045 1.826  0.001 0.204 0.043 1.864 0.042 1.362 0.001 0.060 0.041 1.664 
     
Panel C. January 1963 - December 2006 
  H  L HML Hs Ls HMLs 
Model   Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
CAPM a 0.448 4.072  -0.135 -1.754 0.583 4.415 0.593 4.030 -0.202 -1.312 0.795 5.358 
 
b 0.935 23.620  1.208 70.235 -0.273 -6.812 1.011 20.936 1.381 34.660 -0.369 -8.937 
LCAPM a 0.235 2.456  -0.020 -0.272 0.255 2.187 0.381 2.920 0.061 0.405 0.320 2.497 
 
b- 0.881 13.205  1.240 47.903 -0.360 -5.082 0.962 11.780 1.458 25.213 -0.496 -6.425 
 
b+ 1.005 13.442  1.173 37.597 -0.168 -2.232 1.083 11.094 1.302 18.845 -0.219 -2.803 
HCAPM a 0.507 3.833  -0.062 -0.717 0.569 3.772 0.757 4.181 0.016 0.091 0.741 4.672 
 
b1 0.919 23.645  1.220 58.244 -0.300 -7.074 0.979 21.614 1.404 32.300 -0.425 -9.792 
 
b2 -0.249 -0.335  -0.462 -2.351 0.214 0.292 -0.750 -0.826 -1.319 -2.698 0.570 0.903 
 b3 0.011 0.265  -0.022 -2.201 0.033 0.837 0.017 0.353 -0.053 -2.062 0.070 2.196 
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Table 2-3 Descriptive statistics of value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios in different market regimes 
We model the market return with a first-order regime-switching process for the mean and volatility as in equation (2.9). We report descriptive statistics for the return on the market 
portfolios, as well as the value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios as defined by the H, L and HML portfolios from a 2 by 3 sort on size and book-to-market in each of the 
three regimes. We also conduct a Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of median HML and market returns in each regime. 
 
 Panel A. January 1927 - December 2006 Regime 1: Transition   Regime 2: Bull Market   Regime 3: Bear Market 
 H L HML Market H L HML Market H L HML Market 
Monthly return (%)  0.812   0.492  0.320   0.172  2.087 1.554 0.532 1.258  0.046 -0.142 0.188 -0.591 
Monthly volatility (%)  5.985  6.358  3.461   5.135  3.876 3.474 2.273 2.952  17.482 12.693 6.995 11.187 
Skewness -0.266 -0.177  0.083  -0.170  0.269 -0.042 0.654 -0.116  1.627 0.828 2.085 0.627 
Kurtosis  4.246  2.700  4.971   2.666  3.710 3.140 5.010 2.740  7.395 5.022 10.004 4.806 
Test: equality of median value premium across regimes: 0.001          
Test: equality of median market return across regimes: <0.0001          
 
  Panel B. January 1935 - December 2006 Regime 1: Transition   Regime 2: Bull Market   Regime 3: Bear Market 
 H L HML Market H L HML Market H L HML Market 
Monthly return (%) 1.873 1.345 0.528 1.153  2.245 1.841 0.404 1.298  -0.532 -1.051 0.519 -1.131 
Monthly volatility (%) 3.424 3.093 2.101 2.625  5.149 4.844 2.838 4.041  8.689 8.517 4.141 6.887 
Skewness 0.104 -0.418 0.964 -0.336  0.232 0.046 0.320 -0.017  0.589 0.075 0.813 -0.035 
Kurtosis 3.351 2.968 6.992 2.810  3.773 2.574 4.390 2.429  8.589 3.803 7.728 4.196 
Test: equality of median value premium across regimes: 0.683          
Test: equality of median market return across regimes: <0.0001          
 
  Panel C. January 1963 - December 2006 Regime 1: Transition   Regime 2: Bull Market   Regime 3: Bear Market 
 H L HML Market H L HML Market H L HML Market 
Monthly return (%) 1.608 0.945 0.663 0.761  2.356 2.560 -0.205 1.578  -0.435 -1.644 1.209 -1.538 
Monthly volatility (%) 2.879 2.966 1.935 2.268  3.679 4.664 2.673 3.530  6.638 7.740 3.833 6.343 
Skewness -0.058 -0.179 0.274 -0.248  0.154 0.098 -0.671 0.033  0.186 0.043 0.066 0.091 
Kurtosis 2.802 2.741 3.256 2.639  3.081 2.717 5.647 2.452  5.110 3.202 3.843 3.359 
Test: equality of median value premium across regimes: <0.0001          
Test: equality of median market return across regimes: <0.0001          
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Table 2-4 OLS regressions of CAPM value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios in different market regimes 
We estimate the regime-switching model for the market return (2.9) and then estimate the CAPM for the value (H), growth (L) and value-minus-growth (HML) portfolios 
conditioned on the market regime. The value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios are created from a 2 by 3 sort on size and book to market. 
 
 
 Panel A. January 1927 - December 2006  Panel B. January 1935 - December 2006  Panel C. January 1963 - December 2006 
  H   H  H 
Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: 
  Transition Bull Market Bear Market   Transition Bull Market Bear Market  Transition Bull Market Bear Market 
  a b a b a b   a b a b a b  a b a b a b 
coefficient 0.219 1.019 0.389 1.136 0.762 1.465   0.335 1.12 0.456 1.105 0.354 1.134  0.47 1.079 0.415 0.895 0.441 0.935 
t-stat 1.197 20.395 3.997 27.905 1.263 14.274   2.925 26.292 3.211 22.427 1.286 14.229  2.926 22.592 2.932 19.009 1.566 15.292 
                                         
  L   L  L 
Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: 
  Transition Bull Market Bear Market   Transition Bull Market Bear Market  Transition Bull Market Bear Market 
  a b a b a b   a b a b a b  a b a b a b 
coefficient -0.129 1.185 -0.093 1.096 0.363 1.108   -0.16 1.09 0.009 1.138 -0.084 1.206  -0.27 1.18 0.104 1.221 -0.383 1.185 
t-stat -1.292 57.047 -1.337 44.115 1.431 30.804   -1.879 36.471 0.101 49.727 -0.635 59.56  -2.117 25.602 0.765 35.542 -2.316 47.757 
                                         
  HML   HML  HML 
Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: 
  Transition Bull Market Bear Market   Transition Bull Market Bear Market  Transition Bull Market Bear Market 
  a b a b a b   a b a b a b  a b a b a b 
coefficient 0.348 -0.167 0.482 0.04 0.399 0.356   0.494 0.029 0.447 -0.033 0.438 -0.072  0.74 -0.101 0.31 -0.326 0.824 -0.251 
t-stat 1.627 -3.059 4.019 0.848 0.712 3.439   3.581 0.542 2.708 -0.599 1.535 -0.976  3.988 -1.535 1.517 -5.914 2.557 -4.129 
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Table 2-5 Estimation results for the regime-switching model with alternative risk measures 
We estimate the regime-switching model with alternative risk measures (2.7) for several value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios over the period from July 1963 to 
December 2006. The regimes are: regime 1 = CAPM, regime 2 = LCAPM, regime 3 = HCAPM), and regime changes are governed by transition 
probabilities
1
( | )ij t tp P S j S i+= = = , where tS is a latent variable which identifies the regime at month t. H, L and HML are the value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios 
obtained with a 2 by 3 sort on size and book-to-market. Hs, Ls and HMLs are the small-value, small-growth and small value-minus-growth portfolios obtained with a five-by-five 
sort on size and book-to-market. The estimation is done via a Bayesian Gibbs sampling approach and the values reported are posterior means and standard deviations of the 
parameters from 10000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler obtained after 30000 burn-in iterations. The coefficients b2 and b3 are multiplied by 100 for visualisation purposes. 
 
  Panel A. H, L and HML portfolios  Panel B. Hs, Ls and HMLs portfolios 
  H L HML  Hs Ls HMLs 
  Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.  Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
  a 0.213 0.087 -0.035 0.074 0.253 0.115  0.338 0.118 0.028 0.140 0.308 0.121 
CAPM b 0.897 0.038 1.187 0.071 -0.161 0.072  1.369 0.049 1.470 0.106 -0.281 0.046 
LCAPM b- 0.642 0.106 1.318 0.080 -0.691 0.155  0.677 0.143 1.277 0.115 -0.873 0.135 
 b+ 0.747 0.091 1.178 0.079 -0.475 0.110  1.110 0.130 0.959 0.088 -0.489 0.124 
HCAPM b1 1.230 0.049 1.196 0.094 -0.098 0.103  0.818 0.053 1.631 0.089 -0.132 0.106 
 b2 1.940 0.391  -0.429 0.503  3.374 0.850  -0.474 0.655  -0.820 1.067 3.491 0.147 
 b3 0.109 0.041  -0.016 0.039  0.166 0.047  0.022 0.053   -0.124 0.053 0.770 0.045 
 p11 0.966 0.023 0.720 0.181 0.885 0.078  0.915 0.044 0.903 0.059 0.851 0.076 
 p12 0.021 0.018 0.073 0.068 0.045 0.036  0.070 0.041 0.043 0.033 0.036 0.026 
 p13 0.014 0.014 0.208 0.175 0.069 0.071  0.016 0.015 0.054 0.052 0.113 0.073 
 p21 0.034 0.026 0.082 0.070 0.054 0.039  0.084 0.048 0.040 0.030 0.041 0.029 
 p22 0.854 0.053 0.811 0.123 0.865 0.067  0.870 0.056 0.851 0.100 0.919 0.037 
 p23 0.112 0.052 0.106 0.112 0.081 0.059  0.046 0.036 0.109 0.093 0.041 0.032 
 p31 0.015 07.016 0.212 0.175 0.090 0.077  0.017 0.016 0.042 0.050 0.141 0.078 
 p32 0.091 0.047 0.099 0.111 0.074 0.061  0.036 0.029 0.106 0.094 0.038 0.032 
 p33 0.894 0.051 0.690 0.188 0.836 0.094  0.947 0.034 0.852 0.104 0.821 0.085 
 σ1 1.639 0.242 1.376 0.425 3.581 1.018  3.716 0.817 26.510 4.956 3.151 0.682 
 σ2 8.463 1.530 6.184 1.085 11.721 1.933  19.166 3.131 4.761 1.072 16.130 2.843 
 σ3 2.211 0.580 1.567 0.492 3.861 1.291  3.074 0.642 5.382 1.042 4.929 1.441 
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Table 2-6 Average value-minus-growth return and market return per regime 
This table reports the average HML and average excess market returns per regime. The t-statistics for average HML (excess market return) compare the HML returns (excess market 
return) in each regime with the average HML (excess market return) over the whole sample. We also conduct a Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of median HML and market returns in 
each regime. We collect returns for each regime when the probability of each regime is the highest one at time t. Panel A reports results using the regimes inferred by applying the 
regime-switching model to the HML portfolio, and Panel B reports the same test using the regimes inferred from applying the regime-switching model to the HMLs portfolio. HML 
is the H portfolio subtracted from the L portfolio, where H and L are the value and growth portfolios obtained with a 2 by 3 sort on size and book-to-market. HMLs is the Hs 
portfolio subtracted from the Ls portfolio, where Hs and Ls are the small-value and small-growth portfolios obtained with a five-by-five sort on size and book-to-market. The sample 
period is from 1963 to 2004. 
 
 
Regime 
Number of 
months 
Average HML (HMLs) 
(%) 
t-stat 
p-value for H0: median 
HML (HMLs) is equal in 
all regimes 
Average excess 
market return 
(%)
t-stat 
p-value for H0: median 
market return is equal in 
all regimes
Panel A. Regimes inferred using HML portfolio, sample: 1963-2004 
CAPM 241 0.011 -3.820 0.562 0.298 
LCAPM 150 0.667 0.587 0.252 -0.578 
HCAPM 131 1.021 3.180 
<0.0001 
0.577 0.305 
0.569 
Whole sample 522 0.453   0.477    
         
Panel B. Regimes inferred using HMLs portfolio, sample: 1963-2004 
CAPM 249 -0.102 -4.140 0.668 0.658 
LCAPM 153 1.110 1.983 -0.136 -1.658 
HCAPM 120 0.768 1.575 
<0.0001 
0.861 1.191 
0.116 
Whole sample 522 0.619   0.477   
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Table 2-7 Descriptive statistics of additional value, growth and value-minus-growth 
portfolios 
We report descriptive statistics for value, growth and value-minus growth portfolios based on a decile 
sort on Earning-to-Price ratio over the period July 1963- December 2006, and for the value, growth 
and value-minus-growth portfolios obtained with a 2 by 3 sort on size and book-to-market over the 
January 1927-June 1963 period. We report unconditional OLS alphas (and the appropriate t-statistic 
adjusted using the Newey and West (1987) method) average monthly return, monthly volatility (both 
in %), skewness and kurtosis for each portfolio.  
 
 
 
7 
 H_EP L_EP HML_EP Market  
Monthly return 0.959 0.359 0.600 0.477  
Monthly volatility 5.263 5.740 4.591 4.380  
Skewness -0.134 -0.200 0.402 -0.510  
Kurtosis 6.052 4.466 5.552 5.135  
Alpha (CAPM) 0.481 -0.212 0.693   
t-stat 3.313 -1.969 3.111   
      
Panel B. Portfolios formed on Size and B/M - January 1927 - June 1962 
 H L HML Market  
Monthly return 1.306 0.936 0.371 0.854  
Monthly volatility 10.110 7.237 4.267 6.462  
Skewness 1.923 0.885 2.478 0.421  
Kurtosis 16.589 11.544 19.444 10.570  
Alpha (CAPM) 0.067 0.009 0.058   
t-stat 0.378 0.114 0.331   
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Table 2-8 OLS regressions of CAPM in different market regimes for additional portfolios  
We estimate the regime-switching model for the market return (2.9) and then estimate the CAPM for value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios conditioned on the market 
regime. Panel A reports results for value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios formed on a decile sort on Earnings/Price over the period from 1963 to 2006. Panel B reports 
results for value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios created from a 2 by 3 sort on size and book-to-market over the 1927-1963 period. 
 
 Panel A. Portfolios formed on Earning/Price, July 1963 - December 2006  Panel B. Portfolios formed on Size and B/M - January 1927 - June 1962 
  H_EP  H 
Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3:
  Transition Bull Market Bear Market  Great Depression Bull Market Bear Market 
  a b a b a b  a b a b a b 
coefficient 0.511 1.136 0.285 1.022 0.551 0.984  1.116 1.501 0.143 1.294 -0.062 1.427 
t-stat 2.599 17.194 1.439 17.117 1.456 13.227  1.323 13.996 0.952 20.999 -0.143 10.329 
                           
  L_EP  L 
Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3:
  Transition Bull Market Bear Market  Great Depression Bull Market Bear Market 
  a b a b a b  a b a b a b 
coefficient -0.233 1.18 -0.252 1.27 -0.34 1.16  0.484 1.087 0.058 1.002 0.049 1.149 
t-stat -1.493 18.927 -1.325 25.016 -1.374 23.988  1.23 25.52 0.782 44.379 0.234 25.002 
                           
  HML_EP  HML 
Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3: Regime 1: Regime 2: Regime 3:
  Transition Bull Market Bear Market  Great Depression Bull Market Bear Market 
  a b a b a b  a b a b a b 
coefficient 0.745 -0.044 0.537 -0.249 0.891 -0.176  0.633 0.414 0.085 0.292 -0.11 0.278 
t-stat 2.424 -0.396 1.549 -2.534 1.621 -1.552  0.798 3.835 0.507 5.008 -0.277 2.521 
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Table 2-9 Estimation results for the regime-switching model with alternative risk measures for additional portfolios 
 
We estimate the regime-switching model with alternative risk measures (2.7) for several value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios over the period from July 1963 to December 2006. 
The regimes are: regime 1 = CAPM, regime 2 = LCAPM, regime 3 = HCAPM), and regime changes are governed by transition probabilities 1( | )ij t tp P S j S i+= = = , where tS is a latent 
variable which identifies the regime at month t. Panel A reports results for value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios based on a decile sort on Earning-to-Price ratio over the July 1963-
December 2006 period, and Panel B for value, growth and value-minus-growth portfolios obtained with a 2 by 3 sort on size and book-to-market over the January 1927-June 1963 period. The 
estimation is done via a Bayesian Gibbs sampling approach and the values reported are posterior means and standard deviations of the parameters from 10000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler 
obtained after 30000 burn-in iterations. The coefficients b2 and b3 are multiplied by 100 for visualisation purposes. 
 
 
 Panel A. Portfolios formed on Earnings/Price, July 1963 - December 2006  Panel B. Portfolios formed on Size and B/M - January 1927 - June 1962 
  H_EP L_EP HML_EP  H L HML 
  Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.  Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
  a 0.202 0.119  -0.050 0.097  0.171 0.184  -0.110 0.110   -0.081 0.059  -0.087 0.120 
CAPM b 1.000 0.078  1.502 0.128  0.052 0.110  1.324 0.038  0.891 0.016  0.202 0.041 
LCAPM b- 0.580 0.182  1.101 0.140  -1.132 0.203  1.424 0.109  1.099 0.039  0.454 0.114 
 b+ 0.816 0.123  0.894 0.168  -0.649 0.150  1.820 0.070  1.102 0.031  0.669 0.061 
HCAPM b1 1.331 0.115  1.080 0.060  0.193 0.145  0.906 0.057  1.148 0.033  -0.078 0.068 
 b2 2.563 0.972  0.454 0.529  4.006 0.997  -0.456 0.526  1.318 0.235  0.758 0.617 
 b3 0.178 0.054  0.017 0.036  0.203 0.051  -0.047 0.033   0.129 0.020  -0.032 0.036 
                              
 p11 0.908 0.065  0.681 0.188  0.899 0.081  0.907 0.038  0.928 0.029  0.906 0.050 
 p12 0.041 0.039  0.287 0.184  0.043 0.041  0.046 0.028  0.035 0.021  0.052 0.035 
 p13 0.051 0.047  0.032 0.033  0.058 0.063  0.047 0.027  0.036 0.021  0.042 0.036 
 p21 0.059 0.050  0.295 0.190  0.054 0.046  0.070 0.039  0.040 0.025  0.067 0.042 
 p22 0.760 0.080  0.666 0.189  0.792 0.093  0.912 0.043  0.893 0.046  0.913 0.046 
 p23 0.181 0.076  0.039 0.047  0.154 0.094  0.018 0.017  0.067 0.037  0.020 0.020 
 p31 0.065 0.053  0.023 0.026  0.069 0.068  0.060 0.033  0.033 0.024  0.049 0.041 
 p32 0.166 0.072  0.036 0.043  0.151 0.099  0.018 0.016  0.069 0.037  0.025 0.023 
 p33 0.769 0.082  0.941 0.050  0.780 0.114  0.922 0.037  0.898 0.040  0.927 0.048 
 σ1 4.076 0.847  4.982 1.392  9.160 2.339  3.656 0.589  0.616 0.132  3.556 0.810 
 σ2 15.578 3.349  6.272 1.310  27.560 4.252  29.791 5.383  3.896 0.656  22.304 3.808 
 σ3 3.458 1.017  2.289 0.966  12.403 4.028  2.402 0.438  1.017 0.188  3.282 0.886 
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Table 2-10 Average value-minus-growth return and market return per regime for additional portfolios 
This table reports the average value premium and average excess market returns per regime. Panel A reports results for the value-minus growth portfolio based on a decile sort on 
Earning-to-Price ratio over the period July 1963- December 2006, and Panel B for the value-minus-growth portfolios obtained with a 2 by 3 sort on size and book-to-market over the 
period January 1927- June 1963.  The t-statistics for average value premium (excess market return) compare the value-minus-growth portfolios’ returns (excess market return) in 
each regime with the average value-minus-growth return (excess market return) over each complete sample. We conduct a Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of median value premium 
and market returns in each regime. We collect returns for each regime when the probability of each regime is the highest one at time t. HML_EP is the H_EP portfolio subtracted 
from the L_EP portfolio, where H_EP and L_EP are the value and growth portfolios obtained with a 2 by 3 sort on size and book-to-market. HML is the H portfolio subtracted from 
the L portfolio, where H and L are the value and growth portfolios obtained with a 2 by 3 sort on size and book-to-market. 
Regime 
Number of 
months 
Average HML (HML_EP) 
(%) 
t-stat 
p-value for H0: median 
HML (HML_EP) is 
equal in all regimes 
Average excess  
market return (%) 
t-stat 
p-value for H0: median 
market return is equal in 
all regimes 
Panel A. Regimes inferred using HML_EP portfolio, sample period: 1963-2006 
CAPM 264 0.086 -3.058 0.840 1.547 
LCAPM 137 1.293 1.146 0.551 0.178 
HCAPM 121 0.934 0.890 
0.032 
-0.400 -2.005 
0.012 
Whole sample 522 0.600   0.477   
         
Panel B. Regimes inferred using HML portfolio, sample period: 1927-1963 
CAPM 196 0.169 -1.353 0.898 0.121 
LCAPM 135 1.010 1.052 1.091 0.307 
HCAPM 113 -0.041 -2.210 
0.594 
0.495 -0.778 
0.755 
Whole sample 444 0.371   0.854   
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Figure 2-5 Smoothed probabilities for the regime-switching model with alternative risk measures  
The graphs show smoothed probabilities of the three regimes in model (2.7) (which correspond to the CAPM, LCAPM and HCAPM models) for the H, L, HML, Hs, Ls and 
HMLs portfolios. The sample is from January 1963 to December 2006. The probabilities are estimated with 10000 iterations of the Gibbs-sampling algorithm.  
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Chapter 3  
The Disappearance of Momentum 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Extensive empirical studies on asset pricing since the late 1970s have brought us a 
number of unexpected results, one of which is the momentum premium documented 
by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001). In their seminal work, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) report that strategies which buy stocks with high returns over the previous 3 
to 12 months and short stocks with low returns in the same period earn an abnormal 
return of approximately 1% per month over a holding period of up to 12 months. In 
their second paper on momentum, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) argue that the fact 
that the premium exists throughout the 1990s after being documented in their earlier 
work with data until 1990 suggests that the anomaly is not a product of data mining. 
Moreover, evidence of the existence of momentum in other markets makes this 
possibility unlikely (see Rouwenhorst (1998)). 
The size and apparent persistence of momentum profits have attracted 
considerable attention, and many studies have tried to explain the phenomenon. One 
strand of research aims to explain the momentum premium rationally. Some studies 
attempt to explain the premium with changes in fundamentals; Johnson (2002), for 
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instance, proposes a model in which stock returns are more sensitive to changes in 
expected growth when expected growth is high, and Liu, Warner and Zhang (2005) 
show that winners have higher dividend, investment and sales growth rates than 
losers, and thus the expected returns of winners are systematically higher than those 
of losers. Berk, Green and Naik (1999) suggest a dynamic model for a firm’s optimal 
investment choices which can generate the empirical pattern of momentum. Conrad 
and Kaul (1998) propose a risk-based explanation suggesting that the momentum 
premium originates from cross-sectional variation in expected returns. On the other 
hand, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) argue that time-variation in the sensitivities of 
the momentum strategy to macroeconomic factors can account for the momentum 
premium. 
Another view is that the momentum premium arises due to biases in the way 
investors behave or interpret information. Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) 
suggest that investors underreact to information such as past earnings, whilst Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) argue that psychological biases in investor’s 
perceptions create under- and overreactions which in turn are responsible for 
momentum and long-term reversal. Hong and Stein (1999) propose a model where 
information diffuses slowly, creating short-term price underreaction and allowing 
momentum traders to profit from following trends. These studies are supported by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004). Zhang 
(2006) analyses the role that information uncertainty (i.e. ambiguity about the 
implication of new information for a firm’s value) plays in the continuation of prices. 
He argues that investors underreact more strongly to public information when there 
is more uncertainty regarding this information.  
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The studies mentioned above propose various explanations about why 
momentum strategies are profitable, but they do not directly explain why the 
momentum premium has not disappeared once it became well known in the early 
1990s. One would expect that such a high premium would quickly disappear in a 
well-developed market due to arbitrage activity, unless it is a reward for risk, or it is 
not exploitable due to transaction costs, restrictions on short sales, illiquidity, or 
other market microstructure issues. Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) argue that, although 
market microstructure may explain a part of the profitability of momentum 
strategies, it cannot fully explain the anomaly, whilst Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
estimate that half of momentum profits can be explained by a liquidity factor. The 
large momentum premium, if it still exists more than 10 years from the first 
documentation in the academic literature, is hard to explain considering the 
increasing number of hedge funds that try to exploit every possible arbitrage 
opportunity. Moreover, other well-known premia such as the size and value effects 
have weakened since they were documented16.  
In this study, we contribute to the debate by questioning whether momentum 
strategies consistently provide premia over the sample period from January 1927 to 
December 2006. We analyse the risk-adjusted momentum premium of several 
momentum strategies with a model which allows for multiple structural breaks (or 
change-points) in the relationship between momentum returns and the risk factors17. 
The risk factors we use are the ones in the Fama and French (1993, 1996) three-
factor model.18 The model is estimated via a Bayesian approach, which provides a 
                                                 
16There is stronger evidence that the size premium has decreased, and only mixed evidence that the value premium has 
weakened in recent times, see Schwert (2003) and the discussion in Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). 
17 We use the terms ‘structural breaks’ and ‘change-points’ interchangeably in this work. 
18 All the results reported in this study are obtained using the Fama-French (1996) three-factor model, but we also found that 
these results vary little from those obtained with the CAPM. 
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convenient way to determine the optimal number of change-points through the Bayes 
factors.  
Our results indicate that, far from being a consistently profitable investment 
opportunity, the (risk-adjusted) premium from the momentum strategy is 
significantly positive only during certain periods, whilst it is close to zero or even 
negative during other periods. We find similar structural breaks for different 
momentum strategies during the period from January 1927 to December 2006. The 
momentum strategies appear to be anomalously profitable only during the 1940-1965 
and the 1975-2000 periods. In particular, the strategies do poorly since the last 
structural break which occurs around 2000.  
If momentum disappeared since 2000, the natural question is why it took so 
long for arbitrageurs to act, since momentum was first reported in the early 1990s? 
We seek an answer from the extraordinary boom in a few sectors such as high-tech 
and telecom stocks in the late 1990s. During the late 1990s, the momentum premium 
was driven by winners, many of which were hi-tech and telecom stocks which 
showed extraordinary outperformance. In fact, when these hi-tech and telecom stocks 
are excluded, the overall pattern in momentum profitability from the early 1990s is 
decreasing, and the magnitude of momentum profits in the 1990s becomes far 
smaller than that reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). Therefore we conclude 
that the momentum premium has slowly begun to disappear since the early 1990s. 
The main reason why momentum premium still appears to exist after it was first 
reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is that the premium was driven by a few 
sectors that showed an extraordinary boom in the late 1990s when these sectors 
played the role of winners in the momentum calculation.  
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 This paper is organised as follows. We introduce our methodology and 
briefly discuss the estimation method in Section 3.2. The explanation of the data set 
and empirical tests follows in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we discuss momentum in 
the context of the 1990s stock market boom. Section 3.5 concludes. A detailed 
description of the estimation of the methodology is given in the Appendix in Section 
3.6. 
 
3.2. Modelling Structural Changes in Premia 
 
3.2.1. Multiple Change-Point Model 
 
Estimates of a premium based on past data vary widely depending on sample periods 
and methodologies. Although estimates with longer time series data could provide a 
more precise perspective on the premium over a long horizon, they do not reflect 
time variation in the premium. Modelling time-variation in a premium may not be an 
easy task, since the model specification of the premium is not known. A simple 
method would be to assume a stochastic process for the premium. An alternative 
method which we use in this study is to allow regime changes in the premium over 
time, which is similar to the model that Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) use to estimate 
the equity premium. Our method consists in detecting changes in the premium with 
respect to other risk factors, whilst also allowing the premium to be different across 
regimes.  
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 The model we use to analyse the momentum premium is based on the class of 
multiple change-point models proposed by Chib (1998). This framework consists of 
a hidden Markov regime-switching model with a restricted transition probability 
matrix to model the change-points. The estimation of the model is carried out in a 
Bayesian fashion, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) efficient posterior 
simulation methods proposed by Chib (1998), in which the parameters of the model 
and the change-points are estimated conditioned on the number of breaks. Chib 
(1998) also provides details of the calculation of the marginal likelihood, from which 
it is possible to calculate the Bayes factors, in order to compare models with different 
numbers of structural breaks.  
 Consider the classical linear regression model  
 , 1, ,t ty t Tε′= + =tx ί K , (3.1) 
where in our case ty  represents the return on a momentum strategy at time t, ( )1 21 t t Ktf f f=tx L , where jtf , j = 1,…,K is the realised value of the j-th asset 
pricing factor at time t, ( )0 1 Kβ β β=ί L  is the vector of factor sensitivities and 0β  
is the intercept term, and tε  is a zero-mean error term with variance 2σ . The 
parameters of model (3.1) are collected in a vector ( )2,σ=θ ί . Now suppose that 
there are m  structural breaks in the model at unknown times { }1 2, , , mτ τ τ= Kϒ , that 
is, each of the intervals defined by the change-points is a different regime. In each of 
the m+1 regimes, the relationship between ty  and tX  is governed by a parameter 
vector ( )2k k kσ=θ ί , that is,  
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 The regime or state is indicated by a discrete random variable { }1, 2, , 1tS m∈ +K . Specifically, if tS k=  then the model is in regime k and the 
density of ty  is ( )1| ,t t kf y −y θ% , where ( )1 1 1t ty y− −=y% L . The variable St  is 
modelled as a discrete-state Markov process with a constrained transition probability 
matrix, such that switches can only occur from a certain regime, say regime k, to the 
next one,  k +1 . The transition probability matrix { }ijp=P , 
where
 
pij = P St = j | St−1 = i( ), is therefore represented as 
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. (3.3) 
Therefore, in this model the probability of a regime change depends on the current 
regime. The model starts in regime 1 at t = 1 , the first data point, and at 
 
t = T , the 
last observation, the model is in regime m + 1 . This constrained transition probability 
matrix enforces the ordered structure of the change-points given by (3.2). 
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3.2.2. Estimation 
 
The model is estimated via a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Bayesian 
approach, using the method proposed by Chib (1998). The parameters of the model 
are ( )1 1m+=θ θ θ% L  and P. In the Bayesian context, given a prior density ( , )π θ P% , the 
interest lies in obtaining the posterior density ( ) ( ) ( ), | , | , .T Tfπ π∝ ⋅θ P y θ P y θ P% % %% %
 
Chib (1998) suggests augmenting the parameter space to include the unobserved 
states ( )1, ,T TS S=S% K  and then applying an MCMC sampling scheme to the 
posterior density ( , , | )T Tπ S θ P y% % % . 
 
3.2.2.1. Priors 
 
One of the important benefits from using Bayesian methods is to obtain posterior 
probabilities for different priors, i.e. the researcher’s opinion can be incorporated into 
the posterior probability through different priors19. In our study, our prior knowledge 
does not suggest when there were structural breaks in the momentum premium (if 
any) and what the momentum premia were during the regimes. Therefore we use 
relatively uninformative priors, allowing the data to identify the structural breaks.  
We specify independent conditionally conjugate priors for the parameters of 
the model. The priors are given by 
                                                 
19 See for instance Ang and Chen (2007), who use different priors to explain the value premium. 
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 ( ) ( )2 0 00 0 0 0~ , , ~ , , ~ , ,
2 2
k k iiN IG p Beta c d
υ δσ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ί b B  (3.4) 
for 1, , 1, 1, ,k m i m= + =K K . We choose relatively uninformative priors for kί  
with ( )0 0 0=b L , and 0 10 K= ⋅B I , where KI is the identity matrix of size K K× . 
The priors for 2kσ  are also quite uninformative with 0 0 0.001υ δ= =  (which reflects a 
prior belief of a large variance). For the transition probabilities iip  we follow Chib 
(1998) and choose a prior that favours infrequent structural breaks. Specifically, our 
prior reflects an a priori belief that all regimes have the same expected duration of 
T
m
η = . This is achieved by choosing 0 /10c η=  and 0 0.1d = . For instance, if there 
are T = 960 months in our sample and m = 5, the expected duration of each regime is 
192η =  months, and the parameters which reflect this are 0 19.2c = 0 0.1d = , which 
imply a mean transition probability of 0.994820. 
 
3.2.2.2. Gibbs Sampling 
 
In this subsection we briefly describe the estimation procedure, and give a detailed 
explanation in Section 3.6. We use an iterative Gibbs sampling scheme to obtain the 
augmented posterior density, ( , , | )T Tπ S θ P y% % % . Given initial values ( ) ( )0 0,θ P% , the 
parameters and state vector are simulated from the following conditional 
distributions: 
                                                 
20 Note that the expected duration of a regime, when the transition probability is p, is given by 1/(1-p). 
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1. | , ,T TS y θ P% %% ,  
2. | , ,T Tθ y S P% %% , and 
3. | , ,T TP y S θ% %% , 
where in the second step we simulate, in turn, from the conditional distributions of 
2, , 1, , 1k k k mσ = +ί K . Whilst the conditional distributions in steps 2 and 3 are quite 
standard from Gibbs sampling methods, the simulation of TS
%  requires an elaborate 
recursive procedure. The joint distribution of TS
% , ( )| , ,T Tp S y θ P% %% , can be written as a 
recursion in reverse time order as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2| , , , | , , , | , , ,T T T t T t Tp p S p S− +× × × ×S y S θ P y S θ P y S θ P% % % % % %% % %K K . (3.5) 
Given that 1TS m= + , all that is needed to generate each , 1, ,1tS t T= − K  are the 
mass functions ( )1| , , ,t T tp S +y S θ P% %% . Chib (1996) shows that this mass function can 
be written as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1| , , , | , , | ,t T t t t t tp S p S p S S+ +∝ ⋅y S θ P y θ P P% % %% %  (3.6) 
where ( )1 | ,t tp S S+ P  is the transition probability from the Markov chain. The 
quantity ( )| , ,t tp S y θ P%%  can be calculated using a set of backwards recursions which 
are detailed in the Section 3.6. With these values in hand, TS
%  can be simulated using 
(3.6), where the normalising constant is easy to obtain, since conditioned on 1tS + , 
each tS can take only two values. 
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All our results are obtained with 10,000 iterations after 10,000 burn-in 
iterations, i.e. we start the MCMC sampling and allow the first 10,000 iterations to 
be discarded, so that convergence of the chain is guaranteed. 
 
3.2.3. Bayes Factors 
 
The number of structural breaks in the multiple change-point framework explained 
above is fixed and needs to be chosen before the model is estimated. Typically, one 
considers models with different numbers of structural breaks, and then calculates 
Bayes factors to choose between these models21. Consider two models 
r
M  and 
sM where r and s denote different numbers of structural breaks. The Bayes factor for 
comparing model 
r
M  versus model sM  is given by the ratio of the marginal 
likelihoods of 
r
M  to sM . We apply the method proposed by Chib (1995) to our 
multiple change-point model  in order to calculate the marginal likelihood from the 
Gibbs sampling iterations (see Section 3.6). 
Once we calculate the marginal likelihoods for any two models 
r
M  and sM , 
denoted by ( )|T rm y% M  and ( )|T sm y% M , the Bayes factor comparing rM  versus sM  
is given by 
 
( )( )||T rrs T smB m= yy%% MM  (3.7) 
                                                 
21 Kass and Raftery (1995) provide a review of the calculation and interpretation of Bayes factors.   
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where 
r
M  is more strongly supported over sM  as rsB  increases. Kass and Raftery 
(1995) suggest the following interpretation of the values of the Bayes factor in terms 
of the support for 
r
M  over sM . If 0 3rsB≤ < , there is very weak support, barely 
worth mentioning; if 3 20rsB≤ < , the support is moderate and significant; if 
20 150
rsB≤ < , there is strong and significant support and if 150rsB > , very strong 
and significant evidence to support 
r
M  over sM . 
 
3.3. Empirical Results 
 
3.3.1. Momentum Returns 
 
We use various momentum portfolios in this paper for robustness. For our main 
results, we form portfolios using all stocks traded in the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ on the CRSP monthly 
data file for the period from July 1926 to December 200622. In order to minimise the 
effects of the bid-ask bounce, at the end of each month t we sort stocks into decile 
portfolios based on their past five month returns from t-5 to t-1, skipping month t 
(formation period: 6 months), as in Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004). We then 
hold the portfolios for the next 6 months (holding period: 6 months). Following 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), we exclude all stocks with prices inferior to $5 at the 
portfolio formation date and all stocks whose sizes would place them in the smallest 
                                                 
22 AMEX stocks are present in the CRSP file from July 1962; NASDAQ stocks from December 1972. 
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NYSE decile, in order to minimise the effects of small and illiquid stocks. We call 
this portfolio WMLCRSP,6x6
23. As in the momentum literature, we construct 
overlapping portfolios to increase the power of the tests. For example, in Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001) a momentum decile portfolio in any month includes stocks ranked 
in that decile in any of the previous formation months. In this setting, we calculate 
momentum returns for the period from January 1927 to December 2006. 
 We explore a number of other momentum portfolios, which differ with regard 
to the size of the stocks allowed, the exchange in which the stocks are traded, and the 
length of the holding period. First, we maintain the formation and holding periods 
equal to 6 months, and construct momentum portfolios using only NYSE stocks, 
excluding those with market capitalisation smaller than the percentiles of size 10%, 
20% and 30% of the whole NYSE universe at formation time (we call these 
portfolios WMLNYSE10,6x6, WMLNYSE20,6x6 and WMLNYSE30,6x6). The purpose of this is 
to analyse the impact that size might have in the profitability of the momentum 
strategy. We also form momentum portfolios using all CRSP stocks larger than the 
smallest NYSE size decile, using a formation period of 6 months and holding periods 
of 1 month and 3 months (we call these portfolios WMLCRSP,6x1 and WMLCSRP,6x3), in 
order to investigate the impact of different holding periods. 
Table 3-1 reports summary statistics of the returns on the different 
momentum portfolios24. Using the whole sample from January 1927 to December 
2006 (Panel A), we find an average monthly momentum return ranging from 0.73% 
(for the WMLNYSE30,6x6 strategy, std. error 0.15) to 1.00% (for the WMLCRSP,6x1 
strategy, std. error 0.19). All momentum strategies have average returns which are 
                                                 
23 Unless otherwise specified, the results reported refer to this momentum strategy. 
24 Throughout this work we use the following terminology. We refer to the raw momentum returns as ‘momentum returns’ or 
‘momentum profits’, and to the risk-adjusted return using the Fama-French three-factor model (i.e. alpha) as ‘momentum 
premium’. 
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close to 0.80% to 0.90% a month and similar to the magnitudes reported in the 
literature (see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001)). In the pre-1963 period (Panel B), 
the average monthly returns from all strategies are smaller but still highly significant, 
close to 0.60% a month for all strategies. The momentum returns from all strategies 
is stronger in the post-1963 period (Panel C). For example, the commonly used 
WMLCRSP,6x6 strategy returns a monthly 1.16% (std. error 0.20). It is noteworthy that 
the momentum strategies are mostly negatively skewed and have large kurtosis, 
particularly during the pre-1963 period. It could be argued that if investors are 
sensitive to these features (as for instance if investors’ utility functions have the 
Arrow (1971) desirable properties of positive but decreasing marginal utility of 
wealth and non-increasing absolute risk aversion) they might not find the momentum 
strategies desirable despite the significant momentum profits. 
As expected, average momentum profits from the momentum strategy that 
excludes stocks smaller than the 30th percentile of NYSE stocks are lower than using 
all stocks in the three exchanges. In the pre-1963 period, however, excluding small 
stocks produces little difference in momentum.  
The average momentum returns are economically and statistically significant. 
Popular asset pricing models, namely the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor 
model, fail to explain the momentum premium, as in many previous studies (see for 
example Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001)). In Table 3-1, we confirm that the 
magnitude of the estimated alphas from these models is economically and 
statistically significant. The Fama-French model shows slightly higher premia than 
the CAPM: the estimates of the Fama-French alpha are larger than those of the 
CAPM alpha in all six momentum portfolios. For example, with the whole sample, 
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the estimated CAPM alpha of the WMLCRSP,6x6 strategy is at 1.03% (std. error 0.16), 
whilst the estimate of the Fama-French alpha is 1.15% (std. error 0.15).  
 
3.3.2. A Preliminary Analysis: Momentum in Five-Year Subsamples 
 
In this subsection we explore how momentum profits behave over time, by 
conducting an exploratory OLS analysis with non-overlapping 60-month subsamples 
of the data. We divide our entire 1927-2006 sample into 16 subsamples of 60 
months, each of which starts in January. 
We analyse the momentum premium in terms of average monthly returns and 
alphas from the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model. The results are 
reported in Table 3-2. From the 16 subsample periods, alphas are positive at the 5% 
significance level in 2 (3) subsample periods if the CAPM (Fama-French three-factor 
model) is used. If we are less strict and increase the significance level to 10%, then 
alphas are significant in 9 (5) subsample periods if the CAPM (Fama-French model) 
is used. Alphas do tend to be positive, i.e. they are negative in only 1 (2) subsample 
periods for the CAPM (Fama-French three-factor model), but a small number of 
significantly positive alphas could be much of a blow against the strategy. For 
example, for Benartzi and Thaler (1995) myopic investors, the strategy would still be 
too risky.   
In terms of the asset pricing factors that explain momentum returns, we note 
that there is a great deal of time-variability. For instance, in the CAPM, beta is 
negative and significant (at the 10% level) in some subperiods, whilst it is positive 
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and significant in others. This means that the betas of loser and winner portfolios 
vary over time; sometimes loser stocks are riskier than winner stocks, whilst during 
other periods the opposite happens. When the Fama-French three-factor model is 
used, a more consistent pattern emerges. The two additional factors SMB and HML 
tend to be significant, with the sensitivities to both SMB and HML generally 
negative. The last period, however, is remarkably different with notably high and 
positive sensitivity on HML, which means that there might be many value stocks in 
the winner portfolio during that period.  
 
3.3.3. Momentum Premium and Structural Breaks 
 
The results in the previous subsection show that the momentum premium changes 
over time; contrary to the results using long samples reported in Table 3-1, there 
seem to exist periods of time when momentum strategies yield insignificantly 
positive or even negative returns. Moreover, the sensitivities of the momentum 
strategy to the risk factors also change from period to period. We now investigate 
this issue by using the multiple change-point model in Section 3.2.1, where the risk 
factors are the Fama-French three factors and structural breaks are allowed to occur 
in the constant term, the sensitivities of the momentum portfolio to the risk factors 
and also in the idiosyncratic volatility25. We start by considering the WMLCRSP,6x6 
strategy (which is similar to the momentum strategies used in most studies) and later 
consider the other momentum strategies.  
 
                                                 
25 In this framework the structural breaks occur in all parameters simultaneously. 
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3.3.3.1. Structural Breaks in the Momentum Premium 
 
As mentioned previously, the number of structural breaks (or change-points) in the 
model has to be chosen in advance. In order to select an appropriate model, we 
estimate models with different numbers of change-points and then compare these 
models using the Bayes factors. Panel A of Table 3-3 reports the log-marginal 
likelihoods for models with different numbers of change-points, ranging from no 
change-point to seven change-points26. Panel B reports the difference between the 
log-marginal likelihoods of each pair of models. Recalling from (3.7) that the Bayes 
factor is given by the ratio of the marginal likelihoods, it follows that the Bayes 
factors can be calculated by exponentiating the values in Panel B27. Comparing the 
values in the table, we find very strong evidence for the model with six change-
points in terms of the Bayes factors. 
 In order to date the change-points, we consider the MCMC distribution of the 
variable 
TS
% . From these we can calculate the smoothed probability of the regimes, 
which we plot in Figure 3-1. The date of the change-points is chosen as the point 
when the smoothed probability of one regime becomes larger than the probability of 
the previous regime. As the graph shows, there is little ambiguity and the regime 
changes are quite clear.  
 The parameter estimates from this model, as well as the periods comprised by 
each regime (as explained above) are reported in Table 3-4. The table reports 
posterior medians and 0.95 probability intervals for the parameters, calculated with 
                                                 
26 We also considered models with more than seven change-points and in those cases the extra regimes collapsed to a single 
observation. We interpret that the data do not support more than seven change-points.  
27 For example, the Bayes factor of the model with 6 structural breaks versus the model with 5 structural breaks is given by 
exp(148.909). 
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the MCMC draws. The most striking result from this table is that the momentum 
premium (as measured by the alpha in each regime) is significant only during two of 
the seven regimes. Specifically, alpha is positive and significant during Regime 3 
(0.73% a month), which starts in May 1940 and finishes in March 1965, and during 
Regime 6 (1.13% a month), which starts in April 1975 and lasts until September 
1999. The last regime change occurs in October 1999. Since then, the median alpha 
is around 0.87% a month, but it is not statistically significant. So although - as 
argued by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) - the momentum premium has persisted 
throughout the 1990s, the momentum premium is no longer significant since the late 
1990s.  
 As expected, the sensitivities of the WMLCRSP,6x6  strategy to the Fama-French 
factors change quite dramatically from regime to regime. Whilst the sensitivity to 
HML is mostly negative (although it is significant in only two of the regimes), 
suggesting that the momentum strategy has more exposure to growth than value 
stocks, the sensitivity to SMB seems to alternate between negative (Regimes 1-3 and 
5) and positive values (Regimes 4, 6 and 7). This suggests that the momentum 
strategy is tilted towards small stocks during some periods and large stocks in others, 
which could be related to the cyclical variations in the risk and expected return of 
firms of different sizes, see for example Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000)28. 
We note that the sensitivity of the strategy to the market return also seems to 
alternate from positive to negative, indicating that during some regimes, winners 
have higher betas than losers, with the opposite happening during other regimes. 
 
                                                 
28 Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) show that the expected return of small firms increases sharply in recessions. If this is 
the case, small stocks might become winners during such periods and thus enter the momentum strategy.  
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3.3.3.2. Robustness of Structural Breaks in the Momentum Premium 
 
The results above were obtained with the WMLCRSP,6x6  strategy which considers all 
CRSP stocks. We have seen from Table 3-1 that momentum strategies constructed 
from different subsets of stocks and using different holding periods also earn 
significant premia. In this subsection we investigate whether there are structural 
breaks in the premia from these strategies, and whether they occur in similar dates as 
those we found using the WMLCRSP,6x6  portfolio. 
Since there is no guarantee that the number of change-points is the same for 
each momentum portfolio, we proceed as before and estimate models with different 
numbers of change-points, and then choose the optimal number of change-points 
through the Bayes factors. Table 3-5 reports the log-marginal likelihoods of models 
with different numbers of change-points for each of the momentum portfolios. To 
avoid repetition, we do not report the Bayes factors for all models for each 
portfolio29. Instead, we indicate the optimal number of change-points with bold 
values for the corresponding log-marginal likelihood. From the table, we see that the 
numbers of change-points are similar, i.e. 4 to 6 breaks during the sample period, 
although they are not exactly the same for all momentum portfolios. For example, 
four change-points are optimal for the WMLCRSP,6x3, five change-points for the 
WMLNYSE10,6x6 and WMLNYSE30,6x6, and six change-points for the WMLNYSE20,6x6 and 
WMLCRSP,6x1.  
We report the estimation results for the optimal models for each momentum 
strategy in Table 3-6. First, we notice that the regimes change in similar dates from 
                                                 
29 These can be easily calculated from the log-marginal likelihood values. 
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one strategy to another. For examples, for all strategies there is a change-point at the 
beginning of 1940, and the last change-point happens around the end of 1999 or 
2000. Also, for most momentum portfolios there is a regime that starts at 1975 and 
lasts until around 2000.  
Second, as in our previous results, momentum premia are not always 
significantly positive. A remarkably consistent pattern seems to emerge; for all 
momentum strategies, the periods when the alphas are positive are between 1940 and 
1970 (or around 1965 for the WMLCRSP,6x6 and WMLCRSP,6x1 strategies), and from 
1975 to around 1999 or 200030. Although the magnitude of the premia varies 
according to the momentum strategies, the momentum strategies based only on 
NYSE stocks show smaller premia than the other strategies. For example, the 
premium from the three NYSE momentum strategies (Panels A, B and C) during the 
period from 1975 to 2000 range from 0.77% a month for the WMLNYSE30,6x6 to 
0.87% a month for the WMLNYSE10,6x6. Excluding small and illiquid stocks could 
significantly reduce momentum premium. Strategies that are constructed with larger 
stocks show smaller premia (e.g. 0.77% with WMLNYSE30,6x6) than those constructed 
together with smaller stocks (e.g. 1.13% with WMLCRSP,6x6)
31.  
Finally, after the last change-point in the end of 2000, alphas become much 
smaller than those in the previous periods, from 0.06% a month for the 
WMLNYSE30,6x6 to 0.63% a month for the WMLCRSP,6x1, and none of these alphas are 
significant at the 95% level.  
                                                 
30 It seems that the last change-point occurs earlier for momentum strategies based on all CRSP stocks than for momentum 
strategies based only on NYSE stocks: for all CRSP-based momentum strategies there is a structural break in the end of 1999, 
and for all NYSE-based momentum strategies the break occurs in the end of 2000. 
31 The difference in the median premium is statistically significant. 
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Summarising the results so far, structural breaks occur in similar dates 
regardless of how momentum portfolios are constructed, and the momentum 
premium is not always significant. During periods when the momentum strategy is 
profitable, it is profitable for all the strategies regardless of firm size as in Fama and 
French (2008), but our results suggest that small stocks contribute more to 
momentum premium than large stocks. Finally and more importantly, we confirm 
that momentum premium does not exist since 2000.  
 
3.3.4. Is the Recent Period Unusual? 
 
Our previous results indicate that there have been periods of poor momentum 
performance in the past. An interesting question is whether the recent momentum 
premium is unusual relative to other periods. In this section we analyse this issue 
with a bootstrap experiment.  
 
3.3.4.1. A Bootstrap Experiment 
 
We conduct a bootstrap experiment designed to estimate the probability of observing 
the mean momentum return and the momentum premium in the period after the last 
structural break, in view of the past distribution of momentum returns over various 
periods of strong and poor momentum performance. We sample from the ex-post 
distribution of momentum returns with replacement and then calculate the mean 
momentum return and also estimate the momentum premium using the Fama-French 
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three-factor model. By doing this repeatedly, we can estimate the empirical 
distributions of the mean momentum return and the momentum premium over a 
period. We then compare the recent momentum premium (and mean momentum 
return) with these empirically-constructed distributions. If the recent momentum 
premium lies on the left tail of these distributions, this is evidence that the 
momentum premium since the last structural break is different from the one inferred 
from the historic data. 
We need to choose a period of time from which to sample, which we call the 
sampling period, and a reference period we want to calculate probabilities for. To 
eliminate a possible influence of the period which contains the hi-tech bubble (see 
Section 3.4), we choose January 2001 to December 2006 as the reference period. We 
then draw 100,000 random samples of 72 months (the number of months in the 
reference period) from the sampling period with replacement. To account for periods 
of strong and poor momentum performance, we use the following sampling periods, 
based on the structural breaks found in Table 3-4: January 1927 to December 2000 
(the whole sample up to the start of the reference period), January 1927 to April 1940 
(the period corresponding to the first two regimes, which is a period of poor 
momentum performance), May 1940 to March 1965 (the period corresponding to 
Regime 3, which is a period of significantly positive momentum premium), April 
1965 to March 1975 (the period corresponding to the fourth and fifth regimes, 
another period of poor momentum performance) and April 1975 to December 2000 
(the period corresponding to the sixth regime, which is a period of very strong 
momentum performance).  
Table 3-7 reports the results. We find that the average momentum return in 
the recent period is not unusual. The probabilities of observing a smaller mean 
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momentum return based on the various sampling periods are quite large, except for 
the last period from April 1975 to December 2000, which is a period of very strong 
momentum performance. On the other hand, the risk-adjusted momentum premium 
over the period from January 2001 to December 2006 is very improbable relative to 
all sampling periods, except for the period from January 1927 to April 1940. For all 
other sampling periods, the probabilities of observing a risk-adjusted momentum 
premium inferior to the one in the recent period from 2001 is less than 1%. Even if 
we use the time period that includes the Great Depression, i.e. the January 1927 to 
April 1940 sampling period, the recent momentum premium is larger than the premia 
from only 14% of the bootstrap samples. However, this period includes the 
extremely volatile period of the Great Depression, and the standard deviation of the 
empirical distribution of alpha calculated from this period is almost double that of 
any of the other periods, and thus the momentum premium during this period is not 
significant at all.  
We therefore conclude that the recent period when momentum has 
disappeared is different from previous periods in terms of momentum premium, 
whether we consider periods of strong or weak momentum premium, or the whole 
historical distribution over more than 70 years. We interpret this as evidence that the 
premium has been eroded away, an issue which we discuss in more detail next. 
 
3.3.5. Discussion: Delays in the Disappearance of Momentum 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) assert that, because momentum profits exist (and are 
similar to previous periods’ profits) in the nine years subsequent to the Jegadeesh and 
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Titman (1993) sample period32, it is unlikely that the momentum premium is a result 
of data snooping, and that “market participants have not altered their investment 
strategies in a way that would eliminate this source of return predictability” 
(Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), page 718). 
Our results suggest that since the last structural break which occurs at the end 
of 1999 (or 2000, depending on the momentum strategy) the premium is not 
significant. Considering that momentum has been very popular in academic works as 
well as in practice since the seminal paper of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), we 
wonder why it took such a long time for investors to erode the profit opportunity 
from simple momentum strategies. If the market is efficient, its participants are 
expected to act quickly in exploiting arbitrage opportunities if momentum is not 
related to priced risk.  
One possibility is that not all investors can easily implement the momentum 
strategy. The portfolio of loser stocks contains stocks with extreme past 
underperformance, likely to be small cap and illiquid (see Korajczyk and Sadka 
(2004)) and difficult to short. Also, although Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) estimate 
that momentum strategies could still be profitable for funds with size up to $4.5 to 
$5.0 billion (which potentially includes many funds), fund managers might be unable 
to borrow shares.  
Whilst these possibilities may all contribute to the delayed erosion of 
momentum profits, in our study we propose a different story. We notice that just 
after the publication of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), an unprecedented stock market 
boom - driven mainly by hi-tech stocks - followed in the late 1990s. During that 
                                                 
32 The sample period used in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) ends in 1990. 
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period, investors pursued these stocks creating bubbles in a few sectors, and 
momentum profits appeared to increase since stocks in these sectors were winners 
and widened the gap between winners and losers. Even though momentum profits 
after 2000 are not significant after accounting for risk, raw momentum profits are 
still high in the first years after the burst of the bubble, since the previously inflated 
prices of hi-tech stocks were driven down and these stocks became losers. We 
explore this idea in the next section.  
 
3.4. Momentum Premium During Boom and Bust 
 
Despite the unprecedented boom in the late 1990s which increased momentum 
profits, the momentum strategy might not have been attractive to investors during 
this period, since higher returns were possible from investing in hi-tech stocks. For 
example, during the period from January 1995 to December 1999, the Dow Jones 
and the NASDAQ had average returns of 1.82% and 4.79% a month (standard errors 
0.49% and 1.07% respectively), which means that investors could earn an average 
return of 2.98% a month during the period (standard error 0.92%) by buying hi-tech 
stocks and short-selling ‘old economy’ stocks. In this subsection we analyse the 
contribution of different sectors of the economy to the profit of the momentum 
strategy. 
There have been some studies relating individual stock momentum to 
industry momentum, such as Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), who document a 
momentum effect in the industry component of stock returns, i.e. a momentum 
strategy appears to be significantly less profitable after they control for industry 
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momentum, whilst industry momentum is highly profitable even after controlling for 
size, book-to-market and individual stock momentum effects. They claim that this 
industry momentum accounts for much of the individual stock momentum. However, 
subsequent work by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Grundy and Martin (2001) 
shows that industry effects do not explain momentum. We analyse this issue from a 
different perspective. Instead of calculating industry momentum, we calculate the 
momentum premium using stocks in all industries, and then break it down into 
industry-specific components. Thus we can calculate how much each sector of the 
economy contributes to the profits of the winner and loser portfolios. 
 Our definition of industries is similar to the one used by Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999). We separate stocks into eleven sectors (Consumer Non-Durables, 
Consumer Durables, Manufacturing, Energy, Hi-Tech, Telecom, Shops, Health, 
Utilities, Financials and Others) according to their SIC codes. Every month, we 
create overlapping momentum portfolios as before, making a note of the industry 
from which each stock in the loser and winner portfolios come. Then we break down 
each month’s loser and winner returns as the equally-weighted sum of the returns on 
the stocks coming from each industry. Since we are interested in the effect of the 
bubble on the contribution of hi-tech stocks to momentum profits, we focus on five-
year subsamples such that one of the subsample isolates the bubble period. Table 3-8 
reports these contributions in terms of average returns (Panel A) and as proportions 
of total momentum return (Panel B). The data from Panel B are plotted in Figure 3-2. 
The graph shows that some industries tend to contribute more to the momentum 
premium than others. Before the 1990s, most of the profits from the momentum 
strategies seem to come from traditional ‘old economy’ industries such as 
Manufacturing, Consumer Non-Durables, Shops and Financials, although Hi-Tech 
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has a sizeable contribution as well. Also, a large part of the profits seems to come 
from stocks not classified in any of the groups, which we label ‘Other’ (meaning they 
do not belong to any of the other 10 industries).  
Momentum profits are driven by different sectors in different periods. For 
example, the contribution of the Energy sector to momentum profits becomes large 
during the 1977-1982 period (around 24% of the profits of the momentum strategy, 
see Panel B of Table 3-8), which is quite different from other periods. A closer 
inspection reveals that this is due to the outperformance of the Energy sector that 
belongs to the winner portfolio as a result of the energy crisis of 1979. Another 
example is Financials from 1983 to 1994 when the financial sector contributes to 
almost 40% of the total momentum profits. Financials contribute to winners during 
the period from 1983 to 1988, whilst they contribute to winners as well as losers for 
the period from 1989 to 1994. Financials contribute to losers from the late 1980s to 
the early 1990s since many firms in the financial sector suffered losses from 
mortgage loans during the Savings and Loan crisis. 
 The subsample period that contains the period from 1995 and 1999 
practically isolates the impact of the hi-tech bubble of the 1990s on momentum 
profits. The momentum strategy during this period yields the highest profit 
amongstst the subsample periods considered, and more than half of these profits 
come from high-tech and telecom stocks. Panel A of Table 3-8 reveals that, from the 
average raw monthly momentum return of 2.07% during the period, 1.17% comes 
from hi-tech and telecom stocks, which corresponds to a proportion of almost 60% of 
momentum profits. A similar analysis for the winner and loser portfolios (not 
reported) indicate that most of the profits come from the long side, i.e. from the 
winner portfolio: the average winner return over this period is 2.81% (of which 
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1.62% is from hi-tech and telecom stocks), whilst the average loser return is 0.74% 
(of which 0.45% comes from telecom stocks).  
 The following subsample, from 2001 to 2006, contains the aftermath of the 
hi-tech bubble. Although momentum profits during this period are lower than those 
during the bubble, a large proportion of the profits from the momentum strategy in 
this period still comes from hi-tech and telecom stocks, as shown by the last row in 
Panel B, where the combined contribution of the hi-tech and telecom stocks 
corresponds to nearly 50% of the raw momentum return.  Unlike in the previous 
subsample, however, this profitability comes from the loser portfolio. From the 
average momentum return of 1.03% during the period, hi-tech and telecom stocks 
contribute with only 0.10% in the winner portfolio, but their negative returns in the 
loser portfolio of -0.38% boost momentum during this period (not reported).  
 One simple method to investigate how much the momentum profits are 
affected by the effect of the bubble in these sectors would be to separate the 
contribution of hi-tech and telecom stocks. Figure 3-3 shows average monthly 
momentum profits year-by-year, broken down by the contribution of two categories: 
hi-tech and telecom stocks, and all other stocks. First, it is clear that the contribution 
of the hi-tech and telecom group is atypical during the late 1990s. Second, a few 
years after the burst of the bubble (2000), momentum returns increase again (this is 
due to the negative returns of hi-tech and telecom stocks in the Loser portfolio). 
Finally, immediately after the bubble, i.e. 2001 and 2002, momentum profits are 
close to zero. Considering that winners and losers are calculated with past returns, 
the difference between winner and losers during the transition period is not as clear 
as that in other periods.  
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We analyse the impact of the hi-tech and telecom stocks on momentum 
profits in a few different ways. First, looking at the momentum profits without the 
contribution of hi-tech and telecom stocks (Figure 3-4), the overall pattern is that 
momentum returns have been going down with successively lower average returns 
since the middle 1990s. This is confirmed by looking at the cumulative profits of 
momentum strategies, which we plot in Figure 3-6 for various starting dates. If the 
profitability of momentum were constant, the graph should decline constantly with 
the starting date. Quite clearly, the profitability has decreased sharply in recent years. 
Second, we construct a momentum portfolio that does not allow hi-tech and telecom 
stocks at all. In this case, winners and losers are not necessarily the same as those 
when all firms in the stock market are considered. Figure 3-5 shows the average 
yearly returns of this restricted momentum strategy. The pattern seems to be very 
similar to the one in Figure 3-4, although it is clear that the profits tend to be larger in 
the late 1990s, indicating that other sectors were also affected by the bubble.  
We test whether or not there are differences in momentum returns with and 
without Hi-tech and Telecom stocks. We consider three periods. The first one is from 
1963 to 1994, which we name the pre-bubble sample. The second one is from 1995 
to 1999 (the bubble period), and the last one is the post-bubble period from 2000-
2006. We then calculate the difference between the returns on the momentum 
strategy which uses all stocks and the restricted momentum strategy that does not 
allow hi-tech and telecom stocks. Table 3-9 reports the results. During the pre-bubble 
period, the difference between the two strategies is negligible. The difference in 
average return between the two strategies is virtually zero, and not statistically 
significant. This indicates that before the bubble, including or not hi-tech and 
telecom stocks in the momentum strategy did not affect its return. During the bubble, 
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the average monthly difference between the returns on the two strategies is around 
0.6%, and statistically significant. During the post-bubble period, however, the 
situation seems to have come back to the pre-bubble state: during the 2000-2006 
period the average difference between the returns on the unrestricted and restricted 
momentum strategies is around 0.11%, and not statistically significant. These results 
confirm that momentum is increased during the late 1990s due to the bubble in a few 
sectors. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
The momentum premium from buying winner and selling loser stocks has been a 
defiant anomaly in the Finance literature, apparently persisting for years after being 
documented across a variety of markets. It has been almost 15 years since Jegadeesh 
and Titman’s (1993) study, and although many theories have been presented, there 
has not been a definite explanation of the phenomenon. Not only has it proven very 
difficult to link momentum to a risk-based explanation, but the behavioural theories 
of investor under- and overreaction fail to explain why this near-arbitrage 
opportunity persisted for such a long period of time after being so well divulged. 
Using a model with multiple structural breaks, we investigate the momentum 
premium over the period from 1927 to 2006. We find that the risk-adjusted 
momentum premia from several different momentum strategies are consistently 
significant and positive only during certain periods, such as the period from the 
1940s to the mid-1960s and from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. Not only has 
momentum disappeared during the recent period since the late 1990s, but we also 
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find evidence that the post-1990s momentum premium is also extremely improbable 
compared to previous periods of weak momentum performance.  
Although these results show that the momentum premium has disappeared, 
the question of why it persisted for so long after becoming well-known in the early 
1990s still remains. We seek an answer from the bubble in hi-tech and 
telecommunication stocks during the late 1990s. Because of the bubble (high returns 
that persist for several years), hi-tech and telecom stocks entered the winner 
portfolio, increasing momentum profits. However, investors might not have been 
attracted to momentum strategies, since higher returns were possible by taking long 
and short positions in hi-tech firms and the so-called old economy stocks, 
respectively. After the bubble, momentum increasingly became the focus of 
exploitation by arbitrageurs in the market. Concordantly, the post-1990 period has 
also seen a large increase in the size and number of hedge funds - specialised agents 
with fewer limitations and constraints, who can undertake the kind of active trading 
required by momentum strategies. As far as these arbitrageurs are active in the 
market, the momentum profits we have observed over extended periods in the past 
are not likely to repeat again in the future.  
Despite our interpretation that the momentum premium is not likely to be 
significant over long periods of time in the future, our analysis of the contribution of 
different industries to the profits of the momentum strategy suggests two situations in 
which significant momentum profits might be found. First, during periods of stock 
market bubbles in subsets of stocks (such as hi-tech stocks during the 1990s), 
because the pattern of successively increasing prices widens the gap between winners 
and losers. Second, when a group of stocks outperforms (underperforms) others with 
a series of good (bad) news over a period of time, increasing (decreasing) the share 
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prices and making these stocks winners (losers) in the momentum strategy. Examples 
include energy stocks during the oil shock of 1979 and financial stocks in the 1980s. 
In this study we do not propose a risk-based explanation of the momentum premium, 
but suggest the possibility that momentum might in some cases arise due to irrational 
investor behaviour (in bubbles), whilst in other cases it can arise rationally (with 
long-lasting sequences of good or bad news for a group of stocks). 
 
3.6. Appendix 
 
3.6.1. Gibbs Sampling Scheme 
 
We use an iterative Gibbs sampling scheme to obtain the augmented posterior 
density ( )π T TS ,θ,P | y% % % . Given initial values for θ and P, the parameters and state 
vector are simulated from the following conditional distributions: 
1. T TS | y ,θ,P% %% , 
2. | ,T Tθ S y ,P% % % and 
3. | , ,T TP θ S y% % % . 
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3.6.1.1. Simulating 
T TS | y ,θ, P% %%  
 
The simulation of 
TS
%  requires an elaborate recursive procedure. The joint 
distribution of 
TS
% , ( )p T TS | y ,θ,P% %% , can be written as a recursion in reverse time 
order as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1| , , , | , , |T tp S p S p S− × × × ×T T T t+1 T 2y S θ P y S θ,P y ,S ,θ,P% % % % % %% % %K K  (3.8) 
Given that 1TS m= + , all that is needed to generate each tS  is each mass function ( )| , ,tp S T t+1y S θ,P% %% . Then it is possible to generate, in turn,  
• 1TS −  from ( )1 | , , ,Tp S − T Ty S θ P% %% , 
• 2TS −  from ( )2 1| , , ,Tp S − −T Ty S θ P% %% , 
•   M  
•  1S  from ( )1 |p S T 2y ,S ,θ,P% %% . 
Chib (1996) shows that this mass function can be written as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1| , , | , | ,t t t tp S p S p S S+∝ ⋅T t+1 ty S θ,P y θ,P P% % %% %  (3.9) 
where ( )1 | ,t tp S S+ P  is the transition probability from the Markov chain. The 
quantity ( )| ,tp S ty θ,P%%  can be calculated using a set of backwards recursions. Given 
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the initial value ( )1 11| , 1p S = =y θ,P%% , the values of ( )| ,tp S ty θ,P%%  from t = 2 to t = 
T are obtained from iterating on the two equations below: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1 1 ,
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
| , | , 1, , 1
| , | ,
| , , 1, , 1.
| , | ,
k
t t lk
l k
t t
t m
t t l
l
p S k p S l p k m
p S k f y
p S k k m
p S l f y
− − −= −
− −+
− −=
= = = ⋅ = +
= ⋅= = = += ⋅
∑
∑
t t
t t k
t
t t
y θ,P y θ,P
y θ,P y θ
y θ,P
y θ, P y θ
% %% % K
%% %%% K
%% %
(3.10) 
With these values in hand, 
TS
% can be simulated using (3.9), where the normalising 
constant is easy to obtain, considering that each tS  can take only two values, 
conditioned on 1tS + .  
The complete simulation of 
TS
%  in Step 1 thus can be summarised by the 
following three steps. 
i. Initialise ( )1 11| , 1p S = =y θ,P%%  
ii. For 2, ,t T= K , iterate on the equations in (3.10) 
iii. Set 1TS m= + . For 1, 2, , 2t T T= − − K , compute ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1
1
| , | ,
| , | ,
t t t
k
t t t
l k
p S k p S k S k
prob
p S l p S k S l
+
+= −
= ⋅ = == = ⋅ = =∑ t ty θ,P Py θ,P P%% %%  
and generate tS from a Binomial(1,prob). 
 
3.6.1.2. Simulating | ,T Tθ S y , P% % %  
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The simulation of | ,T Tθ S y , P% % %  consists of first simulating kί , 1, , 1k m= +K , 
conditioned on 2, ,kσT Ty ,S P%%  and then simulating 2kσ , 1, , 1k m= +K  conditioned on 
T T ky ,S ,ί , P%%  . Recalling that the priors chosen are ( )~ ,Nk 0 0ί b B  and 
2 0 0~ ,
2 2
k IG
υ δσ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , the posterior distributions are standard. Let { }:t ty S k= =ky%  and { }:t tX S k= =kX%  contain the values of y and X which belong to regime k. Then 
 ( )2| , , ~ ,k Nσk T T 1,k 1,kί y ,S P b B%% , (3.11) 
where 
 ( )( ) ( )2 2k kσ σ− −′ ′ ′= + ⋅ +-1 -11,k 0 k k 0 0 k kb B X X B b X y% % % % , (3.12) 
and 
 ( )( )2kσ − ′= +-11,k 0 k kB B X X% %  (3.13) 
In turn, the posterior distribution of each 2kσ  is  
 2 1 1| ~ ,
2 2
k IG
υ δσ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠T T ky ,S ,ί , P%% , (3.14) 
where 1, 0
1
T
k t
t
S kυ υ == + =∑  and  ( ) ( )1, 0kδ δ ′′ ′= + −k k k k k ky X ί y - X ί% %% % . 
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3.6.1.3. Simulating 
T TP | y ,S ,θ% %%  
 
Finally, to simulate the posterior of the transition probability matrix P, we only need 
to simulate transition probabilities , 1, ,kkp k m= K  (recall that 1, 1 1m mp + + = ). Given 
the prior ( )0 0~ ,kkp Beta c d , the posterior distribution of each kkp  is given by 
 ( )0 0~ , 1kk kkp Beta c n d+ + , (3.15) 
where kkn  is the number of times that the model stayed in regime k. 
 
3.6.2. Calculating the Marginal Likelihood 
 
We now show how the calculation of the marginal likelihood is done in the multiple 
change-point regression model following the method by Chib (1995). Chib shows 
that the marginal likelihood of model 
r
M  may be written as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )| , , , || | ,r rr rfm ππ= * * * *TT * * Ty θ P θ Py θ ,P y% %%% % %M MM M , (3.16) 
where * *θ ,P%  is any point in the parameter space, ( )| , rf * *Ty θ ,P%% M  is the likelihood 
function, and ( )| rπ * *θ ,P% M  and ( ), rπ * * Tθ ,P | y% % M  are the prior and posterior 
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ordinates evaluated at * *θ ,P% . In the following we suppress the dependence on the 
model. It is convenient to calculate the log of (3.16), 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln ln ln lnm f π π= + −* * * * * *T T Ty y |θ ,P θ ,P θ ,P | y% % %% % %  (3.17) 
 The method proposed by Chib (1995) consists in choosing a particular point * *θ ,P%  
and calculating the above quantity using the output from the Gibbs sampler. 
Although the choice of * *θ ,P%  is in theory irrelevant, it is better to choose a high 
density point. Therefore we choose * *θ ,P%  to be the posterior mean. Having selected 
* *θ ,P% , the calculation of (3.16) requires the likelihood, the prior and posterior 
ordinates. From these, the prior can be obtained directly. We next describe the 
calculation of the likelihood and the posterior ordinate. Liu and Maheu (2008) 
provide a detailed explanation of these calculations for a very similar model. 
 
3.6.2.1. Likelihood Function at 
* *θ ,P%  
 
The calculation of ( )f * *Ty |θ ,P%%  is based on the decomposition 
 ( ) ( )( )
1
ln ln | ,
T
t
t
f f y==∑* * * *T t-1y |θ , P y θ , P% %% % , (3.18) 
where  
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 ( ) ( ) ( )
1
| | , | .
m
t t t t
k
f y f y S k p S k== = =∑* * * * * *t-1 t-1 t-1y ,θ , P y ,θ ,P y ,θ ,P% % %% % % (3.19) 
 The expression above is easily obtained as ( )| ,t tf y S k=* *t-1y ,θ ,P%%  is the 
conditional density of ty  given the regime tS k=  and the term ( )|tp S k= * *t-1y ,θ ,P%%  
is obtained from the first equation in (3.10).  
 
3.6.2.2. Posterior Ordinate ( )π * * Tθ ,P | y% %  
 
To calculate ( )lnπ * *θ ,P% , we first note that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )|π π π π=* * * 2* * * * 2*T T T Tθ ,P | y ί | y σ y ,ί P | y ,ί ,σ% % % %% % % % % % , (3.20) 
where ( )* * *1 m+1ί = ί ί% L  and ( )2* 2*1 1mσ σ +=2*σ% L . Each of these terms can be 
calculated through the output from the Gibbs sampler. The first term is 
 ( ) ( ) ( )p d dπ π= ∫* * 2 2 2T T T T Tί | y ί | y ,S ,σ S ,σ | y S σ% % % %% % % % % % . (3.21) 
If the number of MCMC draws is G and { }
1
G
g=(g) 2(g)S ,σ% %  are the MCMC draws of S%  
and 2σ% , then the above integral can be estimated as  
 ( ) ( )1
1
ˆ
G
g
Gπ π− == ∑* * (g) 2(g)T Tί | y ί | y ,S ,σ% %% % % , (3.22) 
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where ( ) ( )1
1
m
k
π π+==∏* (g) 2(g) * (g) 2(g)T k Tί | y ,S ,σ ί | y ,S ,σ% % % % %  and each density is given by 
(3.11). 
The second term in (3.20) is ( )π 2* *Tσ | y ,ί%% % , which can be written as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )p dπ π= ∫2* * 2* * *T T Tσ | y ,ί σ | y ,ί ,S S | y ,ί S% % % % %% % % % %  (3.23) 
To estimate the above integral we require draws from the distribution of *
TS | y ,ί% %%  
which are not readily available. To obtain those, we run an additional reduced Gibbs 
sampler conditional on *ί% . This is achieved by fixing *ί = ί% %  and sampling 1G  draws 
from 2σ% , S%  and P as before. Once this is done, we estimate (3.23) as 
 ( ) ( )1 ( )
1
ˆ | |
G
g
g
π π==∑2* * 2* *T Tσ y ,ί σ y ,ί ,S% % %% % % % . (3.24) 
Finally, the last term of (3.20) is ( )π * * 2TP | y ,ί ,σ%% % , which can be expressed as  
 ( ) ( )*
1
|
m
kk
k
pπ π==∏* * 2* * 2*T TP | y ,ί ,σ y ,ί ,σ% %% % % % , (3.25) 
where  
 ( ) ( ) ( )* *| | |kk kkp p p dπ π= ∫* 2* * 2* * 2*T T Ty ,ί ,σ y ,S,ί ,σ S ί ,σ , y S% % % %% % % % % % . (3.26) 
  
 113
To estimate this quantity, we proceed as before and sample additional values of S%  
from ( )p * 2* TS |ί ,σ ,y% % % , that is we maintain 2ί,σ% %  fixed at * 2*ί ,σ% %  and sample S% as 
before. Then the estimate of (3.26) is  
 ( ) ( )1* *
1
ˆ | |
G
kk kk
g
p pπ π==∑* 2* (g) * 2*T Ty ,ί ,σ y ,S ,ί ,σ% % %% % % % , (3.27) 
and the estimate of (3.25) is  
 ( ) ( )1 *
11
ˆ | .
Gm
kk
gk
pπ π=== ∑∏* * 2* (g) * 2*T TP | y ,ί ,σ y ,S ,ί ,σ% % %% % % %  (3.28) 
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Table 3-1 Summary statistics of portfolios sorted on past returns 
This table reports summary statistics for several momentum portfolios which are formed via the following procedure. At the end of each month t, all stocks traded in the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ which are listed on the CRSP monthly file are sorted into decile portfolios based on their past five month returns 
from t-5 to t-1 (for some momentum strategies, only NYSE stocks are considered). The momentum strategy consists in holding a long position in the Winner (highest decile) 
portfolio whilst holding a short position on the Loser (lowest decile) portfolio. The positions are held for a subsequent period, which is 6, 3 or 1 month depending on the momentum 
strategy. Standard errors are given inside brackets where appropriate.  
 
Panel A. January 1927 - December 2006    
 Portfolio  
 WMLCRSP,6x6 WMLNYSE10,6x6 WMLNYSE20,6x6 WMLNYSE30,6x6 WMLCRSP,6x1 WMLCRSP,6x3 Market 
Avg. return 
0.938 
(0.157) 
0.787 
(0.144) 
0.760 
(0.145) 
0.733 
(0.148) 
0.996 
(0.192) 
0.957 
(0.177) 
0.647 
(0.176) 
Skewness -1.862 -2.586 -2.533 -2.727 -1.680 -1.721 0.222 
Kurtosis 20.640 22.644 22.792 25.150 19.342 20.378 10.868 
Alpha (CAPM) 
1.030 
(0.156) 
0.896 
(0.142) 
0.867 
(0.143) 
0.847 
(0.146) 
1.168 
(0.188) 
1.100 
(0.174)  
Alpha (FF) 
1.152 
(0.151) 
1.005 
(0.138) 
0.980 
(0.139) 
0.963 
(0.141) 
1.304 
(0.182) 
1.237 
(0.168)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. January 1927 - June 1962   
 Portfolio  
 WMLCRSP,6x6 WMLNYSE10,6x6 WMLNYSE20,6x6 WMLNYSE30,6x6 WMLCRSP,6x1 WMLCRSP,6x3 Market 
Avg. return 
0.675 
(0.250) 
0.673 
(0.250) 
0.669 
(0.252) 
0.666 
(0.258) 
0.636 
(0.308) 
0.632 
(0.281) 
0.849 
(0.311) 
Skewness -3.081 -3.081 -3.070 -3.315 -2.845 -3.014 0.422 
Kurtosis 23.925 23.928 24.398 26.612 21.549 23.641 10.463 
Alpha (CAPM) 
0.872 
(0.242) 
0.870 
(0.242) 
0.866 
(0.244) 
0.879 
(0.249) 
0.970 
(0.285) 
0.918 
(0.264)  
Alpha (FF) 
0.906 
(0.231) 
0.904 
(0.231) 
0.900 
(0.232) 
0.913 
(0.236) 
1.004 
(0.276) 
0.958 
(0.252)  
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Table 3-1 (continued) 
Panel C. July 1962 – December 2006   
 Portfolio  
 WMLCRSP,6x6 WMLNYSE10,6x6 WMLNYSE20,6x6 WMLNYSE30,6x6 WMLCRSP,6x1 WMLCRSP,6x3 Market 
Avg. return 
1.159 
(0.198) 
0.883 
(0.161) 
0.836 
(0.163) 
0.789 
(0.164) 
1.299 
(0.241) 
1.230 
(0.223) 
0.477 
(0.192) 
Skewness -0.218 -0.946 -0.842 -0.761 -0.045 0.023 -0.510 
Kurtosis 14.007 6.838 6.405 6.002 13.985 13.689 5.135 
Alpha (CAPM) 
1.146 
(0.199) 
0.906 
(0.162) 
0.857 
(0.164) 
0.807 
(0.165) 
1.311 
(0.243) 
1.232 
(0.225)  
Alpha (FF) 
1.301 
(0.199) 
1.015 
(0.165) 
0.953 
(0.167) 
0.900 
(0.168) 
1.467 
(0.242) 
1.379 
(0.224)  
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Table 3-2 Momentum returns in 5-year non-overlapping subsamples 
At the end of each month t, all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ which are listed on the CRSP monthly file are 
sorted into decile portfolios based on their past five month returns from t-5 to t-1. Positions are held for the subsequent 6 months, from t+1 to t+6. The momentum strategy 
(WMLCRSP 6x6) consists of holding a long position in the Winner (decile 10) portfolio whilst holding a short position on the Loser (decile 1) portfolio. We report, for each subsample, 
the coefficients of the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model estimated with OLS. Two (one) * indicates significance at 5% (10%) significance level. The samples span the 
period January 1927 - December 2006. All subsamples have equal size of 60 months, starting in January and ending in December, except for subsample 16 which ends in December 
2006 and has 43 observations. 
 
    CAPM  Fama-French Model  
Sample Period 
 
Market 
return 
Momentum 
return 
 ˆCAPMα   ˆMKTβ   ˆ FFα   ˆMKTβ   ˆSMBβ   ˆHMLβ   
1 1927-1931  -0.673 1.653  1.548 * -0.156 ** 1.001   -0.042   -0.340 ** -0.747 * 
2 1932-1936  2.303 0.236  0.883   -0.281 * 0.645   0.010   0.101   -0.523 * 
3 1937-1941  -0.262 -0.411  -0.544   -0.511 * -0.443   -0.229   -0.529 ** -0.276   
4 1942-1946  1.494 0.472  0.234   0.159 ** 0.267   0.188   -0.157   0.061   
5 1947-1951  1.140 0.756  0.512   0.214 * -0.003   0.280 * -1.175 * 0.333 * 
6 1952-1956  1.330 1.130  0.990 * 0.106   1.030 * 0.090   -0.387 * -0.444 * 
7 1957-1961  0.900 0.822  0.867 * -0.050   0.950 * -0.075   -0.190   -0.968 * 
8 1962-1966  0.226 1.131  1.143 * -0.054   1.185 ** -0.188   0.614 * -0.126   
9 1967-1971  0.364 0.944  0.953   -0.026   1.186   0.118   -0.394 ** -0.244   
10 1972-1976  -0.052 0.800  0.780   -0.386 * 0.514   -0.190 * -0.694 * 0.092   
11 1977-1981  0.193 1.470  1.379 * 0.470 * 0.927   0.230 ** 0.488 * -0.302 ** 
12 1982-1986  0.806 1.227  1.241 * -0.017   1.484 ** -0.099   0.216   -0.212   
13 1987-1991  0.701 1.201  1.104 * 0.138 * 0.942   0.066   -0.244 ** -0.492 * 
14 1992-1996  0.835 0.776  0.481   0.354 * 0.565   0.296 ** 0.300 ** -0.087   
15 1997-2001  0.509 2.208  2.151 ** 0.111   2.444 ** -0.253   0.431   -0.457   
16 2002-2006  0.536 0.595  0.819 ** -0.419 * 0.141   -0.428 * 0.453   0.636 * 
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Table 3-3 Log-marginal likelihoods and differences in log-marginal likelihoods of models with different numbers of change-points 
We estimate a multiple change-point regression model based on the methodology of Chib (1998). The left-hand variable is a momentum portfolio based on six-month formation and 
holding periods using all stocks in the CRSP database (which includes NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ), excluding stocks priced at less than $5 at the beginning of the formation 
period and stocks in the lowest (NYSE) market cap decile. This portfolio is regressed on a constant, the excess market return and the two Fama-French factors SMB and HML. We 
estimate models with different numbers of change-points and calculate their marginal likelihoods, which are reported in Panel A. Panel B reports the differences in marginal 
likelihood across models with different numbers of breakpoints. The Bayes factor for comparing two models in given by the exponential of the values in Panel B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. Log-Marginal Likelihood of models with different number of change-points   
         
 Number of change-points 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
               Log-Marginal Likelihood -3845.78 -3759.69 -2971.61 -3022.92 -2837.96 -2771.16 -2622.25 -2875.26 
Panel B. Differences in the marginal likelihoods across models with different number of change-points 
    
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 - -87.026 -875.105 -823.790 -1008.753 -1075.551 -1224.461 -971.447 
1 87.026 - -788.080 -736.764 -921.727 -988.526 -1137.435 -884.422 
2 875.105 788.080 - 51.315 -133.647 -200.446 -349.355 -96.342 
3 823.790 736.764 -51.315 - -184.963 -251.761 -400.671 -147.657 
4 1008.753 921.727 133.647 184.963 - -66.798 -215.708 37.305 
5 1075.551 988.526 200.446 251.761 66.798 - -148.909 104.104 
6 1224.461 1137.435 349.355 400.671 215.708 148.909 - 253.013 
7 971.447 884.422 96.342 147.657 -37.305 -104.104 -253.013 - 
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Table 3-4 Parameter estimates - WMLCRSP 6x6 portfolio 
This table reports posterior medians and 0.95 probability intervals for the multiple change-point regression model where the left-hand variable is a momentum portfolio based on six-
month formation and holding periods using all stocks in the CRSP database (which includes NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ), excluding stocks priced at less than $5 at the beginning 
of the formation period and stocks in the lowest (NYSE) market cap decile. This portfolio is regressed on a constant, the excess market return and the two Fama-French factors SMB 
and HML. The model is estimated for with seven change-points, which is the optimal number of change-points based on the Bayes factors calculated from Table 3-3.The results are 
based on 10,000 iterations MCMC iterations. 
 
 
  constant  MKT SMB HML σ2 
0.965  -0.123 -0.303 -0.877 24.198 Regime 1 
Jan-1927 : Sep-1932 (-0.177  , 2.125)  (-0.266 , 0.026) (-0.608 , 0.002) (-1.107 , -0.643) (17.491 , 34.799) 
0.435  -0.012 -0.265 -0.028 53.901 Regime 2 
Oct-1932 : Apr-1940 (-1.035  , 1.924)  (-0.253 , 0.227) (-0.586 , 0.051) (-0.381 , 0.324) (40.470 , 74.085) 
0.733  0.096 -0.406 0.015 6.488 Regime 3 
May-1940 : Mar-1965 (0.419 , 1.047)  (0.013 , 0.181) (-0.572 , -0.237) (-0.118 , 0.152) (5.509 , 7.670) 
0.870  0.068 0.647 -0.453 12.699 Regime 4 
Apr-1965 : Aug-1969 (-0.238 , 1.925)  (-0.265 , 0.411) (0.239 , 1.042) (-0.963 , 0.046) (8.620 , 19.991) 
0.264  -0.256 -0.824 -0.173 14.489 Regime 5 
Sep-1969 : Mar-1975 (-0.682 , 1.230)  (-0.467 , -0.045) (-1.101 , -0.553) (-0.481 , 0.151) (10.287 , 21.057) 
1.129  0.125 0.131 -0.222 7.820 Regime 6 
Apr-1975 : Sep-1999 (0.763 , 1.479)  (0.038 , 0.211) (-0.010 , 0.275) (-0.379 , -0.059) (6.470 , 9.431) 
0.874  -0.384 0.755 -0.125 46.117 Regime 7 
Oct-1999 : Dec-2006 (-0.805 , 2.422)  (-0.764 , -0.015) (0.314 , 1.230) (-0.642 , 0.436) (34.689 , 62.998) 
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Table 3-5 Log-marginal likelihoods of multiple change-point models for several momentum portfolios 
For each of the momentum portfolios below, we estimated a multiple change-point regression model based on the methodology of Chib (1998). Each of the momentum portfolios is 
regressed on a constant, the excess market return and the two Fama-French factors SMB and HML. We estimate models with different numbers of change-points and calculate their 
marginal likelihoods. Bold numbers indicate the best model according to the Bayes factors. For some portfolios, a ‘-’ indicates that the model with the corresponding number of 
change-points collapsed to a model with fewer change-points.  
 
 
 Number of change-points  
Momentum portfolio 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
WMLNYSE10,6x6 -3614.085 -3515.769 -3506.008 -3340.683 -2937.795 -2731.933 -3363.122 -3068.712 -3053.703
WMLNYSE20,6x6 -3634.427 -3540.673 -3466.853 -3223.696 -2910.509 -2879.645 -2828.935 -3120.405 -3106.869
WMLNYSE30,6x6 -3671.450 -3563.327 -3444.123 -3225.020 -2854.688 -2787.702 -2827.391 -3228.131 -3129.602
WMLCRSP,6x1 -4390.320 -4263.989 -3272.004 -3384.179 -3205.751 -3129.092 -2862.161 - - 
WMLCRSP,6x3 -4143.443 -4017.029 -3116.757 -3241.441 -3035.281 -3098.019 -3051.802 - - 
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Table 3-6 Estimation of the multiple change-point model for various momentum portfolios 
This table reports posterior medians and 0.95 probability intervals for the multiple change-point regression model where the left-hand variable is one of several momentum 
portfolios. Each portfolio is regressed on a constant, the excess market return and the two Fama-French factors SMB and HML. For each momentum portfolio, the model is estimated 
for the optimal number of change-points based on the Bayes factors calculated from Table 3-5.The results are based on 10,000 iterations MCMC iterations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A.  WMLNYSE10,6x6       
  constant  MKT SMB HML σ2 
0.541  -0.103 -0.075 -0.460 49.210 Regime 1 
Jan-1927 : Apr-1940 (-0.525  , 1.615)  (-0.253  , 0.051) (-0.303  , 0.150) (-0.687  , -0.234) (39.366  , 61.811)
0.876  0.092 -0.107 -0.098 7.770 Regime 2 
May-1940  :  May-1970 (0.586  , 1.176)  (0.011 , 0.172) (-0.246 , 0.036) (-0.224  , 0.029) (6.727  , 9.060) 
0.460  -0.277 -0.918 -0.108 13.522 Regime 3 
Jun-1970 : Apr-1975 (-0.513  , 1.438)  (-0.494  , -0.067) (-1.203  , -0.640) (-0.445  , 0.225) (9.506  , 20.042)
0.867  0.050 0.134 -0.243 8.772 Regime 4 
May -1975 : Nov-2000 (0.496  , 1.232)  (-0.040  , 0.155) (0.012  , 0.249) (-0.388  , -0.049) (6.796  , 10.478)
0.295  -0.317 0.156 0.579 12.587 Regime 5 
Dec-2000 : Dec-2006 (-0.641  , 1.553)  (-0.548  , -0.092) (-0.145  , 0.434) (-0.264  , 0.906) (8.916  , 23.271)
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Table 3-6 (continued) 
 
 
                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B.  WMLNYSE20,6x6       
  constant  MKT SMB HML σ2 
0.537  -0.087 -0.047 -0.513 48.682 Regime 1 
Jan-1927 : May-1940 (-0.528  , 1.609)  (-0.240  , 0.066) (-0.280  , 0.178) (-0.746  , -0.284) (39.213  , 61.196) 
0.514  0.170 -0.454 0.126 6.097 Regime 2 
Jun-1940 : Jul-1957 (0.042  , 0.916)  (0.059  , 0.300) (-0.715  , -0.251) (-0.058  , 0.330) (4.964  , 7.615) 
1.173  -0.088 0.182 -0.450 8.193 Regime 3 
Aug-1957 : May-1970 (0.309  , 1.664)  (-0.264  , 0.100) (-0.078  , 0.641) (-0.713  , -0.142) (6.447  , 12.308) 
0.392  -0.288 -0.836 -0.069   13.953 Regime 4 
Jun-1970 : Mar-1975 (-0.569  , 1.339)  (-0.510  , -0.080) (-1.124  , -0.549) (-0.395  , 0.271) (9.896  , 20.766) 
0.822  0.052 0.166 -0.260 9.188 Regime 5 
Apr-1975 : Nov-2000 (0.462  , 1.176)  (-0.037  , 0.147) (0.047  , 0.280) (-0.399  , -0.107) (7.568  , 10.846) 
0.159  -0.309 0.165 0.632 12.919 Regime 6 
Dec-2000 : Dec-2006 (-0.753  , 1.178)  (-0.541  , -0.078) (-0.137  , 0.467) (-0.023  , 0.956) (9.347  , 20.453) 
Panel C.  WMLNYSE30,6x6       
  constant  MKT SMB HML σ2 
0.502  -0.108  -0.020  -0.548 50.931 Regime 1 
(-0.609  , 1.582)  (-0.267  , 0.046)  (-0.257  , 0.207)  (-0.782  , -0.310) (41.089  , 64.431)
0.867  0.098  -0.045  -0.112 7.658 Regime 2 
(0.568  , 1.171)  (0.019  , 0.179)  (-0.182  , 0.097)  (-0.237  , 0.012) (6.616  , 8.907) 
0.375  -0.300  -0.784  -0.011 13.181 Regime 3 
(-0.561  , 1.325)  (-0.515  , -0.092)  (-1.065  , -0.506)  (-0.344  , 0.309) (9.291  , 19.603)
0.774  0.047  0.181  -0.280 9.652 Regime 4 
(0.406  , 1.137)  (-0.044  , 0.136)  (0.063  , 0.296)  (-0.420  , -0.144) (8.278  , 11.367)
0.061  -0.339  0.211  0.662 13.579 Regime 5 
(-0.870  , 0.980)  (-0.580  , -0.101)  (-0.096  , 0.526)  (0.325  , 0.988) (9.857  , 19.453)
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Table 3-6 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D.  WMLCRSP 6x1       
  constant  MKT SMB HML σ2 
0.399  -0.263  -0.064  -0.530 67.674 Regime 1 
Jan-1927 : Jan-1940 (-0.842  , 1.682)  (-0.442  , -0.085)  (-0.335  , 0.210)  (-0.797  , -0.263) (54.416  , 85.218)
0.871  -0.015  -0.366  0.140 9.908 Regime 2 
Feb-1940 : Feb-1965 (0.493  , 1.244)  (-0.118  , 0.086)  (-0.570  , -0.165)  (-0.024  , 0.304) (8.470  , 11.744)
1.137  0.070  0.671  -0.156 15.534 Regime 3 
Mar-1965 : Aug-1969 (-0.049  , 2.302)  (-0.298  , 0.440)  (0.247  , 1.101)  (-0.710  , 0.399) (10.379  , 24.920)
0.383  -0.255  -0.951  -0.216 23.388 Regime 4 
Sep-1969 : Feb-1975 (-0.824  , 1.567)  (-0.522  , 0.012)  (-1.302  , -0.603)  (-0.610  , 0.185) (16.761  , 33.794)
1.181  0.086  0.123  -0.274 12.684 Regime 5 
Mar-1975 : Oct-1999 (0.752  , 1.614)  (-0.023  , 0.196)  (-0.035  , 0.287)  (-0.458  , -0.081) (10.741  , 15.043)
0.630  -0.667  1.289  0.052 62.601 Regime 6 
Nov-1999 : Dec-2006 (-1.123  , 2.437)  (-1.130  , -0.214)  (0.758  , 1.775)  (-0.580  , 0.631) (46.897  , 86.139)
Panel E.  WMLCRSP 6x3       
  constant  MKT SMB HML σ2 
0.564  -0.101  -0.070  -0.466 48.713 Regime 1 
Jan-1927 : May-1940 (-0.491  , 1.649)  (-0.251  , 0.048)  (-0.299  , 0.155)  (-0.693  , -0.233) (39.303  , 61.220)
0.514  0.159  -0.465  0.147 5.899 Regime 2 
Jun-1940 : Nov-1957 (0.089  , 0.889)  (0.057  , 0.268)  (-0.688  , -0.273)  (-0.022  , 0.338) (4.852  , 7.343) 
1.266  -0.020  -0.101  -0.344 11.626 Regime 3 
Dec-1957 : Oct-1999 (0.953  , 1.575)  (-0.100  , 0.057)  (-0.216  , 0.016)  (-0.473  , -0.213) (10.214  , 13.422)
0.583  -0.411  0.872  -0.007 46.587 Regime 4 
Nov-1999 : Dec-2006 (-0.926  , 2.108)  (-0.807  , -0.020)  (0.458  , 1.277)  (-0.507  , 0.502) (34.926  , 64.171)
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Table 3-7 Bootstrap estimation of the probability of observing the momentum 
premium over the period from January 2001 to December 2006 
We conduct a bootstrap experiment to estimate the probability of observing a momentum premium 
lower than the momentum premium in the 72-month period from January 2001 to December 2006. 
Based on the ex-post distribution of momentum returns over different time periods described in the 
“sampling period” column, we draw 100,000 random samples of size seventy-two months (with 
replacement). We report the probability of observing a momentum premium smaller than the one in 
the period from January 2001 to December 2006 using two methods. The first method consists in 
taking the average of each bootstrap sample and estimating the distribution of the mean momentum 
return over a seventy-two month period. The second method consists of calculating the distribution of 
alpha from the Fama-French model based on the bootstrap samples. We estimate the probability of the 
momentum premium over a seventy-two month period being smaller than the momentum premium 
from January 2001 to December 2006 as the proportion of samples with average return (or alpha) 
smaller than the average momentum return (or alpha) from January 2001 to December 2006. 
 
 
 
Sampling period 
  
Probability of observing a momentum
premium inferior to the momentum premium 
from January 2001 to December 2006 
  Average Return Alpha (Fama-French) 
January 1927 to December 2000  0.208 0.005 
January 1927 to April 1940  0.499 0.139 
May 1940 to March 1965  0.186 0.004 
April 1965 to March 1975  0.193 0.009 
April 1975 to December 2000  0.066 0.000 
  
 124
Table 3-8 Contribution of different sectors of the economy to momentum returns 
We decompose the monthly momentum return into the sum of the returns of the stocks from each of 11 industries such that each month, the return on the momentum strategy is the 
sum of the returns on the stocks from each industry. Panel A reports averages of the contribution of each industry for several 5-year subsamples. Panel B reports the proportion of 
momentum returns due to each sector. The column labelled ‘Total’ displays the sum of the values in each row. 
 
Panel A. Return contribution of several sectors to momentum profits in terms of equally weighted returns 
 
Consumer 
Non-Durables 
Consumer 
Durables 
Manuf. Energy Hi-Tech Telecom Shops Health Utilities Financials Others 
 
Total 
1959-1964 0.23% 0.01% 0.19% 0.05% 0.16% 0.02% 0.07% 0.01% 0.03% 0.02% 0.27%  1.07% 
1965-1970 0.13% 0.11% 0.22% 0.02% 0.12% -0.02% 0.16% -0.03% 0.08% 0.07% 0.22%  1.08% 
1971-1976 0.09% 0.08% 0.06% -0.02% -0.13% 0.04% 0.30% 0.03% -0.04% 0.10% 0.30%  0.82% 
1977-1982 0.08% 0.01% 0.09% 0.38% 0.27% 0.04% 0.14% 0.08% -0.01% 0.12% 0.44%  1.63% 
1983-1988 0.04% -0.01% 0.02% -0.06% 0.09% 0.04% 0.13% 0.05% 0.01% 0.28% 0.11%  0.70% 
1989-1994 0.06% 0.03% 0.06% 0.00% 0.06% 0.05% 0.15% 0.14% 0.00% 0.42% 0.11%  1.08% 
1995-1999 0.04% 0.03% 0.12% 0.07% 0.98% 0.19% 0.13% 0.17% -0.01% 0.15% 0.19%  2.07% 
2000-2006 -0.02% -0.02% 0.00% 0.11% 0.29% 0.19% 0.00% 0.27% 0.03% 0.03% 0.14%  1.03% 
 
Panel B. Return contribution of several sectors to momentum profits in terms of proportion of returns 
 
 
Consumer 
Non-Durables 
Consumer 
Durables 
Manuf. Energy Hi-Tech Telecom Shops Health Utilities Financials Others 
 
Total 
1959-1964 21.17% 1.26% 17.69% 5.13% 14.99% 1.65% 6.74% 1.27% 2.95% 1.43% 25.74%  100.00% 
1965-1970 12.35% 10.56% 20.20% 1.46% 11.18% -1.87% 14.89% -3.13% 7.62% 6.45% 20.29%  100.00% 
1971-1976 10.89% 10.01% 7.44% -2.47% -16.14% 4.62% 36.91% 3.72% -4.74% 12.62% 37.14%  100.00% 
1977-1982 5.12% 0.47% 5.27% 23.45% 16.80% 2.36% 8.29% 4.69% -0.91% 7.25% 27.20%  100.00% 
1983-1988 6.33% -0.89% 2.87% -9.00% 13.15% 5.87% 18.61% 6.56% 0.77% 39.59% 16.13%  100.00% 
1989-1994 5.79% 3.15% 5.09% 0.27% 5.34% 4.81% 14.06% 12.94% 0.15% 38.48% 9.94%  100.00% 
1995-1999 1.76% 1.61% 6.03% 3.38% 47.51% 8.99% 6.40% 8.25% -0.34% 7.26% 9.15%  100.00% 
2000-2006 -2.16% -1.92% 0.18% 10.64% 28.22% 18.95% 0.46% 25.85% 2.58% 3.18% 14.01%  100.00% 
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Table 3-9 The Effect of the Hi-Tech Bubble on the profitability of momentum 
We calculate two momentum strategies for the period from January 1963 to December 2006. One of 
them is the unrestricted momentum strategy using all stocks from the CRSP universe and the other 
does not allow stocks from hi-tech or telecom sectors to be included. Formation and holding periods 
are 6 months. As before we construct overlapping portfolios and skip one month between formation 
and holding periods. 
 
 Average monthly momentum returns 
Period 
All stocks 
(A) 
No Hi-tech and Telecom 
stocks allowed (B) 
Difference 
(A – B) 
t-stat 
Jan 1963 to Dec 1994 (Pre-bubble) 1.064% 1.063% 0.001% 0.029 
Jan 1995 to Dec 1999 (During bubble) 2.072% 1.483% 0.590% 2.643 
Jan 2000 to Dec 2006 (Post-bubble) 0.936% 0.823% 0.113% 0.415 
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Figure 3-1 Posterior probabilities of regimes for the WMLCRSP,6x6 strategy 
At the end of each month t, all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ which are listed on the CRSP monthly file are sorted into decile 
portfolios based on their past 5-month returns from t-6 to t-1. Positions are held for the subsequent 6 
months, from t+1 to t+6. The momentum strategy (WML) consists of holding a long position in the 
Winner (decile 10) portfolio whilst holding a short position on the Loser (decile 1) portfolio. The 
figure shows the estimated probability of structural breaks in the model, based on 10,000 iterations of 
the MCMC scheme. 
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Figure 3-2 Contribution of different sectors of the economy to momentum returns 
At the end of each month t, all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ which are listed on the CRSP monthly file are sorted into decile 
portfolios based on their past 5-month returns from t-6 to t-1. Positions are held for the subsequent 6 
months, from t+1 to t+6. The momentum strategy (WML) consists of holding a long position in the 
Winner (decile 10) portfolio whilst holding a short position on the Loser (decile 1) portfolio. We 
decompose momentum monthly returns into their sector-specific components,  in such a way that, 
over a period of time, the return to any of these portfolios can be calculated as the sum of the sector-
specific components. The graph displays the proportion of average annual momentum returns which 
correspond to each of the industry sectors over several different subsamples.  
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Figure 3-3 Contribution of hi-tech, telecom and all other stocks to momentum 
returns 
At the end of each month t, all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ which are listed on the CRSP monthly file are sorted into decile 
portfolios based on their past 5-month returns from t-6 to t-1. Positions are held for the subsequent 6 
months, from t+1 to t+6. The momentum strategy (WML) consists of holding a long position in the 
Winner (decile 10) portfolio whilst holding a short position on the Loser (decile 1) portfolio. We 
decompose momentum monthly returns based on whether the stocks in the portfolios belong to one of 
two groups. The first group contains hi-tech and telecom stocks, and the second one contains stocks 
from all other industries. The decomposition is done in such a way that, over a period of time, the 
return to any of these portfolios can be calculated as the sum of the two components. The graph 
displays the average annual sector-specific returns for the momentum portfolio. 
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Figure 3-4 Average momentum returns excluding the contribution of hi-tech, and 
telecom stocks  
At the end of each month t, all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ which are listed on the CRSP monthly file are sorted into decile 
portfolios based on their past 5-month returns from t-6 to t-1. Positions are held for the subsequent 6 
months, from t+1 to t+6. The momentum strategy (WML) consists of holding a long position in the 
Winner (decile 10) portfolio whilst holding a short position on the Loser (decile 1) portfolio. We 
decompose momentum monthly returns based on whether the stocks in the portfolios belong to one of 
two groups. The first one contains hi-tech and telecom stocks, and the second one contains stocks 
from all other industries. The decomposition is done in such a way that, over a period of time, the 
return to any of these portfolios can be calculated as the sum of the two components. We plot average 
momentum returns omitting the contribution of hi-tech and telecom stocks.  
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Figure 3-5 Average returns of a momentum strategy that does not allow hi-tech and 
telecom stocks  
At the end of each month t, all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ which are listed on the CRSP monthly file which do not belong to the  
Hi-tech or Telecommunications industries (according to their SIC codes) are sorted into decile 
portfolios based on their past 5-month returns from t-6 to t-1. Positions are held for the subsequent 6 
months, from t+1 to t+6. The momentum strategy (WML) consists of holding a long position in the 
Winner (decile 10) portfolio whilst holding a short position on the Loser (decile 1) portfolio. The 
graph shows yearly average returns of this restricted momentum strategy. 
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Figure 3-6 Cumulative profits of several momentum strategies through December 
2006  
At the end of each month t, all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ which are listed on the CRSP monthly file are sorted into decile 
portfolios based on their past 5-month returns from t-6 to t-1. Positions are held for the subsequent 6 
months, from t+1 to t+6. The momentum strategy (WML) consists of holding a long position in the 
Winner (decile 10) portfolio whilst holding a short position on the Loser (decile 1) portfolio. The 
figure plots the cumulative profit of several momentum strategies per $1 long through December 2006 
for various starting date, i.e. at time t = τ  the figure plots rWML,t
t=τ
June 2005∑ , where  rWML,t is return of the 
momentum strategy at time t in excess of the risk-free rate of return.  
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Chapter 4  
Fishing with a Licence: an Empirical Search for 
Asset Pricing Factors 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Which are the risk factors that should enter a linear factor asset pricing model, and 
what kind of fundamental, pervasive, non-diversifiable risks do they represent? This 
is a question that the asset pricing literature has been struggling with for a long time. 
The apparent failure of the CAPM of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black 
(1972) documented in the 1970s33 and the development of the Intertemporal CAPM 
by Merton (1973) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (henceforth APT) by Ross 
(1976) have led to theoretically motivated linear factor models (henceforth LFM). 
The theory, however, is silent as to which or how many factors should be included in 
the model. Indeed, since the stochastic opportunity set in the ICAPM is not defined 
but left as a largely empirical issue, allowing researchers to choose from a wide 
                                                 
33 Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Blume and Friend (1973) find that the relationship 
between average returns and betas is linear, but the estimated slope of the security market is too flat and the intercept is too 
high. However, as Hwang (2007) points out, because of methodological problems with the Fama-MacBeth procedure, 
specifically the migration of stocks from pre-formation to post-formation portfolios, these results may actually be misleading. 
Hwang finds that, after correcting for these problems, the regression slope of beta is significant even in the presence of size. 
Basu (1977), Banz (1981), DeBondt and Thaler (1985), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that the CAPM cannot price 
portfolios formed on several firm characteristics. 
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range of possibilities, Fama (1991) warns against using them as a “fishing license”, 
in the sense that one might use just about any factor. 
There have been many attempts to determine which factors explain asset 
returns. Some researchers extract the factors from assets’ returns through statistical 
techniques such as factor analysis or principal components. Lehman and Modest 
(1988) and Connor and Korajczyk (1988) both undertake this approach in the context 
of the APT, and find evidence for between 5 to 10 factors. However, this approach 
has some disadvantages. The factors obtained through these techniques might not be 
observable, their economical interpretation is unclear, and it is difficult to distinguish 
between models with different numbers of factors. Moreover, these factors are likely 
to depend heavily on the sample, both in terms of the set of the assets chosen, as well 
as the sample period34.   
A different approach is to work with various risk measures or observable firm 
characteristics, which may or may not be economically motivated. For example, 
some studies have tried to explain assets returns through risk measures other than the 
market beta of the CAPM35. Others try to relate assets returns to macroeconomic 
variables directly; in a seminal work, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) find evidence of 
five priced macroeconomic factors. However, factors can be calculated directly from 
cross-sectional asset returns sorted by firm characteristics; i.e. portfolios are formed 
by sorting stocks on firm characteristics and a factor is created by taking long and 
short positions on the extreme portfolios. The most famous and now widely used 
                                                 
34 For instance, Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) estimate the principal components factors of Connor and 
Korajczyk (1988) over two overlapping periods in their sample from 1963 to 1995 because of instability in the factors obtained 
in each subsample, compared to the whole subsample. 
35 Krauz and Litzenberger (1976) introduce coskewness as a risk measure; see also Harvey and Siddique (2000). Hwang and 
Satchel (1999) add cokurtosis. Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) introduce an equilibrium model with Lower Partial Moments, of 
which the semi-variance – or downside beta – model is a particular case. These approaches are equilibrium-based and do not 
pertain to the LFM literature. 
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firm-characteristic based model is the Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) three-
factor model, which includes the excess market return, the size factor (small minus 
big, SMB) which is long small stocks and short big stocks, and the value factor (high 
minus low, HML) which is long high book-to-market stocks and short low book-to-
market stocks36. Another popular factor of this kind is Jegadeesh and Titman’s 
(2001) momentum factor.  
One important issue regarding factors derived from firm characteristics is 
whether or not they are priced factors. This question appears repeatedly as a number 
of new factors are found. For instance, there is an ongoing debate in the literature 
regarding whether SMB and HML are related to risk37 .  
Whilst some studies attempt to find evidence that factors based on firm-
characteristics are related to risk, others interpret the divergence from the CAPM as 
evidence of irrational behaviour by market participants, or other concerns related to 
market microstructure and biases in the empirical methodology. For instance, 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) explain the value premium with investors’ 
overreaction of past earnings growth of firms; Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), 
and Hong and Stein (1999) amongst others propose explanations of the momentum 
anomaly based on investors wrongly perceiving information due to 
behavioural/cognitive biases. Unfortunately, as MacKinlay (1995) points out, widely 
used asset pricing tests are very unlikely to detect deviations from the CAPM due to 
missing risk factors.  
                                                 
36 Banz (1981) identified the size effect that small stocks earn higher returns than large stocks; Rosenberg, Leid and Lanstein 
(1985) identified the value effect that high book-to-market (value) stocks earn higher returns than low book-to-market (growth) 
stocks. 
37 See for example Khotari, Shanken and Sloan (1995), MacKinlay (1995), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994, Liew and 
Vassalou (2000), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Petkova (2006). 
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Any LFM which uses factors from firm characteristics to explain assets’ 
returns rationally is subject to some critiques. First, the interpretation of the firm-
characteristic based factors in terms of meaningful, interpretable and economically 
sound risk factors may be doubtful. In other words, whichever variables one puts on 
the right-hand side of the asset pricing equation have to reflect the fact that investors 
dislike assets that do poorly in bad economic states. Even if the right-hand variables 
explain assets’ returns statistically, if they do not help to understand how expected 
returns relate to risk, the model might not be very useful. Second, studies that derive 
factors from firm characteristics almost always use test assets obtained from 
grouping procedures, which potentially introduces a data-snooping bias, as pointed 
out by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (1999) and Berk 
(2000). Also, the portfolio formation procedure might make it more difficult to reject 
the null that a certain factor affects assets’ returns, as Roll (1977) suggests. 
Nonetheless, many authors test LFMs using portfolios of stocks, due perhaps to a 
limitation of the testing procedure by Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989), namely 
that the number of assets be smaller than the number of time periods. One possible 
approach that circumvents this problem is the average F-test proposed by Hwang and 
Satchell (2007). 
 As a natural consequence of the empirical studies on asset prices, the number 
of candidate factors has increased steadily, as more CAPM-related anomalies are 
found. However, it is doubtful that all of these factors matter for asset pricing; it is 
more likely that some of them are redundant, or proxies for the same kind of 
fundamental risk, whilst some may just be a product of data snooping. An interesting 
point is argued by Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2007), namely that too many 
empirical models seem to explain the size and book-to-market effects, which is 
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strange considering many of them have little economical common ground. Some 
studies have tried to determine which amongst the several extant factors best 
explains asset returns. In this context, the Bayesian approach is attractive in that it 
permits the researcher to obtain posterior probabilities of different models and 
factors. For instance, Hall, Hwang and Satchell (2002) use a Bayesian variable 
selection methodology to try to find which factors should be included in a global 
LFM in the context of global equity investment. Ericsson and Karlsson (2004) 
conduct a study of 15 potential risk factors using a Bayesian approach to estimate 
posterior model selection probabilities of all the 215 possible LFMs. Their evidence 
supports a LFM with the excess market return, SMB, HML, the momentum factor 
and credit risk spread. However, their results might be misleading since they only use 
portfolios, and their set of possible factors contains mostly macroeconomic factors.  
Whilst some studies seek to identify which factors should be included in a 
LFM, Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) conduct a study of the relation 
between stock returns and measures of risk and non-risk characteristics. Their focus 
is in discovering whether non-risk characteristics have explanatory power relative to 
APT benchmarks using the Fama and French factors or factors obtained from the 
Connor and Korajczyk (1988) principal components approach. Their results suggest 
that, even after accounting for the risk-related factors, there is evidence of return 
momentum, size and book-to-market effects. They also find a significant negative 
relation between returns and trading volume, which they deem consistent with a 
liquidity premium in stock returns. Along similar lines, in a recent study Hwang and 
Lu (2007) consider 16 factors amongstst risk based, firm-characteristic based and 
macroeconomic factors for thousands of individual firms and find that the excess 
market return, liquidity and coskewness factors explain stock returns as well as the 
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Fama-French three factors with momentum. Their approach is based on whether 
factors explain asset returns in terms of zero alphas in a GRS-like test for individual 
stocks, proposed by Hwang and Satchell (2007). 
 In this paper we investigate the issue of selecting asset pricing factors using a 
Bayesian variable selection procedure from the statistics literature called Stochastic 
Search Variable Selection (SSSV), introduced by George and McCulloch (1993). We 
extend their approach to a simple multivariate case with N assets. Our procedure uses 
a latent dummy variable approach to identify the more promising factors as those 
with higher posterior probability. Our approach is different from the previous ones in 
several ways. First, we infer the factors that matter directly through a dummy 
variable vector, thus avoiding the exhaustive search over a prohibitively large 
number of LFMs. Second, we conduct our tests using individual stocks from the 
CRSP universe (although we also conduct tests on portfolios of stocks for 
comparison). The approach with individual stocks is important because it avoids the 
potential data-snooping biases which may arise when models which contain 
empirically motivated factors are tested on portfolios formed on the same 
characteristics, as explained before. Although Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) and Hwang and Lu (2007) also use individual securities, our approach is quite 
different from theirs. We are interested in finding posterior probabilities of risk and 
non-risk factors, whilst Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) test the 
explanatory powers of non-risk characteristics after adjusting for risk. Also, although 
we use similar factors and use individual securities, our work is distinct from Hwang 
and Lu (2007), who look for combinations of factors which lead to acceptance of the 
null of zero intercepts in time-series regressions. In contrast, our primary interest is 
in finding which factors or combinations of factors have high-posterior probabilities. 
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A by-product of our approach is that, since we treat the intercept as a factor, we can 
interpret high-posterior probability models which do not include the intercept as 
well-specified asset pricing models.  
Our results provide evidence that a LFM should contain the excess market 
return, the size factor SMB and the liquidity factor. We find weak evidence that a 
factor proxying for idiosyncratic volatility should be included in the model, and also 
that the HML factor should be included, but these could be related to particular 
periods of time. Our results are robust to different prior distributions and to different 
subsamples during the period from 1967 to 2005. 
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We introduce the model and 
briefly discuss the estimation method in Section 4.2. The explanation of the data set 
and empirical tests follows in Section 4.3, as well as robustness tests and comparison 
with previous studies. Section 4.4 concludes and Section 4.5 contains detailed 
explanations of the model estimation. 
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
4.2.1. Stochastic Search Variable Selection 
 
In this section we describe the details of the Bayesian variable selection procedure 
we employ. We extend the procedure known as Stochastic Search Variable Selection 
(henceforth SSVS) developed by George and McCulloch (1993) to a simple 
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multivariate case. Our approach is based on the algorithm of Kuo and Mallick 
(1998), which significantly reduces the computational burden relative to the one 
suggested by George and McCulloch (1993). Parameters are estimated via a Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method implemented with the Gibbs sampler. 
The method is based on parameterising the independent variables that should 
be selected in a regression via a vector of indicator variables ΰ , where each 
component is equal to 1 if the corresponding variable should be included, or 0 
otherwise. We start with some prior belief about the inclusion of each variable, and 
then modify these with the information contained in the likelihood to form a 
posterior distribution for ΰ . The posterior distribution of ΰ  is supported on all 
possible combinations of variables, and therefore contains information not only about 
whether a particular variable should be included, but also about the probabilities of 
different combinations of variables. We now explain the procedure in statistical 
terms. Consider a system of N regressions with T observations each: 
 i i i ir = X ί + e , for  1, ,i N= K  (3.29) 
where ( )1 2i i iTr r r ′=ir L is the ( )1T × vector of observations of the i -th dependent 
variable, iX is a ( )iT K× matrix of independent variables, iί  is a ( )1iK × vector of 
regression coefficients and ie  
is the ( )1T × vector of error terms of the i -th 
regression. The system of equations (3.29) is a system of seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) if the collected vector of error terms ( )′′ ′ ′= 1 2 Ne e e e% L is assumed 
to have the following distribution: 
 ( )~ ,N ⊗ Te 0 Σ I%  (3.30) 
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where Σ  is an ( )N N×  matrix to be estimated and TI denotes the identity matrix. In 
this study, ir  
represents the return on asset i, and iX  are factors in asset pricing 
models.  
 Now we define vectors ( )1 1 ii i iKγ γ γ ′=iΰ L , where each element indicates 
whether a particular independent variable should be included in the i -th regression. 
In other words, if 1ijγ = then the j -th regressor in the i -th regression equation is 
included, and if 0ijγ = , then it is not. The interpretation of each ijγ  is that it 
indicates whether factor j is required in the model for asset i . We can now rewrite 
(3.29) in matrix form in the following way: 
 = ΰr Xί + e%%% % , (3.31) 
where 
( )0 00 0, , , ,
0 0
N
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= ⊗⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
ΰ T
N N N N
r X ί ΰ
r X ί ΰ
r = X = ί e 0 Σ Ι
r X ί ΰ
L ฀
L ฀%%% % ฀M M M M M M
L ฀
, 
and 1 1 2 2 i ii i i i iK iKβ γ β γ β γ ′⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦i iί ΰ฀ L denotes the element-by-element multiplication of 
i
ί  by iΰ . The above formulation is rather general, and we simplify it with some 
assumptions. First, we assume that the set of possible factors is the same for all 
assets, i.e. 
1 2 NX = X = = X = X
%L  where X%  contains data on K  factors. We also 
assume that Σ  is a diagonal matrix, and therefore each ( )2, iN σi Te 0 Ι฀ . With these 
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assumptions the SUR model simplifies to a system of ordinary regressions. We 
further assume that the vectors iγ  are identical for all assets, i.e. 1 2 Nΰ = ΰ = ΰ = ΰL . 
This assumption is justified by our goal of identifying pervasive factors, and not 
factors which are correlated only with some subsets of stocks. With these 
restrictions, ΰί%  in equation (3.31) simplifies to ΰί = ί ΰ% %฀ , and X%  simplifies to a ( )TN KN×  block-diagonal matrix with X in the diagonal, i.e. ⊗ NX = X Ι% .  
 Our assumption of no correlation between error terms of different assets 
comes from our aim of using individual stocks to identify the factors. A fully-
specified covariance matrix would be very difficult to estimate with thousands of 
individual stocks. However, studies such as Connor (1984), Dybvig (1985) and 
Grinblatt and Titman (1985) suggest that, if the factors are pervasive, or when the 
parameters of the economy are well-specified, the off-diagonal elements of Σ are 
likely to be negligible. For instance, Hwang and Satchell (2007) estimate Σ  for a 
LFM containing the market return, the two Fama-French factors and momentum for 
individual stocks in the CRSP database, and find that about 8 percent of the 
correlations are significant. They also evaluate the impact of diagonality on testing 
LFMs and find that the off-diagonal components do not affect test statistics. We take 
the point of view that the simplicity gained with this assumption and the possibility 
of using data on thousands of individual stocks’ returns compensate for the slight 
increase in efficiency that would be gained by accounting for the small number of 
correlations likely to be significant. An interesting approach, which is however 
outside the scope of this work, would be to allow the model to automatically select 
which correlations are significant, similarly to the approach proposed by Cripps, 
Carter and Kohn (2003). 
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 We now turn to the specification of the priors, and relegate the derivation and 
details of the conditional densities used in the Gibbs sampler to Section 4.5. We 
follow Kuo and Mallick (1998) and choose priors for ί% , ΰ   and Σ  independently, 
with ( )0 0,∼ Νί ί D% % , ( )~ 1,j jB pγ  and ( )2, 2j IGσ α η฀ , for 1, ,j K= K . The 
hyperparameters can be chosen to reflect the amount of prior knowledge about the 
inclusion of the factors. For the regressions coefficients ί%  we choose a prior centred 
on a vector of zeros, to reflect complete lack of knowledge as to which factors should 
be included. We choose the prior variance-covariance matrix of ί%  to be ( ) 10 c −′=D X X% % %  which is similar to the prior used by Smith and Kohn (1996). The 
choice of the constant c  reflects the prior degree of uncertainty about ί% 38. 
 The prior for ΰ  reflects the prior belief about the inclusion of each variable. 
To reflect our lack of knowledge about the inclusion of the factors, we 
choose ( )1 1 2,j jp P jγ= = = ∀ . This prior makes any combination of factors have 
the same prior probability of 1 2K .  
 
4.2.2. Interpreting the Posterior Results 
 
 With these priors, it is straightforward to estimate the parameters using the 
Gibbs sampler. Our main interest is in the posterior distribution of ΰ , which is 
estimated based on many iterations of the Gibbs sampler. From the posterior 
                                                 
38 We discuss values for c in the appendix. 
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distribution of ΰ , several quantities of interest can be calculated, such as the 
marginal posterior probabilities of each factor and of particular models, i.e. 
combinations of factors. Since each jγ  has a prior probability of 0.5, if a factor has 
an estimated marginal posterior probability higher than 0.5, we can interpret that this 
factor should be included in the LFM. Models with high posterior probability will 
show up more frequently in the generated values of ΰ , and thus it is possible to focus 
on high-posterior probability models without having to analytically compute the 
posterior probabilities for all the 2K possible models analytically, which can be quite 
overwhelming for large values of K.  
A comment about the intercept term in model (3.31) is in order. In the context 
of asset pricing models, the inclusion of the intercept is of economical importance. In 
this study we include the intercept as one of the regressors in the matrix X%  and a 
priori it has the same probability of inclusion as any of the other factors. Since all the 
factors we consider in this study are factor mimicking portfolios and can be 
considered tradable assets, the omission of the intercept in a particular high posterior 
probability model can be interpreted as evidence that that model is a good description 
of the assets returns. Thus, besides looking for models with high posterior 
probability, we are also interested in whether or not they include the intercept.  
 
4.2.3. Research Design 
 
The main objective of this paper can be described as follows. Given asset returns and 
a set of possible factors, our main interest is in identifying the factors that should be 
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included in a linear factor model to explain the returns on these assets. We consider 
individual stocks as well as portfolios of stocks, in order to investigate whether the 
LFM implied by the posterior of ΰ  changes significantly. 
 
4.2.3.1. Candidate Asset Pricing Factors 
 
The factors we test in this study are those proposed in previous studies. The 
candidate factors belong to one of two categories: risk-based factors and firm-
characteristics (or non-risk) factors. All factors (except the excess market return) are 
calculated by sorting portfolios on the (risk or non-risk) characteristic and forming 
hedge portfolios, similarly to Fama and French’s (1996) SMB and HML. We next 
describe the factors in each category, and refer the reader to Hwang and Lu (2007) 
for a detailed explanation of how they are calculated. 
 
4.2.3.1.1. Risk-Based Factors 
 
The five risk-based candidate asset pricing factors are the excess market return, 
liquidity, coskewness, cokurtosis and downside risk. The market portfolio as a factor 
has its justification in the CAPM. Although there is controversy as to the empirical 
performance of the CAPM (see for example Fama and French (1992, 1996)), an 
asset’s covariation with a market-wide portfolio is still considered the most important 
determinant of asset returns, and has a very clear interpretation in terms of risk. 
  
 148
Some studies (Clare, Priestley and Thomas (1998), Hwang (2007)) suggest that the 
fact that beta does not appear to be priced in the cross-section is due to 
methodological problems in studies which use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-
step methodology. 
The inclusion of liquidity as a risk-based factor is motivated by Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) and Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003), amongst other studies. Brennan and Subrahmanyan report a 
significant and positive relation between expected returns and illiquidity which is 
robust to adjustment by the Fama-French factors; Chordia, Subrahamnyan and 
Anshuman argue that liquidity needs to be accounted for, even after controlling for 
size, book-to-market and momentum effects. Pastor and Stambaugh show that a large 
portion of momentum profits can be attributed to liquidity risk. 
  Coskewness as a risk factor reflects investors’ attitudes towards non-normal 
returns; investors dislike negative skewness in their portfolios and thus are willing to 
pay a premium for assets that make their portfolios less negatively skewed. The 
seminal work of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) laid the theoretical motivation for a 
CAPM with a premium for coskewness. Harvey and Siddique (2000) show that 
conditional skewness helps to explain the cross-section of returns even in the 
presence of the size and book-to-market factors. Similarly, we include a cokurtosis 
factor. This is motivated by assuming that investors also care about the fat tails 
(kurtosis) of their portfolios. Hwang  and Satchell (1999) show that cokurtosis 
matters in emerging markets where returns are highly leptokurtic. Dittmar (2002) 
suggests that quadratic or cubic pricing kernels are admissible for the cross-section 
of industry portfolios.  
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Finally, the inclusion of a factor to proxy for downside risk is motivated by 
the downside risk literature. Starting with the theoretical developments of the lower 
partial moments CAPM by Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) and Harlow and Rao 
(1989), several authors have studied the role of downside risk. Post and Van Vliett 
(2005) find that when the regular CAPM beta is replaced by the downside beta, the 
cross-sectional risk-return relationship improves, and that this explanatory power is 
robust to size, value and momentum effects. Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) find that 
downside risk commands a premium in the cross-section of stock returns. 
 
4.2.3.1.2. Non-Risk Factors 
 
There is extensive research suggesting that the returns on stocks are correlated with 
many firm characteristics, the most famous of which are size (market equity) and the 
ratio of book-to-market equity (see for instance Daniel and Titman (1997) and 
Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998)). Fama and French (1993, 1996) argue 
that HML, which is constructed based on book-to-market ratio (B/M), represents 
non-diversifiable risk related to financial distress. They argue that weak firms with 
low earnings tend to have high book-to-market ratios, and thus pay a distress 
premium. It is less clear what sort of risk the small-minus-big factor SMB proxies 
for; some studies suggest important asymmetries in the variation of small and large 
firms’ risks over the business cycle particularly because small firms are more 
affected by tighter credit market conditions than large firms, see Perez-Quiros and 
Timmermann (2000).  
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There is an ongoing debate as to whether these two anomalies are indeed 
related to non-diversifiable sources of risk. The same can be argued for many other 
factors based on firm characteristics. However, the use of these factors in LFMs has 
become quite common. As Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) point out, 
the role of these characteristics might either be related to frictions within the rational 
pricing paradigm, or to their statistical properties as proxies for expected returns. 
Therefore we include several factors based on firm characteristics in this study. Since 
these factors are formed on stock characteristics which are not necessarily related to 
risk, we call them non-risk factors. However, as the discussion about the Fama-
French factors illustrates, some of them may be related to risk.  
The non-risk factors we consider are the Fama-French size (SMB) and value 
(HML) factors, momentum, asset growth, idiosyncratic volatility, volume, and long-
term reversal. Momentum or short-term continuation of stock prices has been 
documented by many studies, starting with De Bondt and Thaler (1987) and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who document that past winner stocks outperform past 
loser stocks. The debate over the source of this anomaly is ongoing. Our results from 
Chapter 3 indicate that momentum has disappeared since the year 2000. However we 
include it as a factor since the disappearance could be linked to a risk that 
disappeared in the same period and thus does not necessarily suggest that momentum 
should not be priced.39 Many studies in the 1980s such as De Bondt and Thaler 
(1987), Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988) report negative 
autocorrelations in the long-run, which Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) document as 
the long-term reversal effect, i.e. past winners underperform past losers on horizons 
longer than 12 months. 
                                                 
39 The literature on momentum is enormous, see Chapter 3 for a short review and further references. 
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The inclusion of asset growth is motivated by Cooper, Gulen and Schill 
(2006), who find that asset growth rates are more important determinants of the 
cross-section of returns than size, B/M and several other measures. Asset growth is 
measured as year-on-year percentage change in total assets. Idiosyncratic volatility as 
a risk factor is under debate regarding whether firm-specific risk is priced in the 
market. The answer is not clear; for instance, whilst Goyal and Santa Clara (2003) 
find a positive relationship between the idiosyncratic component of stock variance 
and the return on the market, Bali, Cakici, Yan and Zhang (2005) argue that this is 
mainly due to small and illiquid stocks, and thus could be related to a liquidity 
premium. On the other hand, Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006) find an inverse 
relationship between idiosyncratic volatility (from the Fama-French three-factor 
model) and stock returns, which is robust to the size, B/M, momentum, volume and 
liquidity effects. The volume factor is motivated by the high-volume premium 
investigated by Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001), who document that stocks 
with unusually high (low) trading volume over a day or a week tend to appreciate 
(depreciate) over the following month.  
 
4.3. Empirical Results 
 
4.3.1. Data 
 
Our main results are obtained with individual stocks from the CRSP dataset, but we 
also use portfolios of stocks for comparison purposes. Our data come from various 
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sources. The data on the portfolios is obtained from Kenneth French’s data library, 
and consists of the 25 portfolios formed on size and B/M (see Fama and French, 
1996), plus 30 industry portfolios, in a total of 55 portfolios. The data covers the 
period from January 1967 to December 2006. This choice of portfolios was 
motivated by Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2007). They argue that it is problematic 
to use only portfolios formed on size and B/M to test asset pricing models, because 
these portfolios will have a tight factor structure by construction, in the sense that the 
two Fama-French factors SMB and HML (or factors which are correlated with them) 
explain nearly all of the time-series variation in the returns on these portfolios. In this 
case, the idiosyncratic component of the model will be very small, and the factors 
will appear to be statistically significant cross-sectionally.  
The data on individual stocks’ returns were obtained from the Center for 
Research in Stock Prices (CRSP) data file from January 1967 to December 2006. 
Aside from the Fama-French factors, the data on all other factors has been obtained 
from Hwang and Lu (2007)40. 
When dealing with individual stocks there is a potential survivorship bias, 
and thus we split our 480-month original sample into 4 smaller subsamples of 120 
months each. In each of these subsamples, we exclude all stocks that have a price 
lower than U$5 in the first month of that subsample, to remove any undesirable 
effect from penny stocks. This approach has some advantages. First, it guarantees 
that a larger number of stocks will be used in each subsample period, whereas if we 
use the whole sample period the number of surviving stocks drops dramatically. 
Second, it partly allows for time-variation in the factor sensitivities of each stock 
across subsamples, and thus could give us some insights about whether some factors 
                                                 
40 We kindly thank Chensheng Lu for providing us with these data. 
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may be selected only during some periods of time. To keep results comparable and 
consistent, we follow the same approach with the portfolios. 
 Table 4-1 displays summary statistics of the factors. From the average 
monthly returns and standard errors reported in Panel A, not all factors have average 
returns significantly different from zero41. The factors with significant average 
returns are the excess market return, with a monthly average return of 0.45% (std. 
error 0.20), liquidity with an average return of -0.51% a month (std. error 0.16), 
HML with an average return of 0.45% a month (std. error 0.13), momentum with an 
average return of 0.81% (std. error 0.19), asset growth with an average return of 
0.37% (std. error 0.13) and long-term reversal with an average return of 0.36% (std. 
error 0.11). 
 In Panel B we display the Spearman correlation matrix of the factors. As 
expected, several of the factors have correlations which are significantly different 
from zero. The highest correlations in absolute value are between SMB and liquidity 
(-0.78), idiosyncratic volatility and downside risk (0.68), excess market return and 
the downside risk factor (-0.67), idiosyncratic volatility and SMB (-0.65), 
idiosyncratic volatility and excess market return (-0.61), HML and asset growth 
(0.60), and HML and downside risk (0.57). Whilst HML and asset growth are both 
factors constructed using the book-to-market value and thus are expected to be 
correlated, the fact that idiosyncratic volatility, for example, is correlated with 
several factors shows that this factor might contain information related to several 
other factors. 
                                                 
41 As Hwang and Lu (2007) explain, although the studies that motivated their factors show that these factors generally have 
significant average returns, this does not necessarily have to be the case, due to differences in the sample period, construction 
method, i.e. use of pre-formation or post-formation returns, and the universe of  stocks considered.  
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4.3.2. Exploratory Analysis of the Factors 
 
The correlations amongst the factors suggest that some factors might be linear 
combinations of other factors. To investigate this issue, we conduct a preliminary 
analysis by regressing each factor on the remaining factors. The results are shown in 
Table 4-2, where each column contains the estimates of the regression of the factor in 
the column on all the other factors. The R2 values show that some factors are well 
explained by other factors. For instance, 88% of the variation in SMB can be 
explained by other factors. The other Fama-French factor, HML, has an R2 of 68% in 
the regression on the other factors, and all factors are significant in explaining it. 
Liquidity also has a high R2 (around 80%), but the significant regressors are fewer. 
As expected from the correlations, idiosyncratic volatility and downside risk are also 
well explained by other factors with high R2s, 79% and 74% respectively.  
The results suggest that many of these factors are redundant and proxies of 
priced risk. Whilst these results suggest a potential for multicollinearity, the SSVS 
procedure is very robust in that regard, since variables with high correlation will 
have low posterior probability of being selected together, unless they do carry 
distinct information.  
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4.3.3. Selection of Asset Pricing Factors 
 
This section reports our main empirical findings. First, we report the results obtained 
using individual stocks, and then we show the results using the portfolios. In the end 
of this section we analyse the robustness of our results. 
 
4.3.3.1. Individual Stocks 
 
The numbers of stocks in each of the four subsamples are 1141, 1146, 2159 and 2787 
respectively, from Jan 1967 to December 2006. We apply our methodology to each 
of these subsamples, in order to obtain inference on which factors should be included 
in a LFM through the posterior distribution of ΰ 42. The results are reported in Table 
4-3. Panels A through D correspond to each of the four subsamples, with marginal 
factor posterior probabilities followed by the three highest posterior probability 
models in each subpanel.  
Considering the four subsample periods, our results provide strong evidence 
that a LFM to explain individual stock returns should contain the market return, the 
SMB and the liquidity factor. We found weak support for the idiosyncratic volatility 
factor, as its posterior probability is considerably high in only one of the subsamples. 
                                                 
42 The estimates of the posterior distribution of ΰ are obtained through the MCMC draws. For example, the marginal posterior 
probability for a factor j is estimated as the proportion of MCMC iterations in which jγ  is one. Likewise, the posterior 
probability of a certain model or combination of factors is estimated as the proportion of MCMC iterations in which the 
corresponding elements of ΰ are equal to one. 
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In most subsamples, there is little model uncertainty, and this is generally related to 
the inclusion of one or two factors. For instance, during the first subsample (from 
January 1967 to December 1976), the highest posterior probability model (with a 
probability of 0.78) includes the excess market return, the SMB and the liquidity 
factors (see Panels A.1 and A.2). The second best model (with a posterior probability 
of only 0.11) includes all these factors, and in addition the idiosyncratic volatility and 
the downside risk factors (thus these two models are selected in around 88.4% of the 
cases during this subsample). In the last two subsamples (Panels C.1-C.2 and D.1-
D.2), the highest probability model is the CAPM. However, in the former it has a 
high posterior probability of 0.78, whilst in the latter it is only 0.38, indicating much 
model uncertainty. As to the inclusion of the intercept term, its posterior probability 
is low in all subsamples. This suggests that, although there is some model 
uncertainty, the highest posterior probability models explain the returns on the stocks 
adequately.  
Although some studies which use portfolios of stocks have found 
idiosyncratic volatility to be priced in the cross-section, our results with individual 
stocks suggest otherwise. It is also interesting that the SMB factor is selected 
together with the liquidity factor, suggesting these factors contain distinct 
information about returns, despite their high correlation. Another striking result is 
that the HML factor, which appears to be ubiquitous in empirical research, has a low 
posterior probability in all subsamples except the last.  
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4.3.3.2. Portfolios of stocks 
 
It is most common for studies to use portfolios of stocks when testing whether a 
particular factor should be included in a LFM. However, as Lewellen, Nagel and 
Shanken (2007) point out, models can be accepted too easily if portfolios are used. 
Although this is most obvious in cross-sectional tests of asset pricing models, it 
would be interesting to see how our results would be affected if portfolios of stocks 
are used, rather than individual stocks. In this subsection we apply our methodology 
to 55 portfolios of stocks, consisting of a set of 25 portfolios formed by sorting on 
size and book-to-market augmented by 30 industry portfolios. We follow the same 
scheme of dividing our original sample from 1967 to 2006 into four non-overlapping 
120-month subsamples, to retain comparability with our results using individual 
stocks.  
The results, reported in Table 4-4, suggest that a model to describe the returns 
on these 55 portfolios should always include the excess market return, the two Fama-
French factors SMB and HML, idiosyncratic volatility and the liquidity factor. There 
is also some evidence for the inclusion of the downside risk factor (which is included 
with high probability in the first and last subsamples, see Panels A.1 and D.1). As 
before, in most cases there is little model uncertainty caused by the inclusion or 
omission of few factors. For instance, in the first subsample (Panel B.1) the two best 
models differ only by the inclusion of the liquidity factor, and in the third subsample 
(Panel C.1) the difference is the inclusion of the idiosyncratic factor. There is more 
uncertainty regarding the inclusion of the intercept term for the portfolios than for the 
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individual stocks. Particularly, in the third subsample the intercept is included with 
certainty, suggesting that during the 1987-1996 period no combination of the factors 
explains these portfolios with high posterior probability. In the first and last 
subsamples, the probability of including the intercept is low (0.163 in the former and 
0.005 in the latter), so during the 1967-1976 and the 1997-2006 periods the best 
models explain the returns on the portfolios.  
The inclusion of the two Fama-French factors is expected, since the set of 
portfolios includes 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. It is interesting 
that the idiosyncratic volatility factor has a high posterior probability for the 
portfolios, but not for individuals stocks. The same can be said about the downside 
risk factor, although it has high posterior probability in only two of the subsamples.  
The fact that the two Fama-French factors SMB and HML are included with 
certainty for the portfolios but not for the individual stocks casts some doubts about 
their inclusion. To investigate this issue, in the next subsection we redo our 
calculations using only data on the industry portfolios.  
 
4.3.3.3. Industry Portfolios 
 
The difference in the results with individual stocks and portfolios indicate that HML 
(and potentially SMB) may have high posterior probabilities because the size and 
book-to-market sorted portfolios are included. In order to investigate the sensitivity 
of the posteriors of SMB and HML to the assets, we redo the calculations using only 
the 30 industry portfolios. As Daniel and Titman (2005) argue, variation in the 
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returns on industry portfolios is less likely to be related to the B/M ratio, and more 
likely to covariate with other sources of risk. Because of that, the results with the 
industry portfolios can also be viewed as a robustness test. 
The results, reported in Table 4-5, show some similarities with those from 
Table 4-4. The idiosyncratic volatility and the downside risk factors are in the same 
subsamples (the idiosyncratic volatility factor is selected in all subsamples except the 
third subsample from 1987 to 1996, and the downside risk factor is selected in the 
first and last subsamples). However, whereas the two Fama-French factors SMB and 
HML had a posterior probability of 1 in all subsamples for the 55 portfolios, the two 
factors do not show consistently high posterior probability for the 30 industry 
portfolios over different subsample periods: the SMB factor is selected in three 
subsamples whilst the HML factor has high posterior probability only in the last 
subsample. For instance, in the third subsample from 1987 to 1996, neither of the 
two factors has a high posterior probability. Indeed, only the excess market return 
has high posterior probability in that subsample, suggesting that the CAPM explains 
the returns on the industry portfolios during this period. Similarly to the results with 
individual stocks, the probability of the inclusion of the intercept is low. 
 These results suggest that the HML factor is necessary to explain the returns 
on the 25 size-B/M portfolios, but is not needed to explain the industry portfolios or 
the individual stocks. However, the size factor SMB is required for both sets of 
portfolios and individual stocks in most subsamples.  
Overall, we conclude that using portfolios to calculate the posterior 
probabilities of possible factors is less desirable than using individual stocks, since 
the probabilities will favour factors related to the sorting variables. This suggests that 
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the data-snooping problems which arise when asset pricing models are tested on 
grouped data, as argued by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin 
(1999) and Berk (2000), also affect the calculation of posterior probabilities in the 
time-series setting.  
 
4.3.4. Robustness  
 
In this subsection we analyse the robustness of our results with regards to the priors 
used for the sensitivities of the assets to the factors. In the results we reported so far, 
the prior variance-covariance matrix of ί% , the vector of regression coefficients, was ( ) 1c −′=0D X X% % % , where the constant c  is equal to 143. This reflects a prior which, 
although centred in zero to reflect lack of knowledge about which factors should be 
included, is to some extent informative, with a relatively small standard deviation.  
We increased the value of c to 10 and 100 to check whether our results are 
affected in a significant way. The prior with c=100 is particularly non-informative by 
increasing the variance-covariance matrix of ί% . The results of the estimation with 
the priors with c=10 and c=100 are reported in Table 4-6 and Table 4-7, respectively. 
The analysis of these results reveals that the factors that are selected are not very 
different from the previously reported ones though as expected, model uncertainty is 
higher for these less informative priors. However, we also notice that the 
idiosyncratic volatility factor is not selected unless we have a stronger prior in favour 
                                                 
43 We could also write the prior for each ί
i
as ( ) 12icσ −′=0,iD X X% % % , where iσ is the idiosyncratic volatility of asset i. We 
opt to include a constant c, and since our results do not change significantly for a wide range of values of c, this would not 
influence our results. 
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of the factor. We also repeated our calculations with a diagonal prior for 0D
% , i.e. 
I∝0D% . The results are similar to the ones reported above.  
 
4.3.5. Summary and Comparison with Previous Studies 
 
There have been several attempts to find out which factors, amongst the several 
available factors, should be included in a linear factor asset pricing model. The 
Bayesian method we use is similar to the one used by Hwang, Satchell and Hall 
(2002) in the context of finding style factors in global stock return models.  
Our study is not easily comparable to studies such as Lehman and Modest 
(1988) and Connor and Korajczyk (1988), which extract the factors from assets’ 
returns through statistical techniques such as factor analysis or principal components, 
because the factors obtained in that way might not be observable and have difficult 
economic interpretation. Also, the approach with macroeconomic variables such as 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) is difficult to compare to ours, because we do not use 
macroeconomic variables. In this study we focus on twelve factors which are 
constructed as mimicking portfolios. We chose not to include macroeconomic 
variables together with these factors because, as argued by Cochrane (2001), models 
with factor-mimicking portfolios are very likely to outperform models with real 
economic factors44. Our results suggest that amongst the two factors proposed by 
Fama and French (1993, 1996), only SMB matters in asset pricing. This is in contrast 
                                                 
44 In tests which we do not report, we included macroeconomic factors in the set of possible factors together with the 12 factors 
we used. The results obtained did not change substantially, with the macroeconomic factors having very low posterior 
probabilities. An alternative approach is to allow only the macroeconomic variables  
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with many studies by Fama and French, who argue that their two factors are priced 
risk factors needed to explain the cross-section of return. Although it could be argued 
that most studies supporting the size and value factors are subject to the data-
snooping bias (Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (1999) and 
Berk (2000)), the presence of these anomalies in the cross-section of returns is very 
strong, even after adjusting for risk with the Fama-French factors, as shown by 
Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), who also find a volume effect which 
they interpret as related to a liquidity premium. In that sense, it is surprising that we 
find low posterior probabilities for HML and momentum, but the finding that the 
liquidity factor is important agrees with their analysis (although it must be noted that 
their approach is cross-sectional and ours is done using the time-series of returns).  
Our finding that liquidity is important is also in agreement with Hwang and 
Lu (2007), who find that a three-factor model with the excess market return, liquidity 
and the coskewness factors explains individual stocks’ returns at least as well as the 
Fama-French factors, and that for most sample periods the excess market return and 
liquidity suffice. Our results, however, do not suggest that coskewness and 
idiosyncratic volatility play a role in describing the time series of stock returns.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
In this work we have investigated the question of which asset pricing factors should 
be used in a LFM. We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we extend a 
method of the statistics literature known as Stochastic Search Variable Selection 
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introduced by George and McCulloch (1993) to a simple multivariate linear 
regression case with N assets. The resulting MCMC algorithm is simple, fast and can 
be applied to data on thousands of stocks. The advantage over traditional Bayesian 
analysis is that we do not need to calculate the posterior probabilities of all models of 
different sizes, which can be a daunting task since the number of possible factors is 
large and growing, and the number of possible models grows exponentially with the 
number of factors. Instead the procedure automatically focuses on the more 
promising models with higher posterior probabilities.  
 Second, we use a more comprehensive set of factors than other studies. Most 
studies consider either macroeconomic factors or factors derived through statistical 
techniques such as principal components and factor analysis, whereas we consider 
twelve factor-mimicking portfolios based on risk and firm characteristics, which 
previous studies suggest are related to several possible sources of risk or empirical 
irregularities. 
 Third, we calculate the posterior probabilities of models and factors using 
thousands of individual stocks. This avoids the potential for data-snooping biases 
which arises when the portfolios and the factors are based on the same firm 
characteristics, as argued by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin 
(1999) and Berk (2000). 
 We found strong evidence that a LFM to explain stocks returns should 
include the excess market return, the SMB and the liquidity factors. We found weak 
evidence that the HML and idiosyncratic volatility factors matter for individual 
stocks. Interestingly, over the period from 1987 to 1996, we found that the simple 
CAPM explains stock returns with high posterior probability. Our results using 
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portfolios of stocks differ significantly and suggest caution regarding which factors 
and portfolios are used. When we use a set of 30 industry portfolios that does not 
include portfolios formed on size and book-to-market, the posterior probability of the 
SMB factor remains high, but the HML factor has a low posterior probability. 
Moreover, these results provide stronger evidence that idiosyncratic volatility 
matters, and moderate evidence that liquidity and the downside risk factors are 
important. However, the famous HML factor does not matter. 
 
4.5. Appendix: Detailed Explanation of Prior and Posterior 
Distributions 
 
Our model can be written in the following form: 
 ΰr = Xί + e%%% % , (3.32) 
where [ ]′1 2 Nr = r r r% K , ⊗ NX = X Ι% , =ΰί ί ΰ% %฀ , where ฀ denotes the element-by-
element multiplication and ( )1, , Kγ γ=ΰ K  is the binary indicator variable for the 
inclusion of each of the K  factors, and ( )′′ ′ ′1 2 Ne = e e e% L . The collected vector of 
error terms ( ),N ⊗ Te 0 Σ Ι% ฀ , with Σ  a diagonal matrix such that 
each ( )2, iN σi Te 0 Ι฀ . Thus Σ is completely determined by ( )1, , Nσ σ=σ% K . 
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4.5.1. Prior Distributions 
 
The parameters of the model are ( )1, , Kγ γί,ΰ =% K  and , 1, ,i i Nσ = K . We follow 
Kuo and Mallick (1998) and choose priors for ί, ΰ%  and , 1, ,i i Nσ = K  independently, 
with ( ),N 0 0ί ί D% % %฀ , ( )1, , 1, ,j jB p j Kγ =฀ K  and ( )2, 2i IGσ α η฀ , for 
1, ,i N= K . The parameters of the priors are chosen to reflect our lack of knowledge 
about ΰ , i.e. about which factors should be included in model.  
For ί% we choose a prior centred in a vector of zeros, to reflect our lack of 
knowledge about which factors should enter the model. The prior variance-
covariance matrix of ί%  can be chosen in several ways. One of the ways is choosing 
c=
0
D I% . This choice of prior reflects an a priori belief on independence of the 
regression coefficients, and also a large variance (relative to the OLS one) so that this 
prior is not very informative when c is large. The other specification consists of 
choosing ( ) 1c −′ ′=0D X X% % % , which makes the prior covariance structure equal to the 
design covariance structure, as suggested by Zellner (1971). The parameter c can be 
varied to quantify the degree of prior uncertainty about the coefficients. Our main 
results are reported for 10c = , and we also use 100c =  to study the robustness of the 
results to the prior.  
For the prior of jp , the probability that factor j  is included in the model, we 
choose an equal probability of ½ for all factors and also for the intercept. This prior 
reflects the lack of knowledge about the inclusion of the factors, and implies that any 
model, regardless of its size, has an equal prior probability of 1 2K . 
  
 166
For , 1, ,i i Nσ = K  we chose improper priors with 0α η= = .  
 
4.5.2. Gibbs Sampling Scheme 
 
The main interest in this model is the posterior density ( )|P ΰ r% . To do this, we use a 
Gibbs sampling approach. We start with initial values 0 0 0ί , ΰ ,Σ% , and then sample 
from conditional densities to generate values 1 1 1ί , ΰ ,Σ% . Similarly to Kuo and 
Mallick (1998), we initialise 0ί%  and 0Σ  with the individual-assets OLS estimators 
for the full model, and ( )11 1=0ΰ L . The conditional densities we use are as follows. 
 
4.5.2.1. Conditional Density of ί%  given ΰ,Σ,r%  
 
First, denote by 
j
x  the j-th column of X , then let ⊗* * NX = X Ι% , where [ ]1 2 Kγ γ γ=* 1 2 KX x x xL . Then the conditional density of ί%  given ΰ,Σ,r%  is ( )N 1 1ί , D% , where the posterior mean ( )( )( )*′ ′= + +-1 * -1 -1 * -11 0 0 0ί D X Σ X D ί X Σ r% %% % % %  and 
the posterior variance-covariance matrix ( )( )′= +-1 * -1 *1 0D D X Σ X% % . 
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4.5.2.2. Conditional Density of jγ  given ,-jΰ ί,Σ,r% %  
 
Let ( )1 1 1j j j Kγ γ γ γ− − +=ΰ L L  respresent the vector of binary indicator variables 
with the j -th entry removed. Then the conditional probability distribution of jγ  
given 
-j
ΰ ,ί,Σ,r% %  is ( )*1, jB p , with ( )*j j j jp c c d= + , where 
 ( )( ) ( )( )1exp
2
j jc p
⎡ ⎤′= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦* -1 *j jr - X ί ΰ Σ r - X ί ΰ% %% %% %฀ ฀ , (3.33) 
and 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )11 exp
2
j jd p
⎡ ⎤′= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦** -1 **j jr - X ί ΰ Σ r - X ί ΰ% %% %% %฀ ฀ . (3.34) 
In the expressions above, *
j
ΰ represents the vector ΰ  with the j -th entry replaced by 
1, and likewise **
j
ΰ represents the vector ΰ  with the j -th entry replaced by 0. 
Expressions (3.33) and (3.34) can be simplified in the following way. First, we note 
that 
 ( ) ( )( )( )
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
*
*
1 j
1 j
**
2 j2 j*
j
*
*
N j
N j
X ί ΰί ΰX 0 0
X ί ΰί ΰ0 X 0
X ί ΰ
ί ΰ0 0 X X ί ΰ
฀฀L
฀฀L%% ฀ MM M O M M
฀L ฀
. (3.35) 
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Let 1QF  denote the quadratic form in equation (3.33). Then we can rewrite it as 
 
( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
1
2
1
2
2
2
0 0
0
0 0 N
N
QF
σ σ
σ
−
−
−
′= =′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦− −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
* -1 *
j j
* *
1 1 j 1 1 j
T
* *
2 2 j 2 2 jT
* *T
N j N N j
r - X ί ΰ Σ r - X ί ΰ
r X ί ΰ r X ί ΰΙ
r X ί ΰ r X ί ΰΙ
Ι
X ί ΰ r X ί ΰ
% %% %% %฀ ฀
% %฀ ฀L
% %฀ ฀M L
M M O MM M
L% %฀ ฀r
 
 ( ) ( )1 2
1
1N
i i
QF σ= ′= −∑ * *i i j i i jr Xί ΰ r - Xί ΰ฀ ฀ , (3.36) 
so 1QF  can be calculated as the sum of the residuals for each asset, weighted by the 
reciprocal of their variances, when variable j  is included in the regression. 
Likewise, we have 
 ( ) ( )2 2
1
1N
i i
QF σ= ′=∑ ** **i i j i i jr - Xί ΰ r - Xί ΰ฀ ฀ , (3.37) 
the sum of the residuals for each asset, weighted by the reciprocal of their variances, 
when variable j is not included in the regression. Using (3.36) and (3.37), we can 
rewrite *jp  as 
 ( )( )11 20.5* 0.5 0.51 QFjj QF QFj jp ep p e p e−− −= + − . (3.38) 
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The expression above, although analytically correct, can present some problems 
during implementation, since 1QF  and 2QF  can be quite large numbers. To avoid this 
computational nuisance, we take the inverse of *jp twice and get 
 
( )( ) ( )1 2 2 1
1
1 10.5 0.5
0.5*
0.5
1 1
1
QF QF
j j j QF QF
j QF
j j
p e p e p
p e
p e p
− −− − − −−
⎛ ⎞+ − ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟= = +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ . (3.39) 
With equation (3.39), the elements of ΰ  can be simulated from a binomial 
distribution ( )*1, jB p  one at a time, preferably in random order. 
 
4.5.2.3. Conditional Density of Σ  given ΰ,ί, r% %  
 
The matrix Σ  is completely determined by the volatilities of the error terms of each 
asset. Given the priors ( )2, 2i IGσ α η฀ , for 1, ,i N= K , the conditional densities 
of iσ , given ί, ΰ, r% % are ( ) ( )2,2IG α η η⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟′+⎝ ⎠i i i ir - Xί ΰ r - Xί ΰ฀ ฀  .  
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Table 4-1 Summary statistics of candidate factors 
Our data covers the period from January 1967 to December 2005. The excess market return, (the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms from CRSP 
minus the one-month Treasury bill rate), the Fama and French factors SMB and HML, the momentum factor (Mom.) and the Long-term reversal factor (Rever.) are taken 
from Professor Kenneth French’s Data Library. The data on the Liquidity, Coskewness, Cokurtosis, Downside-risk, Idiosyncratic Volatility and Volume factors are the same 
from and have been kindly provided by Hwang and Lu (2007). We report average returns and standard errors of the candidate factors on Panel A. Values in bold are 
significantly different from zero. Panel B reports the Spearman’s rank correlation matrix.  Bold values are significantly different from zero at 5% significance level.  
 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 Market SMB HML Momentum 
Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume 
Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis 
Downside 
Risk 
Average 0.448 0.247 0.448 0.812 0.366 0.294 -0.042 0.356 -0.514 0.175 0.182 0.006 
Std error 0.202 0.149 0.134 0.185 0.132 0.281 0.091 0.113 0.157 0.116 0.130 0.224 
             
Panel B. Spearman’s rank correlations 
 Market SMB HML Momentum 
Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume 
Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis 
Downside 
Risk 
Market 1.00            
SMB 0.29 1.00           
HML -0.40 -0.22 1.00          
Momentum -0.05 0.00 -0.09 1.00         
Asset Growth -0.41 -0.17 0.60 0.05  1.00        
Idiosyn.Volat. -0.61 -0.65 0.47 -0.02  0.43 1.00       
Volume -0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.03  0.00 0.06 1.00      
Long-term -0.12 0.15 0.39 -0.03  0.35 0.06 0.02 1.00     
Liquidity 0.09 -0.78 -0.12 -0.09 -0.14 0.32 -0.01 -0.21 1.00    
Coskewness 0.28 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.14 -0.23 -0.06 -0.12 0.02 1.00   
Cokurtosis -0.31 0.06 0.33 0.17  0.28 0.18 0.04  0.13 -0.27 -0.21 1.00  
Down. Risk -0.67 -0.28 0.57 -0.12  0.50 0.68 0.05  0.25 -0.06 -0.24 0.35 1 
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Table 4-2 Exploratory Analysis of the Factors Using OLS 
Our data covers the period from January 1967 to December 2006. The excess market return, (the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms from CRSP 
minus the one-month Treasury bill rate), the Fama and French factors SMB and HML, the momentum factor and the Long-term reversal factor are taken from Professor 
Kenneth French’s Data Library. The data on the Liquidity, Coskewness, Cokurtosis, Downside-risk, Idiosyncratic Volatility and Volume factors are the same from and have 
been kindly provided by Hwang and Lu (2007). Each column of the table reports the results of the regression of a factor into a constant and all the remaining factors. The table 
shows the regression coefficients, with bold values representing significance at the 5% significance level.  
 
 Market SMB HML Momentum. Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn.  
Volatility 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
constant 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
Market  0.097 0.074 -0.033 -0.009 -0.113 -0.021 0.012 0.150 0.048 -0.001 -0.220 
SMB 0.702  -0.459 -0.456 -0.157 -0.976 0.154 0.405 -1.044 -0.079 0.094 0.196 
HML 0.260 -0.221  -0.549 0.381 0.254 0.118 0.396 -0.293 0.268 0.214 0.197 
Momentum -0.024 -0.045 -0.113  0.088 0.040 0.000 0.026 -0.063 -0.044 0.149 -0.129 
Asset Growth -0.023 -0.053 0.271 0.303  0.098 -0.029 0.087 -0.098 -0.054 0.013 0.159 
Idiosyn.Volatility -0.141 -0.168 0.091 0.070 0.049  0.027 -0.072 -0.032 -0.052 -0.006 0.429 
Volume -0.054 0.054 0.086 -0.001 -0.030 0.054  -0.064 0.050 -0.044 0.021 0.020 
Long-term rev. 0.029 0.133 0.270 0.088 0.084 -0.138 -0.060  0.081 -0.126 -0.069 0.200 
Liquidity 0.689 -0.658 -0.385 -0.400 -0.181 -0.119 0.091 0.156  -0.066 -0.138 -0.029 
Coskewness 0.095 -0.021 0.152 -0.120 -0.043 -0.083 -0.035 -0.105 -0.029  -0.231 -0.179 
Cokurtosis -0.001 0.025 0.117 0.394 0.010 -0.010 0.016 -0.055 -0.057 -0.223  0.197 
Downside Risk -0.340 0.042 0.087 -0.277 0.099 0.529 0.012 0.130 -0.010 -0.140 0.159  
R2 0.509 0.876 0.683 0.184 0.538 0.798 0.034 0.342 0.823 0.245 0.377 0.742 
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Table 4-3 Marginal posterior probabilities of factors and model posterior probability for individual stocks 
Our data covers the period from January 1967 to December 2005. We divide it into four subsamples of 120 months each and apply our extension of the Stochastic Search Variable 
Selection Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm of Kuo and Mallick (1998) to all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms from CRSP. We exclude firms whose sizes are smaller than 
the 5th percentile of the whole NYSE universe at the beginning of each subsample and stocks with price inferior to U$5. We calculate marginal posterior probabilities of each factor 
as the mean of the latent variable corresponding to the factor. We also report the three models with highest posterior probabilities. Panels A and B report the marginal posterior 
probabilities of factors and the highest posterior probability models, respectively, with each subsample identified by a number following the panel letter.  
Panel A.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1967-1976, number of stocks = 1141  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 1.000 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.222 0.001 0.005 1.000 0.001 0.001 0.115  
              
Panel A.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1967-1976, number of stocks = 1141  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.778 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.106 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.106 
              
Panel B.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1977-1986, number of stocks = 1146  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 1.000 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.696 0.000 0.001 1.000 0.001 0.001 0.031  
              
Panel B.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1967-1976, number of stocks = 1141  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.664 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.304 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.025 
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Table 4-3 (continued) 
Panel C.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1987-1996, number of stocks = 2159  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 0.216 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.017 0.001 0.003 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.002  
              
Panel C.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1987-1996, number of stocks = 2159  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.783 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.196 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.014 
              
Panel D.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1997-2006, number of stocks = 2787  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.000 1.000 0.576 0.625 0.002 0.019 0.376 0.001 0.002 0.556 0.004 0.016 0.067  
              
Panel D.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1997-2006, number of stocks = 2787  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.375 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.309 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.180 
 
  
 174
Table 4-4 Marginal posterior probabilities of candidate factors and model posterior probabilities for 55 portfolios  
Our data covers the period from January 1967 to December 2005. The data on all portfolios have been obtained from Kenneth French’s website. The portfolios used are the 25 
portfolios formed on market equity and book-to-market plus 30 industry portfolios. We divide our sample into 4 subsamples of 120 months each and apply our extension of the 
Stochastic Search Variable Selection Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm of Kuo and Mallick (1998) to the portfolios. The prior probability of inclusion of each factor is 0.5. Our 
results are based on 10000 iterations. We calculate marginal posterior probabilities of each factor as the mean of the latent variable corresponding to the factor. Panels A and B report 
the marginal posterior probabilities of factors and the highest posterior probability models, respectively, with each subsample identified by a number following the panel letter. 
Panel A.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1967-1976  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.163 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.002 0.031 1.000 0.001 0.028 0.651 0.006 0.005 1.000  
              
Panel A.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1967-1976  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.496 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.340 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.118 
              
Panel B.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1977-1986, number of stocks = 1146  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 1.000 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.696 0.000 0.001 1.000 0.001 0.001 0.031  
              
Panel B.2 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1977-1986  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.817 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.161 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.008 
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Table 4-4 (continued) 
 
Panel C.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1987-1996  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.409 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.002 0.026 0.481 0.002 0.058 1.000 0.013 0.002 0.055  
              
Panel C.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1987-1996, number of stocks = 2159  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.406 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.229 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.176 
              
Panel D.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1997-2006  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.005 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.015 0.619 1.000 0.002 0.015 1.000 0.012 0.164 1.000  
              
Panel D.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1997-2006, number of stocks = 2787  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.456 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.379 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.139 
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Table 4-5 Marginal posterior probabilities of candidate factors and model posterior probabilities for 30 industry portfolios 
Our data covers the period from January 1967 to December 2005. The data on all portfolios have been obtained from Kenneth French’s website. The portfolios used are 30 industry 
portfolios. We divide our sample into 4 subsamples of 120 months each and apply our extension of the Stochastic Search Variable Selection Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm of 
Kuo and Mallick (1998) to the portfolios. The prior probability of inclusion of each factor is 0.5. Our results are based on 10000 iterations. We calculate marginal posterior 
probabilities of each factor as the mean of the latent variable corresponding to the factor. Panels A and B report the marginal posterior probabilities of factors and the highest 
posterior probability models, respectively, with each subsample identified by a number following the panel letter. 
Panel A.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1967-1976  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.092 1.000 1.000 0.399 0.003 0.019 0.913 0.000 0.022 0.197 0.001 0.006 0.756  
              
Panel A.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1967-1976  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.322 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.157 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.109 
              
Panel B.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1977-1986, number of stocks = 1146  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.441 1.000 1.000 0.315 0.023 0.003 1.000 0.003 0.009 0.711 0.015 0.003 0.119  
              
Panel B.2 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1977-1986  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.295 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.179 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.136 
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Table 4-5 (continued) 
Panel C.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1987-1996  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.034 1.000 0.365 0.255 0.005 0.045 0.266 0.002 0.128 0.153 0.006 0.007 0.020  
              
Panel C.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1987-1996, number of stocks = 2159  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.519 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.073 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.063 
              
Panel D.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1997-2006  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.056 1.000 0.859 1.000 0.026 0.057 0.918 0.001 0.005 0.849 0.032 0.434 1.000  
              
Panel D.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1997-2006, number of stocks = 2787  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.351 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.318 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.132 
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Table 4-6 Marginal posterior probabilities of factors and model posterior probability for individual stocks (c = 10) 
Our data covers the period from January 1967 to December 2005. We divide it into four subsamples of 120 months each and apply our extension of the Stochastic Search Variable 
Selection Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm of Kuo and Mallick (1998) to all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms from CRSP. We exclude firms whose sizes are smaller than 
the 5%-tile of the whole NYSE universe at the beginning of each subsample. We also exclude stocks with price inferior to U$5. The prior probability of inclusion of each factor is 
0.5. Our results are based on 10000 MCMC iterations. We calculate marginal posterior probabilities of each factor as the mean of the latent variable corresponding to the factor. We 
also report the three models with highest posterior probabilities. Panels A and B report the marginal posterior probabilities of factors and the highest posterior probability models, 
respectively, with each subsample identified by a number following the panel letter. 
Panel A.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1967-1976, number of stocks = 1141  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 0.899 0.013 0.001 0.002 0.293 0.001 0.002 0.653 0.003 0.001 0.029  
              
Panel A.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1967-1976, number of stocks = 1141  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.414 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.209 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.192 
              
Panel B.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1977-1986, number of stocks = 1146  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 1.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.221 0.001 0.001 1.000 0.003 0.000 0.091  
              
Panel B.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1967-1976, number of stocks = 1141  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.726 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.183 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.053 
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Table 4-6 (continued) 
Panel C.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1987-1996  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 0.260 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.031 0.000 0.001 0.262 0.001 0.001 0.004  
              
Panel C.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1987-1996, number of stocks = 2159  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.736 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.227 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.025 
              
Panel D.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1997-2006  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 0.626 0.526 0.006 0.026 0.699 0.001 0.000 0.608 0.007 0.013 0.071  
              
Panel D.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1997-2006, number of stocks = 2787  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.283 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.223 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.126 
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Table 4-7 Marginal posterior probabilities of factors and model posterior probability for individual stocks (c = 100) 
Our data covers the period from January 1967 to December 2005. We divide it into four subsamples of 120 months each and apply our extension of the Stochastic Search Variable 
Selection Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm of Kuo and Mallick (1998) to all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms from CRSP. We exclude firms whose sizes are smaller than 
the 5%-tile of the whole NYSE universe at the beginning of each subsample. We also exclude stocks with price inferior to U$5. The prior probability of inclusion of each factor is 
0.5. Our results are based on 10000 MCMC iterations. We calculate marginal posterior probabilities of each factor as the mean of the latent variable corresponding to the factor. We 
also report the three models with highest posterior probabilities. Panels A and B report the marginal posterior probabilities of factors and the highest posterior probability models, 
respectively, with each subsample identified by a number following the panel letter. 
Panel A.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1967-1976, number of stocks = 1141  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.000 1.000 0.735 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.229 0.000 0.008 0.641 0.000 0.001 0.175  
              
Panel A.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1967-1976, number of stocks = 1141  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.378 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.244 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.129 
              
Panel B.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1977-1986, number of stocks = 1146  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 0.834 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.282 0.000 0.002 0.831 0.003 0.000 0.159  
              
Panel A.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1967-1976, number of stocks = 1141  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.435 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.237 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.166 
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Table 4-7 (continued) 
Panel C.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1987-1996  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.000 1.000 0.291 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.026 0.001 0.002 0.289 0.002 0.001 0.004  
              
Panel C.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1987-1996, number of stocks = 2159  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.708 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.262 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.017 
              
Panel D.1 Marginal posterior probabilities of the inclusion of each factor, sample period 1997-2006  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
 
0.001 1.000 0.458 0.200 0.002 0.025 0.330 0.000 0.001 0.443 0.009 0.018 0.044  
              
Panel D.2 Ten highest posterior probability models, sample period 1997-2006, number of stocks = 2787  
Intercept Market SMB HML Momentum Asset 
Growth 
Idiosyn. 
Volat. 
Volume Long-term 
reversal 
Liquidity Coskewness Cokurtosis Downside 
Risk 
Posterior 
probability 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.481 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.135 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.118 
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